Andrew Sarris and Pauline Kael: the Duel For the Soul of American Film Criticism by Fossen, Inge
1 
1 
 
 
 
Andrew Sarris and Pauline Kael:  
The Duel For the Soul of American Film Criticism 
 
 
 
 
By Inge Fossen 
Høgskolen i Lillehammer /  
Lillehammer University College 
 
Avdeling for TV-utdanning og Filmvitenskap / 
Department of Television and Film Studies (TVF) 
Spring 2009 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
2 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
For My Parents 
 
3 
3 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
”When we think about art and how it is thought about […] we refer both to the practice of art and 
the deliberations of criticism.” 
―Charles Harrison & Paul Wood 
 
“[H]abits of liking and disliking are lodged in the mind.” 
 
―Bernard Berenson 
 
“The motion picture is unique […] it is the one medium of expression where America has 
influenced the rest of the world” 
 
―Iris Barry 
 
“[I]f you want to practice something that isn’t a mass art, heaven knows there are plenty of other 
ways of expressing yourself.”  
―Jean Renoir  
 
“If it's all in the script, why shoot the film?” 
―Nicholas Ray 
 
“Author + Subject = Work” 
―Andrè Bazin 
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Preface and Acknowledgements 
 
A while back, my undertaking to write this thesis seemed permanently stalled. I am grateful to my 
supervisor Søren Birkvad, who essentially gave me the same advice that Andrew Sarris had been 
given by his editor while he was writing his last book: “One can never finish. One can only stop.” 
The twin subject of Andrew Sarris and Pauline Kael had been in the back of mind long before I put 
pen to paper. In my late teens, I saved up to buy a Laserdisc-player. (It is a nostalgic reminder of 
my advanced years that I came of age cinematically in an era before DVD, VOD and High 
Definition.) My friends and I would devour the films of the New Hollywood filmmakers and 
discuss performances, sequences, camera placement, and themes.  I guess in some ways I owe this 
thesis to Ole Jacob Rosten, Jarle Øverland and Trond Ola Wiigen, with whom I have shared so 
many movies and discussed so many stylistic epiphanies—to use a phrase Sarris is fond of. 
      I can still remember vividly the elation I felt the first time I saw Mean Streets, in a 
widescreen Laserdisc transfer. I did not realize it at the time, but my friends and I were actually 
applying Sarris’s critical methods to the films Kael adored and fought for. Not only that, we were 
responding to what she saw as the particular greatness of movies. As a freshman, I discovered not 
only the writings of Sarris and Kael, but also fell in love with the old Hollywood movies to which 
Sarris has dedicated his career. The rest, as the saying goes, is history. 
      Many people have shaped this thesis in profound ways. I would like to thank Kristin 
Sandvik for going above and beyond the call of duty to get the source material I needed, or in some 
cases, simply thought I needed. I also extend my heartfelt thanks to Geir Neverdal and Kari 
Bjølgerud Hansen, without whom I could have never written a text of this magnitude and 
complexity in what is for me a second language. Thanking your therapist strikes me as a uniquely 
American thing to do, but since this is a thesis about American film criticism, it seems appropriate. 
So, thank you, Hilde Johanne Aafoss. Our discussions of everything in my life during the past few 
years (including this thesis) have been an inspirational factor in simply getting the thing done. On  a 
similar  note, I also thank my brother Roald Fossen for technical assistance when it seemed my 
computer was about to give in. Ane Faugstad Aarø and David M. Smith have served me well as 
proof-readers.  
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     My friend and fellow student Håvard Berstad has read the manuscript throughout and has 
been unstinting with his perceptive comments. I should go on record to thank Pauline Ann Hoath at 
the University of Bergen for her insights on pop art and the cultural climate in the 1960s.  
 Most of all, I would like to thank Stèfan Snævarr. Although his direct involvement in this project 
has been less than nominal, his intellectual keenness and unwavering generosity have influenced it 
in more ways than I can remember, much less mention. You have all made this work possible. Its 
faults are  of course entirely my own doing. 
Inge Fossen, April 2009, Uppsala 
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Andrew Sarris and Pauline Kael: Analogies and Contrasts in 
the Duel  for the Soul of American Film Criticism 
 
Introduction  
 
 
In his book, The Function of Criticism (1984), Terry Eagleton makes the following 
statement, which I find rather depressing because substantially true: 
 
[C]riticism today lacks all substantive social function. It is either part of the public relations branch of the 
literary industry, or a matter wholly internal to the academies. […] The contradiction in which criticism finally 
runs aground is one between inchoate amateurism and socially marginal professionalism.1 
 
It would not be unfair to say that this polarisation of criticism has become increasingly pronounced 
in writing about film—even more so than in writing about literature. On the one hand, there are 
those instantly quotable, nearly subliterate exclamation blurbs (the WOW being the extreme, but far 
from unheard-of case) by more or less nondescript general interest reviewers diffused through the 
various and ever-expanding channels of mass media that serve merely to prop up massive ad 
campaigns.2 At the other extreme are the various branches of scholarly criticism, laden with highly 
specialized jargon and totally unconcerned with issues of artistic merit.  
The latter has been the case in most of what is usually labelled film theory since the mid-
sixties. At present, a somewhat similar trend is making itself strongly felt in the field of academic 
film history, which is becoming less concerned with detailing the genesis of masterpieces, seminal 
turning points of the medium and other canon-related questions, shifting instead to more holistic and 
empirical approach—no doubt to bring film history closer in line with other branches of hyphenate 
history like social and cultural history, which are older and more prestigious disciplines. I believe 
                                                 
1
  Terry Eagleton (1984) The Function of Criticism: From The Spectator to Post-Structuralism London: Verso 
Books. p.7ff 
 
2
  The internet and the spread of blogging may also be the ultimate step towards making film criticism 
democratic in the banal sense of being a “free for all” genre for the millions who have access. This development also 
raises disconcerting questions of editorial responsibility, which, admittedly, are more pressing in other areas of  
journalism.  
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the very broad distinctions outlined above to be, on the whole, a quite adequate summary of the 
present situation.         
Sceptical and historically-minded readers may object to my thinly-veiled implication that 
film theory and film history are concomitant with criticism, or even special branches of criticism at 
large. I stand by this implication, which cannot be entirely original, since it is also present in the 
quotation from Terry Eagleton presented in the opening paragraph of this thesis. 
     Regarding film history, it is my firm conviction that the only truly relevant difference 
between aesthetic film history and film criticism is that the historian by definition has to deal with 
the tension between change and stasis over time, whereas the mere critic may potentially disregard 
the temporal aspect. Still, this a minority view, and for practical purposes I shall modify it 
somewhat. It is expedient for analytical purposes to distinguish between critical film  historyy and 
empirical or contextual film  history, and I shall do so in this thesis. I shall give a much fuller 
account of the relationship between film history and film criticism in my examination of our 
protagonists’ sharply divergent efforts as film historians. 
     Returning to Eagleton's lament and taking it at face value, I wish to compare two film 
critics, Andrew Sarris and Pauline Kael, whose bodies of work are neither socially marginal nor 
amateurish. On the contrary, I believe these two to be socially substantial as well as aesthetically 
significant. While Susan Sontag should probably be regarded as prima inter pares among American 
critics and cultural commentators in the second half of 20th century, Sarris and Kael belong in her 
company, at least, as distinctive critical essayists and accomplished belletrists. Unlike Sontag, 
however, they must be counted as “dedicated no bones about it film critics.”3 They broke into print 
at a very pregnant moment in the mid-fifties, a decade or so before the rising tide irrevocably broke 
the dam of resistance against film scholarship in America. 
       In that cultural climate, film critics and reviewers working the journalistic beat in general 
interest magazines and specialized, almost underground film magazines could, if they were smart 
enough and bullish enough and witty enough, become instrumental in defining film as an academic 
field that exploded in the culturally volatile sixties—and matter to moviegoers at the same time. 
Sarris put it like this when he looked back on the sixties from the vantage point of 1973:  
 
                                                 
3
 Francis Davies (2002) Afterglow: A Last Conversation with Pauline Kael. New York: DaCapo Press. p.62. 
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While my debate with Pauline Kael in Film Quarterly attracted a great deal of attention as a squabble between 
two schools of thought, it served also to propel two obscure polemicists from the little magazine backwaters 
into the mainstream of the critical establishment.4 
 
It is worth belabouring at this juncture that Andrew Sarris and Pauline Kael are journalists first and 
foremost. Notwithstanding the considerable amount of important interpretive news reporting, the 
perceptive reader may counter by stressing that the journalistic ideal is embodied in our collective 
psyche as the newshounds who simply follow and report the breaking news, without any literary or 
rhetorical pretensions. I hereby submit that Sarris and Kael, by virtue of their work as film critics, 
primarily belong to cultural journalism.  
    According to Norwegian media scholar Martin Eide, the fabled newshound is the 
journalistic ideal type: a reporter who does not see himself as someone actively engaged in the 
construction of narratives and the production of ideology.5 If one requires an example of this ideal, 
the nominally emancipated comic book character Lois Lane strikes me as its purest distillation 
imaginable in fiction, though we encounter them (the real ones) several times a day on CNN.  It is 
my contention that the conscious construction of narratives and the production of ideology is exactly 
what the cultural journalist or critic, as opposed to the news reporter, is engaged in. When Sarris 
returned from a life-changing spell in Paris, he returned, by his own admission, with “a foreign 
ideology”: 
 
As I remember that fateful year in Paris, deliriously prolonged conversations at sidewalk cafes still assault my 
ears with what in Paris passed for profundity and in New York for peculiarity. I have never really recovered 
from the Parisian heresy (in New York eyes) concerning the sacred importance of the cinema. Hence I returned 
to New York not merely a cultist but a cultist with a foreign ideology.6 
 
Pauline Kael's criticism, reflecting her complex attitudes about the tension between trash and art, is 
of course no less ideological for being indigenously American and for revolving around a 
countercultural understanding of Art and Pop. I ought to move swiftly to dispel any lingering 
suspicions that the mere mention of the word ideology entails a dour Marxist exposé of American 
film criticism’s false consciousness. Far from it. I feel the need to point this out, since Western 
                                                 
4
   Andrew Sarris (1978) Politics and Cinema. New York: University of Columbia Press p. 188. 
5
  Martin Eide (1991) Nyhetens Interesse-Nyhetsjournalistikk  Mellom Tekst og Kontekst. Oslo: 
Universitetsforlaget. p. 10.  
6
 Andrew Sarris (1970) Confessions of a Cultist: On the Cinema 1955/1969. New York. Simon & Schuster. p. 
13. 
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Marxists of different stripes (but of the same colour) have all but monopolized this term in 
academic discourse.  Therefore, I shall, with some hesitation, propose the replacement of Eide’s 
rather tainted word ideology—which has a downright sinister ring due to the cataclysmic events of 
the 20th century that were perpetrated in its name—with the more neutral, or even positive word 
ideas. What does this mean? It simply means that criticism, understood as cultural journalism, is as 
dependent on a personal voice and opinions and reflections as on newsworthy events.  
      Two eminent historians who have written extensively on the American press, Michael and 
Edwin Emery, define journalism in the foreword of their seminal book, The Press and America: An 
Interpretive History of the Mass Media, in a concise way that seems especially poignant when 
connected to the work of Sarris and Kael and their shared place in the stream of the history of film 
criticism. “Journalism history is the story of humanity’s long struggle to communicate, to discover 
and interpret news and to offer intelligent opinion in the marketplace of ideas.”7 Since the end of the 
nineteenth century, when films first appeared, the latest releases in cinemas worldwide have been 
considered newsworthy, and the reviews we encounter routinely, in the popular press and 
specialized film magazines alike, typically lay claim to news-value of some sort or another.8  Film 
critics, who, as opposed to mere reporters, would offer their “opinions in the marketplace of ideas”, 
did not however really proliferate until the 1950s onwards—even if the battle to elevate film as such 
from novelty entertainment to art had been fought (and in a restricted sense, won) in the twenties 
while the movies still were silent. It is, however, fair to say that Sarris and Kael would move quite a 
bit beyond their predecessors by popularizing the notion of movies as art.9 
     It could be argued with conviction that what may be designated the Sarris-Kael feud over the 
auteur theory is the only substantial polemical debate about film carried out by journalistic critics in 
America. Cultural historian Raymond J. Haberski Jr. has called their much publicised feud “the duel 
for the soul of American film criticism.”10 
     Like Addison DeWitt, a critic who declared himself central to the theatre in Joseph 
Mankiewicz’ All About Eve (1950), Sarris and Kael wielded their power as tastemakers in a way 
that affected the course of (American) film and how we think and talk about it. 
                                                 
7
  Michael Emery & Edwin Emery (1988)  The Press and America: An Interpretive History of the Mass Media. 
Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall Publishers. 6th Edition. p.v.   
8
  Exemplified, for instance, by Kael’s capsule reviews in the pages of the “On the Town” section in the New 
Yorker throughout her tenure at the magazine. These capsules were collected in book form and published as 5001 
Nights at the Movies. Boston: Owl Books. 
9
 .Raymond J. Haberski Jr. It's Only a Movie: Films and Critics in American Culture.  Kentucky: Kentucky 
University Press. p. 124. 
10
 Ibid. p. 122-143. 
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  Sarris still stands as the auteur critic par excellence in America and is often credited with 
adopting the French La Politique des Auteurs and translating it for an Anglophone public by 
coining the much-used and abused term auteur theory.11   His counterpart Pauline Kael was a 
fiercely combative and roving intellectual propelled to fame by attacking other critics and scholars. 
She was also a great populist in the American tradition. While Sarris pioneered the use of European 
concepts to discuss American genre films and European and Asian art films on an equal aesthetic 
footing, Kael preferred to make use of a quintessentially American pragmatism to deflate 
pretension. 
     In the sixties, Sarris and Kael both defended the vitality of American films, at a time when 
foreign films (i.e. European and Japanese) were probably regarded, relatively speaking, as more 
intellectually chic than they are today. 
   Like no other critic, Kael pointed out and forcefully brought home the point that the 
immediately gratifying sensuousness of the popular and the trashy (to use one of her favourite 
critical terms) in movies is integral to their aesthetic appeal and their claim to art status.  She 
conveyed this beautifully in her writing. The complexities and strengths and flaws of her position lie 
in giving film as a popular art its aesthetic due and insisting on its particular intrinsic value, while at 
the same time countering the tendency to treat it with solemnity. 
     Her collection Kiss Kiss Bang Bang came with an explanatory note which has come to serve 
as an emblematic summation of her thinking, and above all her feelings about film: “The words 
‘Kiss Kiss Bang Bang,’ which I saw on an Italian movie poster, are perhaps the briefest statement 
imaginable of the basic appeal of the movies. This appeal is what attracts us, and ultimately what 
makes us despair when we realize how seldom movies are more than this.”12 
  At the height of her clout from the late sixties and throughout the rest of her career, Kael 
embodied that most problematic and most American of virtues: the influence and prestige that stems 
from popular success. 
     That I find these two critics worth discussing should by now be obvious, but at the risk of 
jumping to premature conclusions, I shall express my prejudice even more bluntly: Pauline Kael and 
Andrew Sarris to me loom large as the most important film critics in America. No doubt they loom 
large because they were and are considered classic rivals, with the auteur theory and its application 
                                                 
11
  Strictly speaking, this is incorrect. John Caughie points out that the term Auteur Theory was first used by 
French critic Luc Moullet as early as 1959 in a Cahiers article on Sam Fuller.  John Caughie (ed.) (2001[1981]) 
Theories of Authorship.  London: Routledge. p. 62.  Sarris should, however, be credited for giving the term widespread 
currency. 
12
 Pauline Kael (1970[1968]) Kiss Kiss Bang Bang London: Calder & Boyars.  Preface. Unpaginated. 
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13 
their bone of contention. In academia and the popular press alike, much has been made of their 
status as antagonists. Almost all the secondary literature on Sarris’s and Kael’s criticism is slanted 
strongly in favour of one or the other, which is to say that the battle lines between Sarrisians and 
Paulettes are still keenly felt. An indication, perhaps, of the always very human and sometimes very 
ugly need to take sides when exposed to brilliant and sometimes inflammatory polemic.  
       All fields of inquiry thrive on heuristic dichotomies to some extent, but these can be 
overstated. Systematic comparison of any kind presupposes that there are relevant similarities as 
well as relevant differences. While it perhaps seems somewhat high-minded and inappropriate to 
invoke the authority of political scientists in a thesis about belletristic film criticism, I still cannot 
resist referring to the comparative sociologists Mattei Dogan and Dominique Pelassy, who point out 
that any systematic comparison consists of uncovering and studying relative analogies and 
contrasts.13  
      The driving force behind this thesis is to go beyond the conventional and still-persistent 
pigeonholing that often barely scratches the surface of Sarris’s and Kael's rich and often frustrating 
bodies of criticism. For example, in a current BFI teacher's manual, one finds the most bombastic 
declaration imaginable, with talk of a Pauline Kael who hated everything Sarris stood for.14 I do not  
mean to imply that the antagonism between them did not exist, but it is doubtlessly at once more  
tempting and more correct to see Sarris as the harassed Spencer Tracy to Kael's spunky and sexually 
assertive Katharine Hepburn. This movie analogy was very clear in Sarris’s own mind when he first 
met his arch-nemesis: 
 
As I sped on the F train to my rendezvous with destiny, I fantasized about the scene in Woman of the Year, in 
which Spencer Tracy and Katherine Hepburn play two feuding journalists who meet for the first time in their 
editor's office. Tracy enters just as Hepburn is straightening the seam of her stocking. The leggy lechery of this 
meet-cute scene vanished from my mind the moment I saw Pauline Kael.15 
 
Physically, the diminutive Pauline Kael was no movie star, and the sallow-featured Andrew Sarris 
has never been anything like a leading man. But that is hardly the point. If one superimposes what 
they have put down in writing, we get close to the spirit of the jostling of opinions over something 
                                                 
13
 Mattei Dogan & Dominique Pelassy (1990) How to Compare Nations: Strategies in Comparative Politics. 
New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers p. 5ff. Second Edition 
14
 David Wharton and Jeremy Grant (2005) Teaching Auteur Study: London. BFI Education. p.33. Italics added. 
15
  Andrew Sarris “Sarris vs. Kael, the Queen Bee of Film Criticism.”, Village Voice. 1980 Vol. 2-8 July. p. 1, 30-
31, 70.  
14 
14 
that matters in way that seems very close in spirit, if not in form, to the best Spencer/Hepburn 
outings.  
   Most of us will probably readily admit that this analogy may fuel mythology rather than 
facilitate any clear assessment of their criticism, but at least it shows the extent to which they made 
film criticism seem sexy and glamorous, at almost exactly the same time film studies became 
academically respectable. They were by no means alone in establishing new ways of writing about 
film by finding new ways of seeing film, but they were preeminent.16 As critics, they were 
interested in what constitutes film art and how this relates to other aspects of culture. This has 
shaped my key thesis, which is that Andrew Sarris and Pauline Kael represent different ways of 
approaching film aesthetically that are culturally and historically conditioned. Through their 
criticism, Sarris and Kael disclose basic underlying assumptions on the generic concept of art by 
writing about the specific concept of film as an art form. 
      However, their volumes of collected criticism are also aesthetic artefacts, and thus belong in 
the firmament of aesthetic literature by virtue of being what Wilbur S. Howell has termed 
nonfictional imaginative prose.17  Which is to say that Sarris’s and Kael's criticism, like the best 
criticism in any field, was created for the sake of expression as well as for the sake of impression.18 
 
Defining Art in Relation to Criticism 
 
            Art is a notoriously difficult concept to define, even if most of us have some notion of what 
it entails. To define art disjunctively can be done quite easily. This is what we do when we say that 
painting, sculpture and architecture are the three basic visual arts that constitute the core of what art 
historians study. Using this method, we can define film as the seventh art, as art critic Ricciotto 
Canudo did back in the 1920s.19 The most important thing in this context, however, is to know how 
the term art and the corresponding term artist have been understood in practical circumstances as 
historically infused ideas. I will, however, already at this point, make one very brief comment about 
auteurism, which we shall return to and explore from several perspectives. Grossly simplified, we 
                                                 
16
 In terms of longevity if not cultural relevance, it is fair to say that Sarris and Kael were outlasted by their still-
active near-contemporary, the British critic Robin Wood.  Wood was originally a New Critic auteurist who reinvented 
himself as a radical in the 1970s.  
17
 Wilbur S. Howell (1975) Poetics, Rhetoric and Logic: Studies in the Basic Disciplines of Criticism. Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press p. 18.  
18
 Ibid. pp. 218-219. 
19
  Ricciotto Canudo quoted in Jack C. Ellis & Virginia Wright Wexman (2001) A History of Film. Boston: Allyn 
& Bacon. p. 115. 5th Edition. 
15 
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might say that the director as the film artist and authorial agent arose out of a pressing need to 
legitimize commercially released entertainment films as works of art. The art of movies became 
evident before its artists were appraised. If the artist of a collective mass medium based on 
mechanical recording and playback did not present himself as self-evident, or even evident, then he 
(almost invariably male) simply had to be invented in order to be discovered. This concludes what I 
have to say about disjunctive definitions of art. 
        Functional definitions of art, however, are another matter altogether. In this thesis, I shall 
refrain from arguing any particular definition that postulates necessary and sufficient conditions for 
my own concept of art, since I firmly believe, despite the strenuous efforts of a score of thinkers 
since Leo Tolstoy first insisted on the pressing need for a definition in What Is Art?20 (1896), that no 
such fully satisfactory definition exists. At the risk of sounding snide, it is a more fruitful route for 
aesthetics to dissolve the problem of functional definitions of art once and for all, rather than persist 
with futile attempts to solve it. Lest the reader think that I am completely oblivious to problems in 
aesthetics during the last half-century, I should mention one definition which has been regarded has 
having great explanatory force in recent decades, the institutional definition of art, most notably 
developed and continually  refined  by George Dickie. The institutional definition defines art as a 
more or less informal network of social practices where agents within the art-network nominate 
candidates for aesthetic appreciation.21 As a definition, however, properly speaking, it has been 
exposed as faulty. Monroe Beardsley has argued forcefully against it in his article, “An Aesthetic 
Definition of Art” (1983). According to Beardsley, the institutional theory of art inverts the logical 
order:  
 
To define any form of activity in terms of the concept of institution, rather than the other way about, seems to 
me to invert the logical order: how can we conceive of religious, political and artistic and other institutions 
except in the terms of the forms of activity that they sponsor and regularize?22 
 
I want to reaffirm, in the strongest possible terms, that I do not see the philosophical need to define 
art functionally. I do not wish to dispute that art may be used in a classificatory sense in most, or 
perhaps all instances.  
                                                 
20
 Leo Tolstoy(2001 [1896] ) What  Is Art? New York: Replica Books. Translated by Aylmer Maude. 
21
  See for example George Dickie (1974) Art and the Aesthetic: An Institutional Analysis. Ithaca:  Cornell 
University Press. 
22
  Monroe Beardsley (1983) “An Aesthetic Definition of Art.-”, Peter Lamarque and Stein Haugom Olsen (2004) 
(ed.) Aesthetics and the Philosophy of Art: The Analytic Tradition. New York: Blackwell Publishers. pp. 53-59.  
16 
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     However, I share philosopher Sung-Bong Park's view that the common denominator in all 
definitions of art is that at its core, it is seen as a term of value-orientation.23 (This is in fact also true 
of art in a pre-modern or rather pre-classical sense, the real difference, albeit of the greatest 
importance, being one of degree.) Even George Dickie (who, as I mentioned, originated the 
institutional theory of art, which aims to be a descriptive theory) admits that art serves as an 
evaluative weapon-word.24  
      We should, I think, simply acknowledge that art above all is a normative premise. Following 
up on that, I take what I assume to be a common-sense position: that the cultural activity of creating 
and consuming art is seen as culturally valuable and self-evidently desirable, even if individual 
artworks may be aesthetically deficient, or even fail as art. And here we have a clue as to the 
relationship between art and criticism, a relationship that is by its very nature reciprocal. Literary 
theorist Elder Olson has outlined the relationship between criticism and art as its subject in 
exhaustively detailed terms: 
  
Whatever art itself may be as a subject, it is clear that criticism has employed certain aspects of it as subject 
matters. Thus one aspect of an art is its product; another, its  instrumentality, active or passive, which produced 
the product; another, the product as relative or determined by that instrumentality, whether this last be viewed 
as actual or potential. Another is the relation of an art to a certain subject or means, as a consequence, and 
hence as a sign, of these; still another aspect is the production of a certain effect, either of activity or passivity, 
upon those who are its spectators or auditors; and lastly there is art viewed as instrumental to that effect. We 
may sum up all this by saying that criticism has viewed art variously as a product; as an activity or passivity of 
the artist; as certain faculties or as a certain character of the artist; as a certain activity or passivity of the 
audience; as certain faculties or as a certain character of the audience; as an instrument; or as a sign, either of 
certain characteristics of the artist and his audience or of something else involved in art, e.g. its means, subject 
etc.25 
 
Andrew Sarris and Pauline Kael may be placed comfortably within such a general matrix, with film 
as their chosen artistic subject. This is perhaps most readily apparent in the case of Sarris, who 
became famous (and in Kael’s opinion, should have become infamous) for focusing very 
specifically on the Hollywood director as the figurative author and as the constant yet evolving 
factor in a body of films that constitute an oeuvre. Kael’s underlying perspective was more modern 
                                                 
23
 Sung-Bong Park (1993) An Aesthetics of the Popular Arts: An Approach to the Popular Arts from the Aesthetic 
Point of View. Uppsala. PhD. Diss.  Uppsala University. p. 14.  
24
  George Dickie (2001) Art and Value. Malden Mass.: Blackwell Publishers p. 21. 
25
  Elder Olson “An Outline of Poetic Theory”, R.S. Crane (ed.) (1957) Critics and Criticism: Essays in Method 
By a Group of Chicago Critics: Phoenix Books. University of Chicago Press. Abridged Edition pp. 3-24. 
17 
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than classical, more clearly and specifically grounded in the theory and practice of modern art, even 
as she lamented many of the developments in 20th century visual, literary and dramatic art.  
   As our digital society is evolving at a breakneck pace, it has long since become apparent that 
celluloid projected in public places where people converge to share somehow miraculously private 
experiences defined the 20th century in a way that will not, strictly speaking, define the 21st. In that 
sense, this comparative study of Sarris’s and Kael’s criticism is an attempt at interpretive intellectual 
history, or perhaps more precisely, interpretive intellectual biography. 
     The paradox of the movies as art and mass medium may have seemed less fuzzy back in the 
days when you had to see films by going to the cinema. Sarris is awed by this almost unfathomable 
if not quite indefinable trait of the medium: 
 
[A] curious paradox emerges out of our supposedly shared experiences with movies. Obviously a part of us 
recognizes that any given movie may have been seen by millions and millions of people, and yet, in some 
ineffable way it belongs to each of us individually, not even really to each of us, but to the me, me, me alone in 
each of us.26  
 
    Sarris’s and Kael’s views on art and criticism, as well as their deliberations on the aesthetic 
situation somewhat unique to the medium of film, are not necessarily logically and empirically free 
from contradictions or thought out in an especially lucid form. As Monroe C. Beardsley points out, 
journalistic and scholarly criticism alike usually blur the line between two distinct levels of meaning 
when talking about art: “When writers speak of art [...] they often do not make it clear to themselves 
if they are proposing a way of using the word art or a generalization about the thing [called] art.”27  
      
  I am not entirely convinced, however, that Beardsley's analytical separation is all that 
relevant. Teddy Brunius has gotten closer to the heart of matter when he says that the term art 
performs two functions simultaneously: It appoints and confers value.28 This being the case, the 
distinction between using the word art and generalizing about art dissolves into a single concept; 
we are left with ways of using the term art.  
  It would be fair to say that Kael and Sarris use the term art in roughly the same way, 
namely, in an evaluative sense to describe films on the same level as other art objects that tend to 
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provoke aesthetic responses. In my view, it is to their everlasting credit that they never locked 
themselves into rigid or monolithic preconceptions about what cinematic art should be; rather, they 
could appreciate and find art within a wide range of filmic expressions, while at the same time 
defending basic underlying preferences that are anything but arbitrary. If Sarris tends towards a 
definition of art as the expression of a single metaphorical author's vision, Kael, in slightly more 
modern terms, once defined it as a formalized expression of experience.29  
     Kael's intellectual grounding and tastes were two conflicting but by no means mutually 
exclusive strands of thought manifested in art history during the short spell that marks the second 
half of the 20th century: high modernism, represented by abstract expressionism and its very 
dominant ideologue Clement Greenberg on the one hand, and pop art on the other. I do not claim 
that she was a connoisseur of pop art and abstract expressionism, but she shared some of the basic 
aesthetic assumptions of both trends. 
      Discussing pop art, Kael once summed up Andy Warhol's alleged legacy with a gloomily 
foreboding rhetorical question that I think frightened her—because of what were perhaps pangs of 
recognition and a guilt she would never quite admit: “What's the matter with shallow?30  
     Art, for Kael the modernist, is an accolade whose antonym is junk or trash or kitsch.31 In her 
writing, Kael's energies and confusions are usually centred on keeping this distinction meaningful, 
if not exactly clear and simple. As she pointed out, movies are so rarely great art that if we cannot 
appreciate great trash, we have very little reason to be interested in them.32 
It has been argued by film scholar Edward Murray that Kael never offered a definition of 
either trash or art, thus making her application of these key terms semantically meaningless.33 
This very strict and pedantic critique could perhaps be levelled against Kael if her work was in 
formal, academic philosophy rather than journalistic criticism. In any event, I believe she did define 
art in the above quotation. Whether or not she actually defined trash is perhaps more debatable. 
      At any rate, Murray's critique will not do for our purposes, and I shall attempt to define 
Kael's usage of these terms very closely in our general chapter on axiological criticism, where her 
practical criticism will be discussed.  We might, in any case, claim without too much controversy 
that her usage of the term (even more so than her concept of art) is determined by modernist 
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theories of art and culture. This is one of the key points that, hopefully, this thesis will help clarify.  
For now, however, it will suffice to say that there are unresolved tensions, which we might relate to 
brow-levels and divided loyalties in her thinking. 
     Sarris has no such qualms. In fact, he spent a career defending the appreciation of old 
movies from what he felt were the pernicious frivolities of pop, camp and trivia.34 He was not too 
enamoured of pop art and its implications, but he recognized the relevance of Warhol and 
Lichtenstein as something that tapped into modern life in a way the immediately preceding, 
hermetic, self-centred and masturbatory aesthetic based on high-toned ideas of singular genius,   
represented in the works of the action painters, did not: 
 
The fallacy of all-wise antiquity is replaced by the fallacy of all-meaningful modernity. The nostalgic yearning 
for hand-woven linen handkerchiefs is ridiculed in order to worship the efficiency and expendability of a 
Kleenex. This is part of the mystique of pop art, and there is a great deal to be said for its frank recognition of 
technological change. You may not like Campbell's soup cans, but it is futile to pretend you still pick herbs in 
Arcady where the new housing development is located.35 
 
If popular culture could be the subject matter for high art, who is to say popular culture itself is not 
artistic and does not afford genuine aesthetic pleasure? Moreover, it is the aesthetic of the popular 
that seems not only most honest, but also most responsive to current needs and tastes. Here, Kael 
and Sarris are in agreement. 
Unlike Kael, Sarris has made no moral issue out of the intellectual split this entails. In sharp 
contrast to Kael, Sarris may have consciously and restlessly revised his opinions, but his 
commitment has been to the excellence of individual films and directorial careers without worrying 
unduly about questions of brow-levels, and as a consequence his writing is less unstable, less 
hypnotically volatile, and less neurotic.  
 
The Popular as a Common Ground—and an Outline of the Study 
Many of Kael's and Sarris’s generalizations about film as an art—specifically, their realization that 
film is primarily a popular art—are at times strikingly similar. “Popular” can mean two things. First, 
it can mean tangible success in terms of box-office receipts. Inevitably, mass art aims at satisfying 
                                                 
34
  Andrew Sarris (1996[1969])) The American Cinema: Directors and Directions 1929-1968. New York: 
DaCapo Press. p.16. 
35
 Andrew Sarris (1973) The Primal Screen: Essays on Film and Related Subjects. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
p. 69.  
20 
20 
large audiences and vast consumer groups. As such, mass art correlates to the rise of mass media: 
“It is the development of mass communication technologies that has augured, in the era of mass art, 
i.e., an era dominated—at least statistically—by artworks incarnated in multiple instances and 
disseminated widely across space and time.”36 As far as movies were concerned, this was seen as 
the great democratic advantage of that particular medium at the beginning of the previous century: 
“Shipped in tins, the movies could go anywhere in the world, taking a synthesis of almost all the 
known art forms to rich and poor. In terms of the number of people they could reach, movies were 
so inexpensive that they could be hailed as the great democratic art form.”37   
    While true and important, this is not what I have in mind. What I mean, quite independently 
of questions of quantity and technological mediation, is an understanding of popular art, of which 
the movies are among the most pervasive, as made up by certain qualities of experience—certain 
elementary fixtures.  I believe that Sung-Bong Park's five-tone scale of the popular is sufficiently 
well-rounded to be universally acceptable, and I hazard a guess that Sarris and Kael would concur: 
 
In my view there are above all five main characteristic qualities of the popular when we experience the popular 
arts. They are: The comic—the world of nonsense, roar of laughter, pie-casting and crazy people; the erotic, 
the world of kissing, passion, raping and strip-teasing, love-making and black underwear, suspenders and silk 
stockings; the sensational, the world of fear, terror, horror, violence, disaster and agony; the fantastic, the 
world of enchantment, reveries, magic and miracle; and the sentimental, the world of sweet solitude, sobbing, 
tear-jerking, nostalgia and melancholy.38 
The elements outlined by Bong-Park could be a summary of the basic plot elements in a Griffith 
epic or a Chaplin two-reeler as well as anything Renoir and Welles have put their names to—
unassailable gods in Sarris’s pantheon of cinema, all. Moreover, it is important to note that Bong-
Park sees the popular as intimately embedded in and conditioned by a narrative form or structure. 
Peter Greenaway, a maker of coldly clinical art films, has claimed that the cinema is far too rich and 
capable a medium to be left to the storyteller.39 As a feature film director, however, Greenaway has 
not found a way to do without narrative—nor, for that matter, have inventive mainstream fantasists 
like Terry Gilliam or Tim Burton. It could be further argued that Quentin Tarantino has taken some 
of these popular elements to their logical, yet absurd extremes by synthesising every socially 
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irresponsible (albeit wickedly exciting) exploitation film under the sun and giving these amassed 
sugar-rush highlights a shot of adrenaline. It seems, in fact, to be an overly conscious strategy and a 
ravishing one-note performance on his part. 
When quizzed on Pulp Fiction (1994), the writer-director opined, “It's doing something exciting for 
cinema. I have this really eggheaded theory that it's like the ultimate postmodern movie, because it 
takes fifty years of film and pop culture history and synthesizes it into something new.”40 
     In popular art, the elements of the five-tone scale outlined above are always used in 
combination; the erotic element by itself, for instance, would simply be pornography rather than 
popular art. Some media seem to be uniquely suited to the popular themes and forms, and film is 
arguably one of them  precisely because it grew out of popular traditions  and  because of the 
features inherent feature of the medium.  Movies have a sensory appeal beyond the combination  of  
density and precision that characterize words on  the printed page. In 1968, film scholar Gordon 
Gow had the following to say about the film medium and the older artistic form from which it has 
traditionally drawn most of its inspiration:  
 
It might be argued that many films [..] have derived their plots and ideas from novels. But the images and sounds of 
cinema are another language: A transformation is wrought: the ideas impinge in a different manner, and more strongly. 
For no matter how deep a spell the written word may cast, none but the recluse can surrender completely.41”  
 
 Gow's quote leads us quite naturally and directly to a key difference between popular art and high 
art. In a traditional understanding of the term: A signal difference between the elite and the popular  
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is is in the spectator's actual  approach to the work. What I have in mind is  that both cultural forms 
privilege certain, quite specific ways of looking, which are diametrically opposed in a high 
art/popular (low) art dichotomy. Central to ideas of high art are the Kantian notions of disinterested 
contemplation and the aesthetic attitude. Popular art, on the other hand, caters to popular tastes, 
which are altogether anti-Kantian in such a way that we can (in a classical understanding of the 
issue) speak of the term popular art as an oxymoron—an example of either/or binary opposites:   
 
[P]opular taste is altogether anti-Kantian. [...] It privileges subject matter over form, participation over 
disinterestedness, utilitarian and moral criteria over purely aesthetic ones, and entertainment over art. [...] The 
pleasures of fine Art are allegedly pure, refined, serious, complex, deep and reflective, whereas those of 
entertainment are impure, vulgar, facile, shallow, merely sensory and physiologically induced.42   
 
We have already detailed how this idea became almost impossible to defend during the 1960s, and 
Sarris’s and Kael's criticism (along with that of Susan Sontag), albeit in somewhat different ways, 
are as crucial to this development as Beatlemania and the Brillo-Boxes (1964), which saw popular 
culture invade art and vice versa. Norwegian film scholar Anne Gjelsvik is partly correct about the 
film culture of that era when she claims:  
The distinction between high and low culture is re-negotiated by, among others, the critics, and that  auteur criticism is 
the best example of entertainment movies and B-culture being elevated within an institution we may call the institution 
of art.43 
      Gjelsvik is correct in pointing towards a re-contextualisation and re-interpretation of popular 
movies with regards to auteur criticism, but, like many other scholars, she is  mistaken in her belief 
in  the institutional  definition of art. I believe Jerrold Levinson is right when he argues  that “the 
institutional definition of art comes uncomfortably close to conflating art and self-conscious art, art 
and socially situated art, art and declared art. [...] In no case must one invoke the shadowy 
infrastructure of the art-world to make what one makes into art.44”  Most of the American films 
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rescued from cultural limbo by way of re-interpretation by auteur critics were certainly not, in any 
usefully strict sense, self-conscious art. 
     In fact, it could be argued that  the first self consciously artistic American studio film of the  
sound era, was Citizien Kane (Orson Welles, 1941.)  (Kael made the biggest waves of her career for 
insisting that Citizen Kane  is firmly grounded in popular art) Another, much later test case for the 
auteur theory, the thematically rich but stylistically wholly functional and totally  transparent work 
Rio Bravo (Howard Hawks, 1958) was certainly not   intended in an artistically  self-conscious  
way.45 In fact,  the film was not even deemed worthy a review when it was first released     Sight & 
Sound, which was still staunchly non-auteurist at that time. 46   
 Gjelsvik also raises an interesting general  question about the nature  of the concept  of  
aesthetic quality or worth; a question  we must grapple  with if we want to understand the changing 
status of film beginning in the last half of the twentieth century.  
Is quality, aesthetic or otherwise, inherent, or is it imputed? Is the aesthetic experience itself simply 
a question of an attitude adopted to any object whatever, as  philosopher and psychologist Edward 
Bullough believed?47  To put it in a more directly relevant way, did the auteurists invent the 
aesthetically positive qualities in old Hollywood movies that gave them status as artworks,  or did 
they only discover something already there?  This is not a straightforward question, but I shall 
provide an answer of sorts. After some deliberation, Gjelsvik reaches no final conclusion in the 
question whether or not  quality or inherent to the work  or imputed to it. Imputed can be substituted 
with the  marginally stronger term,  superadded.- 
 There is no question that the surrogate authors of old Hollywood  films were  constructed by 
the auteur  critics in order to evaluate commercial films as art. But it does not follow from this 
assumption that because the new  status of commercial films as artworks was the result of 
renegotiation  by the critics (Gjelsvik's term) that the qualities within the work that legitimize their 
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claims to art status are  altogether superadded by the critic, An interpretation will change over time, 
but this does not typically mean that the work changes. In most cases the work as referential object 
(the film, novel or painting etc.) remains identical, irrespective of the passage of  time or cultural 
differences. To deny this is to give in to the   temptation of extreme constructivism. Jerrold 
Levinson explains: 
 
It is not artworks that, in the crucial sense, change over time, it is rather us. We think more, experience more, create 
more – as a result we are able to find more in an artwork than we could previously. But these works are what they are, 
and remain from the art-content point-of-view, what they always were. It is not their content that changes over time, but 
only our access to the full extent of that content, in virtue of our and the world's subsequent evolution. The latent and 
unnoticed must not be confused with the newly acquired and superadded; later history may bring out what was in earlier 
art, but it does not progressively bring about that there is now more in it.48 
 
This is not to belittle interpretation but merely to acknowledge  the critic's object of study. The 
recontextualization of popular films afforded by the auteur theory did not so much change the 
object of study as expand the field of art.  
               The auteur  theory dealt mainly with American film from the  outset, but it  was a janus- 
face, adaptable also to a new kind of film that even the most conservative highbrow could not easily 
dismiss  as simply entertainment. Just as a spate of foreign  art films began to be the subject of an 
openly invited Kantian mode of viewing among relatively large audiences, the virtues of American 
entertainment movies in the near past were thus being rediscovered for their energy and beauty. 
        In all areas of art and culture since the early sixties the post-Kantian (or more precisely in an 
American context, post-Greenbergian49) aesthetic has moved through several stages from the ideal 
to the corporeal.50 Attendant to this development has been the sexual revolution in the Western 
world. A few years before pop art arose independently at The Royal College of Art in London and 
in the New York art world, ushering in a decade of social, political and cultural dissent, auteurism 
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in France had, as we have seen,  showed the way towards an aesthetic of popular culture in the 
fifties. 
       We might say that pop art was, among many other things, an at least partly successful attempt 
to claim some of the popular qualities of cartoons and movies (particularly the domestic 
melodrama) for high art. However, we might also perhaps argue with some justification that the 
equation of cinema in and of itself became more muddled and chaotic with the rise of art films and 
what we might designate the Film Generation avant-garde in the sixties, the decade Sarris and Kael 
came of age as critics. However, I ask you to consider how many films, American and foreign (or 
for that matter, works of modern high art from Picasso to Hirst) have combined at least two or more 
of the popular qualities listed in Bong-Park's analysis? But in the movies, more so than most artistic 
media, these qualities are important. Although there are examples in the cinema that disprove the 
assumption that they are essential, I must confess that I prefer reading about them rather than 
actually spend time watching them.  According to Kael, the combination of popular elements is the 
reason why audiences love them, as well as why we should love them—not, as it was assumed in 
some academic quarters in the sixties, because of their transparent ontological purity, but because 
film was a bastard, cross-fertilized super-art.51  
    Sarris too discounted the purity in form and content, even if he phrased it in more directly 
cine-aesthetic terms: “Mise-en-scène as an attitude tends to accept the cinema as it is and enjoy it 
for what it is—a sensuous conglomeration of all the other arts.”52 A specialized vocabulary for film 
studies is something that set Kael's teeth on edge, but what about authorship in film, a long-standing 
tradition in the other arts?  
I pose this question because the relationship between Sarris and Kael must be analysed to a 
great extent around a cluster of ideas related to cinematic authorship. In American critical discourse, 
Sarris may be held largely responsible for erecting a near-contemporary pantheon of film directors 
which still holds sway. The auteur-theory from then on became impossible to ignore for anyone 
interested in film. As David A. Cook points out:  
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By the time this influential volume [The American Cinema: Directors and Directions 1929-1968] had 
appeared, even critics like Pauline Kael, who were initially hostile to the idea of the auteur theory, had begun 
to accept its fundamental premise, if only by inverse corollary.53 
 
This is the conventional wisdom. Cook is thinking here about Kael’s controversial attempt at film 
history, “Raising Kane,” which resurrected the reputation of Joseph Mankiewicz, the forgotten man 
in the genesis of Citizen Kane, and in so doing, stressed the collaborative nature of feature film-
making as the expense of Welles's conception of his precocious debut as a one-man show. Like 
Sarris, however, Kael did believe in authorship as a basic premise of art, something which is plain 
to see even in “Circles and Squares: Joys and Sarris”, without question the most brilliant piece of 
anti-auteurist polemic ever written. 
     While the auteur theory is the focal point of Sarris and Kael's antagonism, I shall try to place 
their work within the greater context of film criticism as a whole, conceptually and historically. 
There are two major reasons for this. Firstly, Andrew Sarris is primarily an intuitive and 
impressionistic critic, and his work, though a function of the auteur theory, cannot be fully explained 
by a reference to any single theoretical doctrine: “My response to my role as a critic has generally 
been intuitive, and nothing is to be gained from institutionalizing my intuitions.”54 The second 
crucial reason is perhaps more obvious. Pauline Kael was an extraordinary critic, and so deserves to 
be defined positively on her own terms, rather than negatively as a simple antipode to auteurism in 
general and Sarris in particular. 
    That close readings of primary texts are paramount goes without saying. As such, I have 
chosen to concentrate almost exclusively on reviews and essays published in comprehensive text 
anthologies available as books. In this sense, the academic legwork of collecting data has largely 
been done for me. I am fully aware that this leaves me vulnerable to charges of shoddy scholarship, 
but in this case hermeneutic interpretation takes precedence over empirical methodology.  
    My approach to this subject is at once narrow and wide. In addition to close readings and 
comparison of judiciously selected texts, it is equally necessary to provide the appropriate 
theoretical and historical framings that fix their meanings.  
As the reader already will have noticed, my background in art history and aesthetics will no 
doubt influence the nature of this thesis and give it a somewhat different character than if it were 
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written by someone with a background in English or literature, as is more customary in film studies.  
Nevertheless, art history and aesthetics are very useful tools for opening up perspectives on two 
critics who had very definite views on criticism as well as the intersection of art and popular culture.  
  It should also be noted that the style adopted for this thesis is consciously essayistic. My 
justification for this is identical to that provided by Paul Coates in the preface to his brilliant, if not 
quite accessible book, Film at the Intersection of High and Mass Culture (1994): 
 
After all, is not the essay the fruit of an exploded, primitively pre-methodological impressionism? One may 
wonder, however, to what degree an object—in this case a work of art—may be comprehended by an observer 
who lacks the sort of sympathy for it that the essay displays.55 
 
This approach mirrors and is perfectly congenial with the way Sarris and Kael approach film 
in its many manifestations. Fred L. Bergmann describes the essay as follows:  
 
To write an essay is to record a reaction to and interpretation of experience. The essay may merely record that 
reaction or interpretation; it may explain it; it may argue against it; it may attempt to persuade others to accept 
a like reaction or interpretation. In any event, the essay communicates.56 
 
In the course of this thesis, to fully exploit the essay as a literary form is my ambition more 
than my aim. 
       Despite the leeway I have given myself by openly opting for an essayistic impressionism, it 
would be perverse in a thesis such as this not to include a firmer and more rigid outline of purpose 
and intent. I have already identified Sarris and Kael primarily as journalistic critics or cultural 
commentators that also helped define film scholarship. As such, a comparison of their bodies of 
criticism may be tentatively partitioned in three levels.  Firstly, there are the general critical essays. 
Secondly, we must stress their conscious efforts to make sense of the past—i.e. their efforts as film 
historians. Thirdly, there is what may be termed lower-level reviewing. Without in any way giving 
reviews short shrift, we might say that the review has a specific consumer function. It is a public 
service, and as such is the most purely journalistic subgenre in film criticism.  
In terms of level of abstraction, it ranks below the critical essay, which deals with concrete films in a 
wider perspective, and the theoretical essay, which seeks to draw general conclusions applicable to 
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all films.57 This does not mean that I in my own thesis have practised an absolute partition between 
critical essays and reviews. Most of the time, quotations from reviews will serve to illustrate, 
buttress and deepen our understanding of the usually more general propositions and ideas found in 
the critics’ longer essays. However, a partition is still in place, even if not absolute. Limited space 
has forced me to make this thesis in some ways drastically selective. 
      My focus is thus on selected essays rather than reviews. This has its drawbacks. Particularly 
when dealing with concrete textual material which aspires to being belle-lettres, such partitions 
serve mainly an analytical function. If the longer essays could be seen as something laboured over in 
seclusion, like an architect designing some monumental structure, and their reviews were simply the 
practical application of these blueprints, my job would be easy. But such is not the case. Sarris’s and 
Kael's works are more often than not written on journalistic rather than scholarly deadlines, and (at 
least in the sixties and seventies) put forward in a climate of feverishly polemical frenzy. To 
compare reviews side-by-side in order to determine divergence and convergence of opinion on 
individual films would be a highly interesting empirical exercise, but it is not the project I shall 
attempt here.  
The suggestion of the loose tripartite division I have outlined, however, is worth noting. The 
main aim is to elucidate the nature of Sarris’s and Kael’s criticism on a more abstract level than 
single reviews can offer.  
     Context is the most overused word in academia, but for all their uniqueness and singularity, 
Sarris and Kael grew out of an American tradition in film criticism which will be addressed in the 
form of a brief chapter on American film criticism from its beginnings up to the mid-fifties. I shall 
make no attempt to evaluate their contemporaries, nor offer a weighted opinion on current 
American criticism. What I offer at the end of this chapter, however, are some general remarks on 
the challenges—and opportunities—any contemporary critic of movies (film is all but a thing of the 
past) must face—and exploit.  
    A long chapter on the general nature of film criticism, with Sarris and Kael as examples, 
will be a major issue in this thesis. Then there is the concrete discussion of primary texts. As already 
indicated, this includes analyses of Sarris’s and Kael's critical essays, and perhaps even more 
importantly, their consciously historical narratives about film. Their plainly historical writings will 
be presented last—Kael's first, then Sarris’s—before a few concluding remarks that render final 
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judgements and a general summary of final thoughts that rounds out this thesis as an essay. Finally I 
will briefly point to what has what has done to illuminate our subjects.  
   A note on my selection of primary texts is in order. The centrepiece of this study is of course 
the controversy that ensued from the original “Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1962” and Kael's 
emphatic rebuttal, “Circles and Squares”. There is, however, a need for background. As a gateway 
to the genesis of the auteur theory, I have included a blow-by-blow description of Kael's brilliant but 
not widely read sociological piece, “Movies, the Desperate Art” (1956). The piece was collected in 
an anthology edited by Daniel Talbot in the sixties, but it has never been included in any of Kael's 
mass-market publications, and has not garnered the same attention as the later but equally brilliant 
“Trash, Art, and the Movies” (which, due to space limitations, will be only briefly mentioned in this 
thesis). So much for critical essays. The selection of plain, film-historical narratives is easier 
because relatively self-evident. The only major explicitly historical work ever attempted by Kael is 
“Raising Kane” (1971), which, as already noted, is a controversial debunking of Orson Welles's 
mythic status as a solitary genius.  
     Apart from his monographs on Von Sternberg and Ford, Sarris has contributed two major 
works of cinematic macro-history: Directors and Directions: The American Cinema 1929-1968 
(1969) and You Ain't Heard Nothing Yet: The American Talking Film in History and Memory 1927-
1949 (1998.) Of these, the former is clearly more influential and thus will provide the main thrust of 
my outline of Sarris the film historian. Just as the discussion of the critical essays is meant to 
illuminate criticism as such, the plainly historical texts will hopefully serve to illuminate film 
history and its relationship to history proper, on the one hand, and film studies on the other. 
    I have now presented this text’s organization and chronology, which will hopefully lead the 
reader from the universal to the particular with regards to an at once broad and incisive 
understanding of the primary texts forming the core data of this thesis. We might now begin in 
earnest by outlining a few general aspects of criticism after a brief summary of our protagonists’ 
respective careers.  
 
Career Overview – Andrew Sarris 
In 1955, Andrew Sarris began writing about film in the pages of the radical cult periodical Film 
Culture, and for the Village Voice from 1960: “At the time I started writing for Film Culture, I was 
not quite twenty-seven years old, a dangerously advanced age for a writer manqué if not maudit, a 
dreadfully uncomfortable age for a middle-class cultural guerrilla without any base, contacts or 
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reliable lines of supply.”58 Sarris’s emphasis on filmmakers who, for all intents and purposes, 
already were grizzled veterans and who essentially belonged to another era, must initially have 
made him seem like the odd man out in the magazine’s offices—considering that many of those 
active in the magazine Film Culture, most notably Jonas Mekas (the art curator and avant-garde 
filmmaker who was vital in opening journalistic doors for Sarris) were actively pursuing counter-
cinema practices as conscious East Coast alternatives to the Hollywood mainstream. Film Culture 
was notable for two things.  
First, it managed to be a hotbed for what was at the time termed New American Cinema, the 
standard under which very diverse avant-gardists with an interest in film and a distaste for 
supposedly vulgar Hollywood illusionism were camped in the first half of the sixties.   But second, 
Film Culture was for a short time also, quite paradoxically, the hotbed of American auteur criticism. 
Not only did Sarris cut his teeth at the magazine, it was also here that a certain young upstart and 
would-be filmmaker named Peter Bogdanovich, who as a director would specialize in fond 
valentines to old-style Hollywood films, published his first pieces. Whatever we might feel about 
Jonas Mekas's inane musings on avant-garde art, his publication did fill a function which was highly 
significant, irrespective of its low circulation figures: 
 
In England they had Sight and Sound, and in Paris, Cahiers du Cinema. But in the U.S. the only thing there 
was Films in Review, which was a very conservative, low-level monthly. There was Film Quarterly at the 
University of California, which came out once a year or something, and the leftists had something that came 
out, Film Sense. That's why we felt we needed Film Culture. It was a way for young people to write and 
exchange ideas about film.  We had a network of outlets at university bookshops that took Film Culture from 
its third issue. By the late sixties we had 5,000 subscribers.59 
  
     Sarris’s second journalistic home, and the one with which he is most often identified, was 
the weekly Village Voice. There is no question that this was a paper more congenial with Sarris’s 
general outlook on life than Film Culture.  Founded in 1955, the Village Voice was the earliest of 
the so-called underground papers, a branch of publishing that rose to prominence and became a 
force in the mid-sixties. Politically, the paper’s outlook was anti-Establishment Democrat—a 
political stance which may fit without too much friction with Sarris’s centrist liberalism. In 1978, 
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Sarris summed up his political position thus: “Rabidly centrist, liberal, populist, more Christian than 
Marxist, [and] libertarian to the point of licentiousness.”60 Sarris’s political orientation marks the 
point where his views most frequently converge with Kael’s. Apart from its commitment to the arts, 
the Village Voice deserves its place in history for breaching the four-letter-word taboo in American 
mass media.61  What Film Culture and the Village Voice shared was, in Sarris’s words, a cranky 
individualism.62  From 1990 to the present day, Sarris has been a staff critic in the pages of the New 
York Observer. 
     It seems fitting that Sarris’s first review in the Village Voice concerned Psycho (Alfred 
Hitchcock, 1960). Looking back on this watershed moment in his own career as well as Hitchcock’s 
from the vantage point of 1984, we are left in no doubt of the film’s importance:  
“The first time I saw Psycho I screamed with authentically Freudian fright. (Mother invading my 
shower with a knife?) I have witnessed this scene many times since, and have even ‘taught’ the 
scene in a classroom, and I now regard it as one of the most profoundly religious expressions in this 
century.”63  Sarris was the only critic in America who gave a rave review of the film at the time of 
initial release. He relates this episode with characteristic candour:  
 
As it happens, I came of age as a film critic in the sixties. Although I had published pieces in esoteric film 
periodicals beginning in 1955, it was not until my first review in the Village Voice that I first made contact 
with the masses of outraged readers. My offence? I praised Alfred Hitchcock’s Psycho in high-brow terms, 
indeed in Cahiers du Cinema politique des auteur terms (later “auteurist” terms). For weeks afterwards there 
came angry letters, demanding my head and my job. (Actually, I was not getting paid at the time for my 
reviews, but I valued a personal byline as the currency of immortality.)64 
 
Today, it seems almost surreal to consider that Hitchcock’s greatest commercial (and 
arguably artistic) success at the time of release was generally regarded as wayward and 
exploitive nastiness.  The formative experience that would fundamentally shape Sarris’s way 
of thinking was an extended sojourn in Paris in 1960-61 on the back-end of the Cannes film 
festival that year. This brought Sarris in close contact with a more enveloping and romantic 
conception of film as an art than any American critic or film historian before him. The 
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lasting impact of this experience can be gauged by the fact that Sarris actually published 
twelve editions of a publication called Cahiers du Cinema in English in the years between 
1965 and 1967.65 While always maintaining his commitment to journalism and belles-lettres, 
Sarris was also a pioneer in the early development of American hands-on film scholarship. 
Since 1965, Sarris has taught at The School of Visual Arts, New York University, Yale 
University and his alma mater, Columbia University. In the foreword to the anthology 
Confessions of a Cultist (1970), Sarris touchingly relates his bemusement at finding himself 
as a central protagonist in film scholarship simply because he as a young man had taken the 
plunge for film cultism in an attempt to defer the pressures of choosing a career: 
 
I didn’t realize at the time that I was slowly but surely gaining seniority in a profession that was about to 
explode. I didn’t even have to maneuver or manipulate. All I had to do was stand my ground, and suddenly I 
would find myself at the centre of the cultural landscape, returning in triumph to Columbia University, a 
scholar more prodigal than prodigious.66 
 
Career Overview – Pauline Kael  
 
Andrew Sarris is a cinephile expounding the glories of commercial narrative cinema, whereas 
Pauline Kael simply loved the movies—without a smidgen of remorse or intellectual pretension. One 
must take note of their diverging choice of words. Kael generally declined to use movie-specific 
jargon like “Mise-en-scène”, “cinema”, “cinematic” and “filmic.”  
Although Kael earned a reputation as a great impromptu lecturer, she was extremely 
sceptical of the academization of film, which of course can be summed up fairly adequately by 
pointing the finger at exactly the cultural shift from movies to cinema. “A movie becomes cinema 
when it can bore you as much as your worst experiences at lectures, concerts and ballet; i.e., when it 
becomes something you feel you shouldn’t walk out on.”67 This, of course, is a lament that points to 
two parallel developments that were crucial to Sarris and Kael's status as critics of a different kind 
than their predecessors.  
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     One development, of course, is the rising tide of avant-garde and foreign art films, and the 
other is the inclusion of film studies in the liberal arts curriculum at colleges and universities across 
America. As Kael would claim during a film symposium she attended in the 1970s: “If you think 
movies cannot be killed by education, you underestimate the power of education.”68 This has not 
endeared her to film academics, and in some circles, Kael has been something close to a pariah. 
Sarris, somewhat paradoxically, even went on record to blast “her cinephobic admirers in the 
cultural Establishment.”69 While there is a core of truth to Sarris’s statement, I find it very harsh, 
since giving up movies, for Kael, would have been like giving up “a vital appetite.”70 It is also fair 
to say that Sarris understood Kael's reservations about the academic appreciation of film, even if he 
disagreed with her. In 1970, he would write: “Until very recently, the earliest movie-going 
experiences—silent and sound both, were mercifully free from the stink of culture. There were no 
courses on the subject. No obligations and no imperatives.”71 Sarris, however, did see film 
scholarship as not only inevitable, but self-evidently desirable. This, perhaps, when all is said and 
done, is what most distinguishes his writings from Kael's. 
    David Bordwell, generally regarded as the leading film scholar of his generation, who 
indeed contributed to a Festschrift in honour of Andrew Sarris in 2001, is content to dismiss Kael as 
a “ vulgar but righteous  film fan.”72    
Unlike Sarris, a native New Yorker of Greek descent, the Californian Kael had no 
continental yearnings. In San Francisco during the 1940s, which was, of course, the stomping 
ground of the beat artists, Kael experimented with various forms of prose as well as avant-garde 
filmmaking together with James Broughton, a gay artist who fathered Kael's daughter Gina, a 
virtually unprecedented move in the sexually repressive climate of those times. Before making a 
living as a film critic, Kael worked in a variety of jobs, including as a cook and a seamstress, as well 
as programmer at the Berkeley Cinema Guild and Studio, a repertoire cinema, reportedly the first 
such venue with two screening rooms in America. Her long struggle for recognition goes a long way 
towards explaining her enormous zest and energy as a critic. 
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      That Kael’s programme notes became instant collectibles is a measure of her stimulating 
freshness as a precocious stylist. Her first piece of criticism, a review of Charlie Chaplin’s Limelight 
(1952), appeared in 1953 in the San Francisco quarterly City Lights. (She disliked the film intensely, 
referring to it with the singularly unflattering neologism “Slimelight”.) This served as a precursor to 
Kael’s in many always brilliant, always harsh, sometimes unfair put-downs, which became a 
hallmark of her prose style. 
    A genuine breakthrough came two years later, when she got a regular, albeit unpaid show at 
the listener-sponsored KPFA radio station. Several of these broadcasts are included in her best-
selling first anthology, a seminal work in 1960s non-fiction which set the tone for her brashly sexual 
metaphors, the aptly titled I Lost It at the Movies (1965).73 
   
  For a while, Kael wrote freelance, her work appearing in such serious-minded film and art 
periodicals as Sight & Sound, Film Quarterly, Partisan Review and Kulcher. A stint in the glossy 
magazine McCall’s ended prematurely. A caustic review of The Sound of Music (Robert Wise, 
1965) is often cited as the reason why her contract was not renewed. The review, actually a two-
hander on The Sound of Music and The Singing Nun (Henry Koster, 1966), ends like this: 
 
It's the big lie, the sugar-coated lie that people seem to want to eat. [...] Why am I so angry about these movies? 
Because the shoddy falseness of The Singing Nun and luxuriant falseness of The Sound of Music are part of the 
sentimental American tone that makes honest work almost impossible. It is not only that people who accept 
this kind of movie tend to resent work which says that this is not the best of all possible worlds, but that people 
who are gifted give up the effort to say anything. They attune themselves to The Sound of Money.74 
 
A brief interlude at the New Republic eventually led Kael to a job as a staff critic of the New Yorker 
in 1968. That she ended up on the East Coast was no accident. Critical clout, as well as the real 
economic power in the American film industry, is concentrated in New York. Apparently, the 
culturally conservative magazine approached Kael in an attempt to attract a more youthful 
readership. Mark Feeney offers a consensus view on this symbiotic relationship: 
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Mismatched though the patrician New Yorker and pugnacious Kael may have seemed, the marriage turned out 
to have been made in magazine heaven. It was Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers all over again: The magazine 
gave her class, she gave it sex appeal.75 
 
 Kael’s first published piece in the New Yorker was a review of Bonnie and Clyde (Arthur Penn, 
1967). (It almost seems scripted that way, considering her critical role in championing key figures of 
the Hollywood renaissance like Altman, Peckinpah and the early films of Scorsese and Coppola.)    
In the late sixties and seventies, sometimes misguidedly, she used her considerable power to further 
the careers of these filmmakers. Nobody, except perhaps Diane Jacobs, has contributed more to our 
current understanding, rightly or wrongly, of American films in the seventies as a golden age of 
personal filmmaking. “Our filmmakers seem to be on a quest—looking to understand what has been 
shaping our lives. A few decades hence, these years may appear to be closest our movies have 
gotten to the tangled, bitter flowering of American letters in the early 1950s.”76 Critic David 
Thomson has hit on this counter-cultural understanding of the New Hollywood film as central to 
Kael's writing:  “At this particular time in American film, her rescue act of Bonnie and Clyde placed 
her in the camp of the of the new, the American, the sexy and the violent.”77 Kael made herself 
central to the New Yorker, and the magazine was as firm a base for Kael as the Village Voice was for 
Sarris. After a brief, luckless stint as a producer attached to Paramount Pictures in 1979 (at star and 
producer Warren Beatty's request), she returned to the magazine in 1980 as  the New Yorker's sole 
film critic on a flexible, bi-weekly basis, having formerly shared the job with Penelope Gilliat. 
Kael's working relationship with the New Yorker lasted until her retirement from reviewing in 1991. 
 
American Film Criticism from Its Beginnings to the 1950s—And a Note on Present 
Challenges 
In the introduction, I argued the perhaps idiosyncratic and debatable point that Sarris and Kael are 
the most important film critics in American history. The reader may agree or disagree, but I shall 
simply restate this as an axiom or dogma, if you will, and I do not intend to subject this assumption 
to thorough empirical inspection of their relative merits or demerits vis-a-vis other American critics. 
A brief historical framework to place their work (and mine) on a surer footing is nevertheless in 
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order. To do so, we must briefly trace the evolution of film criticism from its beginnings to the mid-
1950s, when Sarris and Kael first appeared on the critical scene. 
      Journalistic writing about film is virtually as old as film (for a theatre audience) itself. The first 
instance of what may be called proto-film criticism in America appeared in the New York Times on 
April 24, 1896, when an anonymous journalist reported the opening of the Koster & Bial's Music 
Hall Theatre which had taken place the previous day. Most reviews during the first decade of film 
history resemble this first ever film review on American soil. They are journalistic hybrids, 
combining factual description of the programme and the venue with a pointed public-service 
pronouncement on whether or not the prospective patrons should pay to see the spectacle on show. 
According to Sarris, these snippets of information are invaluable as sources to the film historian 
because they are simple descriptions of an event.78  
    As the general run-of-the-mill film gradually extended to feature-length and became more 
structurally complex around 1905, trade papers began appearing, publications which treated film as 
an economic fact and a permanent feature of urban life.  Periodicals such as the Moving Picture 
World were primarily concerned with film as a booming business enterprise, but also offered articles 
of marked critical value. The first influential, if not exactly famous, film critic in America, Frank E. 
Woods, wrote for the trade paper the New York Dramatic Mirror between 1908-1912 under the 
byline “the Spectator”—a moniker, perhaps, with just an ounce of voyeuristic self-deprecation. 
       In the history of film criticism, as well as film history proper, D.W. Griffith's Birth of a 
Nation (1915) is a highly significant milestone. In Sarris’s most important film-historical narrative, 
The American Cinema: Directors and Directions 1929-1968, Griffith's film marks the beginning of 
cinema as a fully-fledged art, in the sense that everything prior to that film constitutes archaeology 
and prehistory in Sarris’s conception of aesthetic film history.  In the words of film scholars Tim 
Bywater and Thomas Sobchack, Birth of a Nation, in its own contemporary context, gave a great 
impetus to film criticism as a professional activity.79  
      The American critical scene was largely untouched by the European ontological trends of 
formalism and realism in the search for the essence of film art in the 1920s and 1930s, but the last  
decade before the Second World War saw the arrival of stylish critics in the American press. Chief 
among these was Otis Ferguson, who made his mark in the short time span of 1934-1941. Ferguson 
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was himself a verbal entertainer who treated the movies not as art but as a lively form of 
entertainment which could be either good, bad, or indifferent. Ferguson was a marked influence on 
Sarris, who provided the foreword to the former's anthology of criticism, and claimed that several of 
Ferguson's reviews “were so close to top of American journalism that it isn't worth measuring the 
difference.”80 That film criticism was gaining prestige in the thirties is incontestable, and nothing 
denotes prestige like books. It is no coincidence that the first Anglo-American anthology of film 
criticism was published in 1937: Garbo and the Night Watchmen, edited by Alistair Cooke.81 
Cultural historian Michael Kammen comments: 
 
The development of serious film criticism required a full generation to emerge, because for several decades, 
even through the 1920s, many publishers and editors mistakenly perceived moviegoing as primarily a vulgar 
mindless phenomenon. When Nunally Johnson asked to review films for the New Yorker, Harold Ross, its 
founder and editor, dismissed the proposal archly by declaring that “movies are for old ladies and fairies.”82 
 
     In the forties and fifties, there emerged two figures more important than even Otis Ferguson: 
Robert Warshow, a sociologically oriented critic who was a pioneer in genre criticism, and above all 
James Agee.83 Agee holds the rare honour of being Pauline Kael's favourite film critic (and this is no 
mean feat, considering how ungenerous Kael was to most scribes in her profession). Agee is 
generally regarded as the most distinctive and perceptive film critic in America before the beginning 
of the boom years from the mid-fifties and onward. Collections of Warshow's and Agee's criticism 
were published posthumously at the end of the fifties (both died in 1955, the year Sarris broke into 
print) and these collections helped fuel interest in serious film scholarship. There are other names of 
interest, notably Manny Farber and Parker Tyler, but their writings are too esoteric and obscure to 
exert much influence on the critical mainstream in a country where criticism and philosophy alike 
have always been primarily pragmatic.  
      If Agee was the American yardstick against whom both Sarris and Kael measured 
themselves, they were both also sharpening their critical knives to do battle with their common 
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contemporary foes. Apart from each other, their favourite target was the very influential and very 
socially conscious Bosley Crowther of the New York Times. It is without question primarily 
Crowther and critics like him that Sarris had in mind when he wrote: 
 
  
Unfortunately, too many bookish film critics have perverted the notion of ecumenical erudition by snobbishly 
subordinating film to every other art. Whereas the late James Agee discovered cinema through his love for 
movies, too many of his self-proclaimed successors choose to abuse movies in the name of Kultur.84 
 
Note the strategic use of the word Kultur, which denotes gravitas but also connotes a kind of stuck-
up stuffiness and a condescending attitude towards American popular culture. On this score, I would 
venture to guess that Sarris and Kael are in agreement. In fact, Kael would press the issue of 
American popular culture vis-a-vis the Old World one step further than Sarris:  
 
As a schoolgirl, my suspiciousness about those who attack American “materialism” was first aroused by the 
refugees from Hitler who so often contrasted their “culture” with our “vulgar materialism” when I discovered 
that their “culture” consisted of their having had servants in Europe, and a swooning acquaintance with the 
poems of Rilke, the novels of Stefan Zweig and Lion Feuchtwanger, the music of Mahler and Bruckner. And 
as the cultural treasures they brought over with them were likely to be Meissen Porcelain, Bierdermaier 
Furniture, wax fruit, oriental carpets wax fruit, and bookcases with glass doors, it wasn't to difficult to 
reconstruct their “culture” and discover that it was a stuffier, more middle-class materialism than they could 
afford in the new world.85 
It is significant in this context that the  film followed followed the opposite trajectory to first real 
mass medium: the newspaper. Sociologist and historian Paul Starr puts the matter thus: 
 The  movies' low status beginnings were of particular importance because of the deepening divide between high culture 
and popular entertainment at the turn of  the  century [...] Whereas  newspapers and magazines had begun among  the 
elite and evolved in a more popular direction, movies acquired a lowbrow image at an early point in their history and 
faced a challenge in achieving respectability.86 
After sixty years of film history, nobody could argue against the fact that this tide was turning, In 
“Trash, Art, and the Movies” Kael voiced her by now familiar complaint; that the movies would be 
killed if rendered respectable: 
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“When you clean them up, when you make movies respectable, you kill them. The wellspring of 
their art, their greatness, is in not being respectable87” 
  Stil, Kael depended on a growing respectability of the medium. After all,the impetus behind both 
Sarrisian auteur theory and Kael's art/trash interplay was to confer artistic status and aesthetic value 
on a medium whose dominant expression is derived from neither courtly/bourgeois high culture nor 
ancient European folk culture, and so could be more easily claimed to be both American and 
popular.  The state of film criticism in America in the fifties helped pave the way for critics looking 
to break away from the petrified timidity and plodding surface of tastefulness and restraint that 
characterize the period, but other external factors were important in giving Sarris’s and Kael's 
criticism a more profound impact than their predecessors.   The single most important historical 
extraneous factor that explains the greatness Sarris and Kael share was the emergence of what 
fellow critic Stanley Kauffmann crystallized as the Film Generation in a 1966 essay.88 The Film 
Generation might be described as quite a large segment of the population, or rather a subculture 
within the American (and European) population born after 1935. This generation was, in their turn, 
dependent on another vastly important external factor.  
     The golden age of film criticism, from the fifties into the seventies, came about largely 
because the movies as a social institution and dominant mass medium became supplanted by 
television. Only by shedding a part of their universal mass appeal, and by attracting a more 
discerning audience who had broken free of the movies as a habit like any other, could mainstream 
narrative movies as the dominant form of expression in a mass medium aspire to a much-coveted (by 
a new breed of filmmakers, critics and audiences) status as legitimate works of art. More than 
anything, Sarris’s example showed that film art could be found where none had previously been 
thought to exist, something which truly captured the serious moviegoer's imagination. Taking this 
into account, Kael would write in 1973: 
 
Right now, movie critics have an advantage over critics in most other fields: responsive readers. And it can 
help you to concentrate your energies if you know that your subject is fresh and that your review can make a 
difference to some people. I would suspect that my reviews gain rather than lose from the speed and urgency of 
making deadlines and reaching the public before the verdicts are in on a film.89 
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      Media sociologist Melvin L. DeFleur has pointed out that motion picture attendances 
reached their two highest peaks ever in 1930 and 1946, with 90 million patrons per week 
domestically, only to plummet to 46 million in 1955, less than a decade later.90 Today we can easily 
observe that the social mechanics of this development is in the process of repeating itself. As the 
Internet has to some extent come to replace some of the more directly social functions of television, 
we now have television series on cable that aspire to being genuinely artistic. Sarris and Kael could 
not have predicted this at the height of their relevance and influence.  But it is very telling that Kael, 
highly critical of television in the sixties and seventies, lived to see The Sopranos and compared the 
series favourably to its big-screen cousin, Goodfellas (Martin Scorsese, 1990).91  
     Yet who can seriously imagine Sarris and Kael writing for TV Guide, or for that matter as 
critics on TV like Gene Siskel and Roger Ebert? They belong so much to an age when movies and 
moviegoing both seemed rebellious and heroic. How they managed to see almost everything of 
relevance makes the mind reel, if we consider the system of distribution in place forty years ago, 
even in a movie-mad metropolis like New York City. In a sense, they spent large parts of their lives 
in the darkness with an illuminated screen, so that filmgoers less avid than themselves did not 
necessarily have to in order to discover what was durable, timely or worthwhile. 
      If it is easier to be a critic today because of the sheer availability of movies—in cinemas or 
on home formats with directors' commentaries in a more pristine state than an old classic film ever 
is when shown in revival houses—it is also more difficult to be a critic of genuine consequence. If 
film and its social—or more precisely, societal status within the media matrix has changed since 
Sarris and Kael's heyday, it is because audiences as well as filmmakers have changed with the 
technology.   
  On the present situation, Josh Horowitz has noted: “For the first time we have a generation 
of moviemakers who did not need to leave their homes to study the greats of the past. In fact, this 
might be the first filmmaking generation whose greatest influence wasn't the world around them as 
much as the world they saw in their living room on TV.”92  While this is true of a new generation of 
critics and film scholars, I wonder if the scholar/critic has not been playing catch-up with the 
filmmakers for a generation or so.  
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 On this count, the Americans were actually way ahead of most of the world. The first 
generation of movie brats who would irrevocably change the film industry in the seventies and 
beyond began their cine-aesthetic education as kids by soaking up old films on television during the 
Eisenhower Administration, developing a sense of what works on the big screen by immersing 
themselves in the medium one step removed from the movie theatre.93 For the most formidable of 
all movie brats (in every sense), Steven Spielberg—who had the enthusiastic support of Kael in his 
early career—television became both an educational medium and a security blanket.94 Diane Jacobs 
sums up the first television/film school generation as being excruciatingly conscious of the medium 
and its history.95  
     In the thirty years since that was written, the trend has intensified.  In the current situation, 
the need for critics who can help us find our bearings in a world saturated with visual culture is 
more pressing than ever. Central to that pressure are issues of value. Value, in its most vulgar and 
basic sense, means simply knowing what you like. But Sarris and Kael also brought something else 
into the equation of value: “If the clamour of our critics is ever to provide insight it must be 
stimulated by a grasp of the essential relationship of the American movies with the mass American 
audience of moviegoers. The critic must throw out his credo of I know what I like and consider 
closely what they like.”96  
This could be construed as an open invitation to sociological film criticism. Judging by 
Kael's criticism, she would perhaps be closer to this spirit than Sarris, but that is not a point I wish 
to stress here. Sarris may possibly disagree, but when considered jointly, what he and Kael 
achieved—indeed, what makes them unique in American critical discourse—is exactly that they 
maintained a double focus: insisting on the value of what they liked, while factoring in the audience 
in the total picture.  
      Issues of value in this sense must be termed meta-criticism.  How does one approach the 
problem of meta-criticism—criticism inscribed in criticism? It is obvious that one must examine 
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criticism from a conceptual standpoint. Some times asking simple questions can yield profound 
answers. And the question we must now ask is: What is film criticism? 
  
Notes on Axiological Criticism, with Sarris and Kael as Examples 
Since this thesis aims to offer a comparative discussion of the works of two preeminent film critics, 
it might seem strange not to have already answered the nagging question with which I rather 
ominously and with great foreboding left hanging at the end of the last chapter. Pauline Kael, in 
particular, dealt with this question explicitly throughout her career. In I Lost It at the Movies, she 
offers a clear summary of the critic's task: 
 
 
The role of the critic is to help people see what is in the work, what is in it that shouldn't be. He is a good critic 
if he helps people understand more about the work than they could see for themselves; he is a great critic if by 
his understanding and feeling for the work, by his passion he can excite people so they want to experience 
more of the art that is there, waiting to be seized. He is not necessarily a bad critic if he makes errors in 
judgement (infallible taste is inconceivable; what could it be measured against?). He is a bad critic if he does 
not awaken the curiosity, enlarge the interest and understanding of his audience. The art of the critic is to 
transmit his knowledge and enthusiasm for art to others.97 
 
As this stands, I find terribly hard not to concur. Kael did not conceal that criticism as she outlined 
it above is a difficult task, a task which requires craft and skill. In fact, she would often flaunt the 
artistic aspects of criticism as essential. Responding to radio listeners who felt she had been too 
hard on a crop of avant-garde filmmakers, the toughness of her intelligence shone through:  
 
I regard criticism as an art, and if in this country and in this age, it is practised with honesty, it is no more 
remunerative than the work of an avant-garde film artist. My dear anonymous letter writers, if you think it is so 
easy to be a critic, so difficult to be a poet or painter or film-experimenter, may I suggest you try both? You 
may discover why there are so many poets, so few critics.98 
Notwithstanding that forty years of film studies and an ever-widening array of media channels has 
increased visibility drastically and made the film critic a much less rare creature, the force of Kael’s 
argument is undimmed, at least in one important respect.  
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In making the case for criticism as an art, Kael is simultaneously arguing that criticism is not 
a science. If this axiom holds true, critics have not only the license to be eclectic, creative and 
personal, but an obligation. One of Kael's most eloquent and incisive supporters, Will Brantley, has 
put the matter thus: “The goal of any subjective critic is not only to find associations, patterns and 
connections in a work, or group of works, but to make them come alive on paper.”99 It would be 
difficult to think of a film better suited to Kael's intensely subjective style than Taxi Driver (Martin 
Scorsese, 1976). The film, of course, is a feverishly nightmarish study in urban alienation and 
ultimately sexual release through annihilation, followed by an ironically disturbing, because heroic, 
vindication. “Travis becomes sick with loneliness and frustration; and then like a commando 
preparing for a raid, he purifies his body and goes into training to kill. Taxi Driver is a movie in 
heat, a raw tabloid version of Notes from the Underground, and we stay with the protagonist’s 
hatreds all the way.”100 
This amounts to the realization, shared by Kael and Sarris, that criticism does not have 
nomothetical rules. Many later film scholars have been troubled by Kael's disparagement of close 
analysis: 
 
I don't think analysing a movie shot-by-shot is any more scientific than describing your emotions when you see 
it. There is no such thing as scientific criticism. Value judgements are not made on a scientific basis and there 
is no scientific criticism in any of the arts.101 
 
Consciously or unconsciously, Kael is here echoing Ludwig Wittgenstein, who claimed that 
criticism, phenomenologically speaking, is generally non-theoretical, and that it involves only an 
illuminating verbal activity. Keine lehre, sondern eine Tätigkeit, was one of his most famous 
dictums.102 It is tempting to see Kael's lack of a formal critical method as a function of her 
empiricism:  
“There are not—and there never were—any formal principles that can be used to judge movies but 
there are concepts that are serviceable for a while and so pass for, or are mistaken for ‘objective’ 
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rules until it becomes obvious that the work that we respond to violates them.”103 Kael is not 
claiming here that there are no formal ways of describing films, but I doubt if she ever saw matter-
of-fact descriptions as very relevant in criticism, or very rewarding on a personal level for any 
writer. Judgements were her forte, and she left frame-by-frame analysis to more timid and usually 
lesser writers. It is too often overlooked how genuinely modern this idea is. In 1967, a sour, 
certified modernist like Theodor W. Adorno claimed: “Binding norms [for art] produce nothing but 
pastiche.”104 Interpreting Kael's pronouncements, something similar apparently applies to the art of 
criticism, at least if we take the dubious modernistic/moralistic view that pastiche must be dead and 
empty.  
     Sarris, on the other hand, has always seen himself as a film scholar, even if high theory was 
not his game. As he remarked in reference to a semiotics conference he attended in 1975: 
 
If anything, my talk was considered too informal for the august halls of academe, and the joint was packed 
with aspiring semioticians. [...] Hence, I consider myself in the role of a gainfully employed journalist. [...] I 
have dutifully read Barthes on Garbo, Wollen on Eisenstein and Metz on Adieu, Philippine. I have struggled 
with Tel Quel and Cinethique and the revamped Cahiers du Cinema. I have toiled through Derrida, Lacan and 
Foucault, and have found to my amazement that Freud has been converted to Marxism and Structuralism. 
Nonsense, I keep telling myself. But that was what most of my contemporaries and colleagues were saying 
about stylistic auteurism at the time I was preaching that gospel in America. Am I then simply the victim of the 
generation gap? Not entirely. Listening to the semiologists at the conference I suddenly realized how much 
romantic individualism remains in my makeup.105 
 
Kael shared Sarris’s individualism and, in fact, her romantic streak on criticism gives us useful clues 
to criticism in general, but what can be said to be unique to her criticism expanded into a 
philosophy? The obvious place to look is in “Trash, Art, and the Movies”, where she made the point 
that the particular greatness of movies resides in their opposition to an official school culture 
covered with reverential moss. While I have been unable to find evidence of any actual conscious 
influence on Kael's work from earlier American philosophers, it is quite plausible that she knew and 
respected the  deep-dish American aesthetic pragamatism of someone like John Dewey: 
 
                                                 
103
 Pauline Kael (1970) Kiss Kiss Bang Bang. London: Calder & Boyars. p. 6. 
104
 Theodor W. Adorno quoted in Ingeborg Hoesterey (2001) Pastiche: Cultural Memory in Art, Film and 
Literature. Bloomington: Indiana University Press. p. xi.  
105
 Andrew Sarris (1978) Politics and Cinema. New York: Columbia University Press. p. 148-158. 
45 
45 
Even a crude experience, if authentically an experience, is more fit to give clue to the intrinsic nature of aesthetic 
experience than is an object already set apart from any other mode of experience. Following this clue we can discover 
how the work of art develops and accentuates what is characteristically valuable in things of everyday enjoyment.106 
 
Reflecting this idea and bringing it down to earth, Kael remarks that most movies we enjoy are not 
works of art in any exalted Arnoldian sense, and not every movie has to matter.107 (A very non-
auteurist idea!)  Moreover, this is OK as long as we don't falsify what we respond to, which is often 
just the attractive glamour of pretty trash:    
 
Movie Art is not the opposite of what we have always enjoyed in movies, it is not to be found in a return to 
official high culture, it is what we have always found good in movies, only more so. It's the subversive carried 
further, the moments of excitement sustained longer and extended into new meanings. [...] When we go to the 
movies we want something good, something sustained, we don't want settle for just a bit of something, because 
we have other things to do.  If life at home is more interesting, why go to the movies? And the theatres 
frequented by true moviegoers – those perennial displaced persons in each city, the loners and the losers, 
depress us. [...] If we've grown up at the movies we know that good work is continuous not with the academic, 
respectable tradition but with the glimpses of something good in trash, but we want the subversive gesture 
carried to the domain of discovery. Trash has given us an appetite for art.108 
 
 
No one has summed up the consequences of this aesthetic doctrine more succinctly and, as it turns 
out, sympathetically, than fellow critic Martha Davis: 
 
She [Kael] is most moved by the cinema of sensations – she is a kind of connoisseur of sex, violence and 
suspense – and most appreciative of these elements when they are presented honestly, without plot 
contrivances that attempt to validate or apologize for this excitement. She wants movies to be vivid, thrilling, 
surprising, and she wants filmmakers to take risks with their form and their subject.109 
 
Kael could find this vitality in the best films by Jonathan Demme or Martin Scorsese (both, 
significantly, had graduated from exploitation films produced by Roger Corman) and sometimes in 
foreign films where American genres were re-imagined, such as Kurosawa's  “Easterns” like 
Yojimbo (1961): 
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Other directors attempt to create a pastness for the story, to provide distance, perspective. For Kurosawa, the 
setting may be feudal, or, as in this case, mid-nineteenth century, but we react (as we're supposed to react) as 
modern men. His time is now, his action so immediate, sensuous, raging, that we are forced to disbelieve, to 
react with incredulity, to admire. (This is partly due to the telephoto lenses that puts us right into the fighting, 
into the confusion of bared teeth and gasps and howls.) He shakes spears in our faces. This is more alive than 
any living we know; this, all our senses tell us, is art, not life. Ironic detachment is our saving grace. Of all art 
forms movies are in most need of having their concept of heroism undermined.110 
 
An undermined, if not actually repudiated heroism, and a more frank recognition of sex and 
violence, are the elements that arguably most attracted Kael to the content of much of the so-called 
New Hollywood Cinema of the seventies. However, it is perhaps difficult to fathom the ironic 
audacity of Yojimbo for a current audience, or for that matter young filmmakers who have grown up 
on that other great foreign imagist who drew even more directly on American forms, Sergio Leone.  
After seeing Once Upon a Time in the West (1969), Sarris was convinced, quite rightly, that Leone 
was the only living director who could do justice to the baroque elaboration of revenge and violence 
in The Godfather (Francis Ford Coppola, 1972). Fortunately, Leone did live to make his 
monumental gangster epic, Once Upon a Time in America (1984). Few have summed up this film 
more succinctly than critic, novelist, and noted biographer of film personalities, John Baxter: “The 
strength and weakness of Once Upon a Time in America is Leone's willingness to stand and stare at 
America, as the first explorers had done, ‘face to face for the last time in history’, as Scott Fitzgerald 
put it, ‘with something commensurate to his capacity for wonder.’”111 Leone's final film serves 
brilliantly to sum up Pauline Kael's views on the interpenetration and mutual enrichment of trash 
and art, or probably more correctly, the transformation of kitsch into Art:  
 
The movie might seem a compendium of kitsch – and in a certain sense it is. But it is kitsch aestheticized by 
someone who loves it and sees it as the poetry of the masses. It isn't just the echoing moments that keep you 
absorbed. It is those reverberant dreamland settings and Leone's majestic, billowing sense of film movement; 
the images seem to come at you in waves of feeling. Despite the film's miscasting and its craziness, Leone 
sustains the mood for an almost incredible three hours and forty-seven minutes – most of it unusually quiet. 
The movie has a pulse; it's alive. But not now. It's alive in some golden-brown past of the imagination.112 
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But Kael did not always follow her aesthetic prescription, as evidenced by her review of a later 
American gangster film with a less operatic feel, which was, if anything, a lot more vivacious and 
filled with in-your-face energy than Leone's reverie of time, loss, dreams and memory. I am 
referring to Goodfellas (Martin Scorsese, 1990):  
 
Scorsese the arousal junkie makes you feel you'd want to hang out with him and listen to him tell you how he 
 brought off the effects; he's a master. But this picture does not have the juice and richness that come 
with major performances. It has no arc, and doesn't climax; it just comes to a stop. Conceivably the abruptness 
could work, but I don't think it does. Will the lift of the movie-making still carry some people aloft? Maybe, 
because watching this movie is like getting strung out on pure sensation. That's Scorsese's idea of a hood's life. 
It's also the young film enthusiast's dream of a director's life, and in Scorsese's case, it's not too far from the 
truth.113   
 
Note that Kael is faulting the film on formal (although modernist would be stretching the truth) 
grounds, even if the film should be a perfect fit for her taste for visceral sensation. For Kael the film 
critic, as opposed to the merely casual viewer, the aesthetic doctrine of sensation must be tempered 
with lucidity and superimposed with a countervailing force inspired not by popular culture or pop 
art, but moderate and cool modernism, which is as close as Kael came to being pedagogical:  
“Movies operate in a maze of borderlines; criticism is a balancing act, trying to suggest perspectives 
on the emotions viewers feel, trying to increase their enjoyment of movies without insulting their 
susceptibility to simple, crude pop.”114  As we have seen, Kael shared that susceptibility to pop she 
attributes to the mass audience, but she saw it as the critic's task to help us reflect upon how we 
respond to the pleasures of popular art. One related, pressing problem for the film critic, according 
to Kael, is that films can be 
effective on shameless levels. [...] When a movie has startled people, like The Towering Inferno or enlisted their 
sympathies and made them weep like Walking Tall, or made them feel vindictive and sadistic like the Charles Bronson 
picture Death Wish, the hardest thing for a critic to do is convince them that it isn't necessarily a great picture. It is 
almost impossible to persuade people that a shallow, primitive work can give them a terrific kick.115 
 
The pop art sensibility of Kael's aesthetic has been duly noted by most observers, even if no one has 
stressed these links as much as I have. However, as I pointed out in the chapter where we delineated 
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the relationship between art and criticism, there is a disconcerting flip-side to this coin. I am talking 
about her sometimes neurotic misgivings about the popular art, the trash that she loves and sees as 
an essential component of film art. Sometimes, Kael actually metamorphoses into a venomous critic 
of mass culture. While always maintaining that mass culture does not sink under its own weight 
because there is vitality contained in it and because of its responsiveness to the needs of the 
public,116 her tone is nevertheless, if only on a couple of occasions, so aggressive that it makes you 
wonder if she is giving elitists like Clement Greenberg and Theodor Adorno a run for their money: 
 
After half a century in which movies were indeed a medium that linked people, and gave us, for good or ill, 
common experiences, we get this public-relations “suddenly” stuff when the bulk of American movies are 
being aimed directly at the young audience and are sold to it on the basis that it's different from all previous 
audiences. In its small way, the pitch is deliberately calculated as the teenage magazine ad (the two are even 
dotted the same way). By the time the media men, with the teachers at their heels, have finished indoctrinating 
school kids to be the film generation, that “core language” —whatever it is—may be only language they've got 
left. The Joker in this stacked deck is that school kids and college students go to the movies less frequently 
than earlier generations did. Although students are saturated from watching television at home (which may be a 
major factor in why they expect to be passively entertained at school and turn off when they aren't), movies are 
being pushed in the school systems because the number of paid movie admissions is about a fourth of what it 
used to be. Movie companies are trying to develop new customers, like tobacco companies when they sent free 
cartons to the soldier in the Second World War, to get them hooked on cigarettes.117 
 
I do not wish to dispute that those who make decisions on behalf of vast media conglomerates, of 
which the film studios have been but one branch since the (still-ongoing) industry realignment 
began in the mid-sixties, oftentimes may have cynical agendas. Still less do I wish to argue that 
there is no reason to debate the effects of an uncritical consumption of the ever-widening array of 
media products. Still, this extraordinary quotation from Kael strikes me not only as neurotic, but 
paranoid. Indeed, one of her collections is called Hooked, which seems to me a way of telling the 
world she had become afflicted, in what is perhaps a moment of painful sincerity. Sarris, of course, 
could not let this play to the opposition go unnoticed: 
 
It is strange enough for a highly regarded professional film critic to describe the movie-going habit as a 
probable cause of cultural cancer. It is stranger still to suggest that film courses have been sneaked into high 
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schools and colleges by the same old nameless media monsters. THEM! Quite the contrary. What is left of the 
film industry has been cashing in on the rising academic interest in the cinema. Film rentals go up every year, 
especially for the fashionable classics like Citizen Kane, and Potemkin and Persona. I wish to go on record 
right here that I would love to be corrupted by free films for my students from any source.118 
What this boils down to essentially, I think, is the conflict between someone who welcomed film 
scholarship as an end in itself, and someone who detested the idea and resisted it despite fighting a 
losing battle. Could the greatest populist of American film criticism be a snob at heart? She seems to 
have felt that since movies are so sheerly enjoyable, we should resist studying them. Whatever we 
may think on that issue, it does appear to be a recurring theme in Kael's criticism. 
            I have now given an extensive run-through of Pauline Kael's aesthetics and criticism, using 
Andrew Sarris mainly as a sounding board. But we have not dealt with film criticism in a more 
general sense, and to this we must now turn.  
            It is probably well-advised to be somewhat more prudent and less greedy for particulars than 
we have been if we are to discuss criticism in the broadest and most general sense. At this point, we 
want to take as our point of departure a less idiosyncratic and more level-headed account of 
criticism in general than either Kael or Sarris can muster. To do so, we might continue by referring 
to a textbook in film studies aimed at undergraduates. One such current book is Stephen Prince's 
Movies and Meaning, which has been published in several editions.   
            In this textbook, Prince offers a definition based on characteristic functions performed by the 
film critic: 
 
The critic (1) teases out implicit or subtle meanings, (2) clarifies seemingly contradictory messages or values in 
a given film, and (3) creates a novel way of interpreting or understanding a film. This last function is the 
central act of criticism: the creation of a new interpretation that extends or deepens the viewers' appreciation of 
a film.119 
 
Prince highlights the interpretive, creative aspect of film criticism as the central functional act in the 
process. David Bordwell has taken this approach several steps further and places film criticism 
(begrudgingly, as it turns out) within the greater context of ancient literary theory when he defines 
the interpretations of film criticism as a form of rhetoric. Bordwell's schemata, identical to that of 
classical rhetoric, consist of inventio (the devising of arguments), disposito (their arrangement) and 
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elocutio (their stylistic articulation). “Rhetoric is the shaping of language to achieve one's ends, and 
in the act of shaping the language, the ends get sorted and sharpened.”120 Søren Kjørup is even more 
direct when he calls rhetoric a form of strategic action.121 
            Since its original inception, rhetoric has taken on a variety of meanings, and is often equated 
with the orator's style and delivery, but it is useful for our purposes to refer briefly to its original 
historical status. Wilbur S. Howell points out that rhetoric in ancient, classical times was a mode of 
communication tied to popular democracy, designed to communicate with the populace through the 
convincing arrangement of arguments, whereas logic was the preferred mode of communication   
amongst scholars. The golden age of criticism proper in early modern times similarly served a 
political function as a midwife of democracy, a driving force in the development of what Jürgen 
Habermas, perhaps with an overly romantic phrase, has termed the public sphere, with the new 
urban coffeehouses as major flashpoints.  Howell writes:  
“Perhaps the most significant change that has come over the theory of communication during the 
last four hundred years is that logic has dissolved its alliance with the communication arts and 
aligned itself with scientific investigation.”122 
            I will not detail the tools of rhetoric any further, but merely affirm that the orator uses 
language as a form of symbolic material to communicate. Following up on this assertion, I now 
specifically want to call attention to the communicative function of rhetoric. Sonja K. Foss puts the 
matter thus: 
 
The choice of whether to use the term rhetoric or the term communication to describe the process of 
exchanging meaning is largely a personal one, often stemming from the tradition of inquiry in which a scholar 
is grounded. Individuals trained in social scientific perspectives on symbol use often prefer the term 
communication, while those who study symbol use from a more humanistic perspective, tend to select the term 
rhetoric.123 
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My own inclination as a writer is toward the humanistic tradition, but in film and media studies, 
which of course draw heavily on sociology, communication is probably the established convention. 
In any event, this semantic distinction is of very little consequence for my main line of argument,  
which brings us back to the point made earlier by Bordwell.  
            If criticism, as Bordwell contends, is an off-shoot of rhetoric—a form of communication 
consisting of the shaping of language to one's ends, as he puts it—what are the implications? 
Bordwell readily admits that rhetoric is not the disinterested manipulation of language. He roughly 
distinguishes between three kinds of institutionalised film criticism, I have inverted the 
chronological of Bordwell's scheme in order to present them in descending order based on  prestige: 
There exists the kind of criticism  that is internal to academia and results in dissertations and 
scholarly books; the essayistic form found in specialized film magazines; and lastly the journalistic 
reviews typical of newspapers and general interest magazines.124 
 We may note that purely academic criticism may or may not be value-oriented, while the personal 
essay typically is value-oriented and the review is so by definition. Sarris and Kael are essayists, yet 
they straddle all three types of criticism, with aesthetic evaluation as the ultinate aim of their 
activity. 
       If we take Bordwell's assertion about criticism as a form of rethoric  at face value, we are in 
effect saying that criticism typically communicates ideas and feelings that are not value-free. Taking 
this as a point of departure, I now want to narrow the field drastically to examine the nature of value 
judgements as an inherent and essential component of criticism. As Kael claimed, these are not 
scientific in any usefully strict sense of the term, but they do provide us with special kinds of 
knowledge.  
 
            Etymologically, “criticism” is derived from the Greek verb krinein, which simply means to 
discern or to judge. Judging, of course, is a prescriptive action rather a descriptive one. When 
criticism openly and explicitly emphasises issues of value, we say that it is axiological. Sarris and 
Kael, who are deeply concerned with film as an art form, share an unabashedly axiological outlook. 
In her first real think-piece, originally published in 1956, Kael saw the axiological variant of 
criticism as being under severe pressure:  
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As the mass media developed, the finer points of democratic theory were discarded, and a parody of 
democracy became public dogma. The film critic no longer considers that his function is the formation and 
reformation of public taste (that would be an undemocratic presumption); the old independent critic who would 
trumpet the good, blast the bad and tell his readers they were boobs if they wasted their money on garbage 
gives way to an amiable fellow who feels responsible not to his subject matter, but to the tastes of his stratum 
of the public.125  
 
As an auteurist, Sarris more or less upheld a Francophile criterion of enthusiasm as an ideal in 
criticism, but distinctions and differentiations have always been his stock-in-trade as a critic. All the 
same, Sarris’s attitude to his profession is less high-minded and more sardonic than Kael's:  
  
[M]ost movie reviewers fancy themselves as magistrates of merit and paid taste consultants for the public. The 
“best movie” reviewer is the “toughest” movie reviewer, and a reputation is made and measured by the 
percentage of movies the reviewer pans. The more movies panned, the more honest the reviewer. Everyone 
knows how assiduously the movie companies seek to corrupt the press. Hence, what better proof of critical 
integrity than a bad notice? Besides, the journalistic beat of a movie reviewer takes in all movies, not just the 
ones he likes. The highbrow critic can pick and choose, the lowbrow reviewer must sit and suffer.126 
  
            Whatever the outlook, the critic's job is to differentiate and discriminate. To differentiate 
between an unimportant bad movie and a bad movie that matters, as Kael once put it,127 is of course 
also to be understood within axiological parameters. 
            So, axiological criticism in general is concerned with making value judgements on a scale of 
good or bad. What does this mean? Does it mean that criticism is no more than emotive reports on 
the critic’s state of mind that tell us nothing about the object he wishes to praise or condemn? 
Philosophers have mulled over this problem for centuries. Curt J. Ducasse represents the extreme 
subjectivist viewpoint, which seemingly amounts to anarchy in criticism: 
 
The critic’s evaluations […] ultimately are just as purely matters of taste as those of the unsophisticated 
amateur. The great difference […] is that the naive amateur is pleased or displeased without knowing exactly 
why, whereas the critic does know what specific features are responsible for his own pleasure or displeasure in 
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a work of art. But in both cases the situation is in the end just the same as with, let us say, the taste of 
pineapple.128 
 
In a sense, Ducasse’s view seems perhaps intuitively right if applied to the specific subjects of our 
study, Andrew Sarris and Pauline Kael, since their careers were built upon their being opinionated.  
They both take pride in describing their immediate emotive responses as directly and truthfully as 
possible, making few concessions to “balanced objectivity”. It must be admitted that even if 
Ducasse is correct, criticism can still perform a couple of important functions which are different 
from and more than simply telling the patron/consumer of art what he ought to like or dislike. The 
critic of course functions as a guide analogous to a guide in a foreign city, but he also fills an 
additional, closely related function: 
 
If a person has read often enough what a given critic has to say concerning books or pictures with which he 
himself is familiar, then he may form an idea of the relation between the critic’s judgements and his own. He 
[sic] may find for instance that he himself usually likes or finds interesting the works that the critic approves; 
and may thus be able to infer, from what the critic says about a given work, whether or not he will find it 
worthwhile.129 
 
            It would probably be fair to say that most people use film criticism, or at the very least, 
reviews, in this manner. It could also be argued that the best critics foster exactly this sort of 
identification. According to noted jazz critic Francis Davis, reading Kael's reviews was “like going 
to the movies with someone you adored; when you disagreed with her, it was like having a lover's 
quarrel.”130  
Ducasse, we should note, essentially advocates a sophisticated view of the critic as a 
consumer guide. The implicit ideal reader asks, “Is it any good?” Answering this question is the 
primary function of a journalistic critic, whatever the publication.  According to Sarris:   
 
This is initially the least interesting question one can ask about a film and ultimately the most important. I 
suppose every wishy-washy reviewer in captivity has known that awesome moment of truth when Aunt Minnie 
has put the question in its most brutal form: “Should I see it or shouldn't I?” The crowd roars; the bull snorts. 
                                                 
128
  Curt J. Ducasse (1955[1944]) Art, the Critics and You. New  York: Bobbs-Merrill.  p. 126. 
129
  Ibid, p. 128. 
130
  Francis Davis (2002) Afterglow: A Last Conversation with Pauline Kael. New York: DaCapo Press p. 23. 
54 
54 
There is no escape. All the iconography, mise-en-scène, politiques and the commitments in the world are 
useless. A simple yes or no will suffice.131 
 
      Still, this is conditional, and the principal problem of Ducasse’s position seems emphatically 
evident. If Ducasse is right, it is perhaps difficult to see how any evaluative and normative 
statements about works of art would have any epistemological value. I would certainly like to think 
that the upper echelons of (film) criticism, where Sarris and Kael belong, can play a somewhat a 
more prominent role than Ducasse affords them.  
    The analytic philosopher Morris Weitz disagrees with Ducasse, maintaining that true 
criticism has an empirical core, and that taste and explicit or implicit standards of criticism are 
potentially two different entities, which can be, and frequently are, separated. If we say that 
something is better than something else, we are always referring to certain standards, but these 
standards need not always be reduced to an arbitrary expression of preferences. Morris Weitz 
convincingly argues that extreme subjectivism, of which Ducasse is a test case, rests on the fallacy 
that our value judgements are by necessity identical with our preferences, our taste. I will take stock 
of Weitz's rejection of Ducasse's position shortly, but first we must perform a close inspection of the 
key concept in his argument, taste, with empirical examples gleaned from Sarris’s and Kael's 
criticism.  Taste itself is an ambiguous concept, referring to habitual preferences as well as a refined 
perceptiveness required in persons said to have good taste.  
    Matters of taste occupy a central position in any critic's outlook, and Sarris and Kael are 
both acutely aware of this. “[Criticism is] all a matter of taste (and education and intelligence and 
sensibility) and one person's taste is not as good as another's.”132 Sarris, characteristically somewhat 
more measured in his explication of taste, quotes Paul Valery to flaunt his vast knowledge of film 
history. “Taste [...] is made up of a thousand distastes.”133 Neither Kael nor Sarris were up in arms 
over the greatest divider in taste, the avant-garde film. In 1966, Kael would write: 
  
Good liberal parents didn't want to push their kids in academic subjects but oohed and aahed with false delight 
when their children presented them with a baked ashtray or a woven doily. Did anyone guess or foresee what 
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narcissistic confidence this generation would develop in its banal “creativity”? Now we're surrounded and 
inundated by artists. And a staggering number of them wish to be, or already call themselves filmmakers.134 
 
According to Sarris, avant-garde films are dictated not primarily by often-trumpeted formal 
concerns, but rather by an impulse towards the shattering of content taboos, political, religious, and 
sexual.135 A decade later, he would elaborate: “At best, the avant-garde cinema is an eccentric 
reaction to the narrative cinema. To argue that it is more is to ignore the evidence of the perennial 
walkouts.”136 Kael would more or less inadvertently describe something that can be construed to 
sum up both this kind of filmmaker and his core audience in relation to movies at large, in Kiss Kiss 
Bang Bang: 
 
Movies have always seemed to be both behind and ahead of the culture. Though the sexual revolution has 
scarcely found its way onto the screen, and movies rarely deal with the simplest kind of heterosexual life in our 
time, they're already treating bisexuality—like the kids who are on pot and discussing the merits of LSD before 
they've had their first beer.137 
 
Kael believed in the traditional prerogatives of the critic, which is why, in the brilliant piece that 
opens I Lost It at the Movies, “Zeitgeist and Poltergeist; Or, Are Movies Going to Pieces?”, she 
blasted Susan Sontag's controversial views on Jack Smith's scandalous success Flaming Creatures—
a milestone in the New American Cinema avant-garde cycle to which Sarris had been a bemused 
onlooker, if actually much more as a mole than as an agent. Kael felt that Sontag's review was a 
rationale that extolled indiscriminateness as a value, and by extension, promoted meaninglessness 
and anarchy in art and criticism: 
 
In Los Angeles, among the independent film-makers at their midnight screenings, I was told that I belonged to 
an older generation, that Agee-alcohol generation they called it, who could not respond to new films because I 
did not take pot or LSD and so couldn't learn just to accept everything. This narcotic approach of torpid 
acceptance, which is much like the lethargy of the undead in those failure-of-communication movies, may 
explain why those films have seemed so “true” to some people (and why the directors' moralistic messages 
seemed so false).138  
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And elsewhere about the baby boomer avant-garde: “ 
Kids who can't write, who have never developed any competence in photography, who have never 
acted in nor directed a play see no deterrent to making movies.”139  
Having doubled as a film experimenter, Kael is, as to be expected, not entirely dismissive of 
the avant-garde, dishing out praise to avant-gardists Bruce Baillie, Carroll Ballard and Jordan 
Belson. However, her loyalties lie with commercial films, which she more often than not called 
movies.  Sarris would wholeheartedly agree with Kael's claim that even the worst overstuffed 
Hollywood film is often easier to sit through than an experimental film, because the former has 
actors and a story.140  
       I should now like to digress about a closely related phenomenon: what Kael terms the 
“failure-of-communication movie.” These films do not constitute a segment of the avant-garde, 
since they do have characters and a story, but rather are (or were in the sixties) a dominant “genre” 
within the commercially released art-house film—the  most telling sign that alienation, long since a 
mainstay in modern painting and literature,  had reached the fringes of popular culture. I choose to 
detail this development now, because it has a great bearing on the theme of this present chapter, 
which is, as noted, axiological criticism the way Kael and Sarris practised it, with its emphasis on 
the matter of taste.  
      The failure-of-communication cycle began in earnest with Hiroshima Mon Amour (Alain 
Resnais, 1959) and continued throughout the sixties with the progressively ever more fantastical 
films of Federico Fellini, and above all Michelangelo Antonioni's austere yet modish works. The 
best-known example of the cycle is probably Last Year at Marienbad (Alain Resnais, 1961). 
Neither Kael nor Sarris have ever been a priori opposed to praising “art films”.  Both, for instance, 
loved the still-perplexing and deeply ambiguous L'Avventura (1961) by Antonioni. On this 
particular occasion, Kael even praised the film in the high-brow terms derived from modernist 
literature, a strategy of interpretation that Antonioni blatantly courted. Kael's strategy in this 
particular review is noteworthy, because much so of her impact in the sixties stemmed from 
attacking, often quite viciously, critics she felt over-relied on similar high-cultural cross-references 
as tools for explication and interpretation. When she finds a film worthy of praise in such terms, 
Kael can be as high-toned as anyone: 
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Antonioni's subject, the fall, that is to say the exposure of a rich handsome gifted man, is treated 
accumulatively and analytically. An oblique, tangential view of love and society, a view not raised to the plane 
of despair. In its melancholy, L'Avventura suggests Chekov. Because it is subtle and ascetic, it suggests a 
Henry James who chewed more than he bit off. And perhaps because the characters use sex destructively as a 
momentary blackout, as a means of escaping self-awareness by humiliating someone else, it suggests D.H. 
Lawrence. Most of all I think, it suggests Virginia Woolf of The Waves. The mood of L'Avventura is disparate 
are we.141 
 
Sarris, on the other hand, ends his review of the same film with the following paragraph: 
 
The travels of the characters are paralleled by the meaningfully shifting backgrounds of geography, 
architecture and painting. This intellectual muscle of L'Avventura should appeal to anyone who seeks 
something more from the cinema than the finger exercises of conventional films.142 
 
There are two major observations about the contrasting styles of Sarris and Kael to be gleaned from 
these brief quotations, and both are less than obvious for anyone with only a passing acquaintance 
with their criticism. If anything, Kael's review is more grounded in literary tropes and steeped in 
modernist traditions—and this is a side to her critical personality which is too rarely considered. 
Sarris’s review is more visually oriented, and we may also detect a caution in his tone and surmise 
that he is less likely to either pan a film or rave about one than the perennially unstable Kael. All 
things being equal, Sarris’s tastes have always been more classical than the foremost representatives 
of the “failure-of-communication” mode of filmmaking (who were, for a time, La mode) could 
offer. Sarris pinpointed the characteristic traits of modernist films in his profile of the emblematic 
actress Monica Vitti, in whose visage the perplexing ambiguities of female sexuality become 
amplified as style as well as the dominant theme. It is not unjustified to regard Ms. Vitti as the pin-
up of the intellect, as Sarris does.143 It is worth noting what Sarris has to say on this paragon of the 
modern woman. Not at least because Sarris, undeterred by such awesome predecessors as Plato and 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, twice attempted the dialogue form as a epistemological mode of 
communication, one of which ended in him defining the cinema in a threefold exclamation: Girls! 
Girls! Girls!144 
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Monica Vitti clearly represents a certain kind of modern woman found at almost any intellectual cocktail party. 
She is usually searching for something, and as she strives to communicate what that something is, the unwary 
male becomes enmeshed in a hopeless guessing game. It is not marriage exactly, not money exactly, not 
security exactly, not sex exactly, not companionship exactly, not a career exactly – in fact, not anything 
exactly. Ultimately, inexactitude becomes the modern woman's secret weapon.145 
 
The key phrase in the context of this kind of film is “not anything exactly”. Always a master at 
encapsulating a filmmaker’s style in striking epigrams, Sarris nails both the appeal and 
shortcomings of Antonioni's entire oeuvre within the last page of his digressive piece on Monica 
Vitti: 
 
Because man, the eternal wanderer and truth seeker, is biologically incapable of woman's constancy, he is 
doomed to appear, at least in Antonioni's films, as a pitiable weakling in terms of a woman's character.  This, 
ultimately, is the cinematic psychology of Michelangelo Antonioni.146 
 
Antonioni was never likely to impress Kael for very long. The lethargic guilt-ridden sexuality of the 
disaffected well-to-do that infuses every minutely composed frame of his films is antithetical to 
Kael's need for liveliness. By the time of The Red Desert (1964), she had all but given up on him. In 
her eyes, Antonioni had become afflicted with a pseudo-intellectual mannerism right out of 
Marienbad. “Despite its connection with the world around us, I found the movie deadly: a hazy 
poetic illustration of emotional chaos—which was made peculiarly attractive.”147 What galled Kael 
most about this kind of film is that it constitutes a cheap way of inviting critics and audiences to 
make fools of themselves: “The art-house audience tends to accept lack of clarity as complexity, 
accept clumsiness and confusion as ambiguity and as style.”148 Kael, however, reserved her harshest 
critique of Antonioni for one of his “American” films, Zabriskie Point (1970). Not only did the film 
upset Kael stylistically, she also found Antonioni's intended critique of American consumerism 
offensive and trite while being blandly flattering to its young core audience: 
 
Zabriskie Point is pitched to youth—that is, to the interests and values of the rebellious sons and daughters of 
the professional and upper middle classes—the way old Hollywood movies used to be pitched to lower middle-
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class values. The good guys (youth) and the bad guys (older white Americans) are as stiffly stereotyped as in 
any third-rate melodrama and the evil police have been cast in the same mould as the old Hollywood Nazis. 
Antonioni has dehumanized them, so that they can be hated as pigs, but since he has failed to humanize the 
youths, it's dummies against dummies. Antonioni's speciality has always been “exposing” dehumanization in a 
dehumanized way; he has never before fallen into the trap of trying to show people with energy and vitality, 
and he simply doesn't have the temperament for it. [...] It's a dumb movie, unconsciously snobbish, as if 
America should be destroyed because of its vulgarity. [...] What he exposes is not America but the class basis 
of his own tastes and reactions. He gets an easy laugh out of a family of tourists in the desert—out of their 
garish clothes and materialistic equipment; he himself is an upper middle-class tourist with aristocratic 
tastes.149 
 
Sarris basically agreed, but here he demonstrates, once again, that for all his cultural audacity, he is 
a reluctant panner: 
 
Antonioni's relentless aestheticism dilutes his ideological impact at every turn.  If he had photographed the 
Nazi death camps, he would have found the most beautiful compositions available for that sort of material. 
This absurd dilemma of a Vogue photographer with a Marxist overview is Antonioni's curse and glory. It 
makes me enjoy Zabriskie Point more than I really respect it, but I can't help thinking that I belong to a 
minority of a minority in the pleasure I derive from dynamic visual forms for their own sake. Without pleasing 
performances, zippy dialogue and an unspoken complicity with the guilt-ridden but oh-so-comfortable 
affluence of America, Antonioni's Art must carry Zabriskie Point single-handedly, and that may not be enough 
to pay the rent in Culver City. But no one who takes cinema seriously can afford to pass up this latest canvas 
from the palette of the Michelangelo for our own time and our own medium.150 
 
The abiding impression left by Kael's and Sarris’s criticism is that they are essentially democratic, 
populist and open-minded, if not in any way open-ended. Kael did not want to be mistaken for a 
boob that attacks ambiguity and complexity.151 She wrote, “Errors of judgement aren't fatal, but too 
much anxiety about judgement is.”152 This, and I do not hesitate to call it a philosophical insight, 
may in fact be the reason why Kael ended up as a film critic. This statement requires closer 
explanation. As I pointed out earlier, Kael, as a matter of taste, appreciated and wanted to maintain 
the traditional cultural standing of movies rather than cinema, just as the balance between these two 
competing attitudes towards film seemed to be shifting toward the latter: 
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When movies, the only art which everyone felt free to enjoy and have opinions about, lose their connection 
with song and dance, when they become cinema, which people fear to criticise just as they fear to say what 
they think of a new piece of music or a new poem or painting, they will become another object of academic 
study and “appreciation” and will soon be an object of excitement to practitioners of the “art.”153  
 
If taste is crucial to criticism, it is still not the whole story. We should note that there is nothing 
logically unsound in the statement: “I know that Battleship Potemkin is a great movie, but I don’t 
like it.”  By the same token, every film fan has guilty pleasures that he or she enjoys inordinately, 
despite a distinct feeling that they are not really (even allowing for the potential absence of camp) 
good. The not always reliable but eternally fascinating interviewee Orson Welles, about whom both 
Sarris and Kael wrote extensively, similarly spoke for most of us when he once remarked in an 
interview: “There are works that I know to be good which I cannot stand.”154  
 
No one, however, has gotten so much poetic mileage out of this often troubling realization 
as Sarris did in his profile of John Ford, arguably the most ideologically problematic of all his 
pantheon directors. There is a tone of reflective rumination and doubt in this passage, which has no 
parallel in Kael's direct, slam-bang approach: 
 
John Ford's The Fugitive is a solidly pre-Catholic picture about a priest, a creeping Jesus. My feelings about 
the Catholic Church, are, to put it mildly, more mixed than Mister Ford's; I doubt that Jesus ever crept, and I 
am sickened when I watch others creep in his name. I dislike allegory and symbolism which are imposed on 
and denature reality as deeply as I love both when they bloom from and exalt reality; and romantic 
photography is the kind I care for the least. Over all, I think The Fugitive is a bad work of art, tacky, unreal and 
pretentious. Yet I think almost as highly of it as the films mentioned above, because I have seldom seen in a 
moving picture such grandeur and sobriety of ambition, such continuous intensity of treatment or such frequent 
achievement of what was obviously worked for, however misguided or distasteful I think it is.155 
 
These examples ought to give credence to Weitz’s position. Note also that the term “bad work of 
art” in Sarris’s argument expresses praise and severe reservations at the same time, bearing out our 
contention made in the introduction that art is to be understood as a normative premise.  
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Returning to Weitz’s argument specifically, the distinction between the critic and the non-
critic must be something more than just an ability to pinpoint entirely subjective reactions and 
express them cogently in verbal terms. Weitz goes on to suggest a different criterion of demarcation, 
in direct confrontation with Ducasse’s view: 
  
It simply is a fact that people, amateurs and critics alike, do distinguish between their preferences and their 
evaluations. […] The big difference between the amateur and the critic, lies, therefore, not in the fact that one 
is disinterested, and the other is not, in the causes of his pleasure or displeasure, but that the critic – provided 
that he is a real critic, not merely a reporter – tries to seek out within the work of art what makes it good [or 
bad], whereas the amateur is willing to accept his reactions with no such curiosity.156 
 
It is particularly noteworthy that Weitz, echoing the point we made in the introduction, makes an 
analytical distinction between critic and reporter. It is possible, as the media sociologists William 
Rivers and Wilbur Schramm have done, to distinguish between two ideal types of communication in 
this respect: informational communication and entertainment communication:  
 
The entertainer may be expected to be more concerned with form than is the informational communicator. 
How he writes […] is expected to give pleasure. He is usually imaginative rather than utilitarian, prizes rich 
writing over clear writing, and must expertly turn a phrase or build a scene. In short, although informational 
communication may be artistic, and although entertainment communication may present a picture of reality, 
the thrust of informing asks for the skills of the reporter, and the thrust of entertaining asks for the skill of the 
artist.157 
 
It is my contention that belletristic film criticism of the kind practised by Sarris and Kael calls for 
the skill of the reporter as well as the skill of the artist. It is very difficult to imagine a good critic 
who writes badly, though he may well be a good theorist.  Criticism is thus a fusion of the two ideal 
modes of communication as outlined by Rivers and Schramm. The entertainment element may be 
called criticism’s artistic or poetic aspect, which we saw Kael defend so vigorously at the beginning 
of this chapter. Sarris’s claim that the best criticism, like the best poetry, is that which is richest in 
associations,158 gives us a vital clue as to how criticism as a personally expressive and 
communicative literary mode ought to be understood. To highlight the poetic aspect of criticism is 
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to insist on a strong element of subjectivity. I now want to focus on criticism as a rhetorical and 
poetic mode in the broadest sense by detailing the nature of the aesthetic object as the focus of 
criticism.  
 
  With this in mind, I find it pertinent to clear up any potential misunderstandings 
immediately. I agree with Weitz, who highlights the empirical dimension of criticism in the sense 
that criticism is always directed at an object which holds the critic's attention. If we are to believe in 
the possibility of criticism, we must side with the empiricists and moderate philosophical realists 
and accept the existence of the object. The great art historian and connoisseur Max J. Friedländer 
once wrote, albeit with a hint of defensiveness: “No philosopher can forbid us to hold true that 
which we observe. If we do not believe in the object, then we cannot explain how an understanding 
between artist and spectator becomes possible.”159 Put a little more prosaically, the object-as-
representation/experience is scepticism's final destination.  As critics, we must simply accept this. 
This object is not the “thing in itself” which Immanuel Kant believed to be unknowable. It is, 
however, a special kind of object in a general and purely conceptual sense. Following the lead of 
philosopher Katarina Elam, we might say that the objects of criticism are intentional objects, 
making them subject to the interpretive motives and intentions of the critic and the consequences of 
intentional utterance, regardless of whether the original intention is relevant to the interpretation of 
the work. As Elam puts it, “The aesthetic object is the work of art as experienced.”160 Experience 
has a dominant emotional component, according to Elam: “Emotions seem to be links of great 
importance between ourselves and the surrounding world.  We understand and judge other people 
through our emotions. And working in the other direction, in the expression of an emotion, we try to 
say something about ourselves.”161 This, I think, is what Susan Sontag attempted to make clear in 
her classic collection of essays  “Against Interpretation162”, when she made a convincing case for 
the erotics of art. However, as much as I admire Sontag (she is indeed my favourite writer), she 
never abandoned her distant and grave intellectual aloofness, and so Kael's criticism is a more 
consistent—some would no doubt say insistent—example of someone who celebrates the erotics of 
art.  
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The cornerstone of experience, emotional or otherwise, is perception, and a great critic must 
of course be perceptive. Indeed, Pauline Kael asserts that “we read critics for the perceptions, for 
what they tell us that we didn’t fully grasp when we saw the work, the judgements we can usually 
make for ourselves.”163 Film scholar Frank M. Scheide similarly defines film criticism in relation to 
the singular film-experience: “Viewers perceive film through their physiological, emotional and 
intellectual  responses to a given motion picture. Criticism is the process by which we assess these 
perceptions. The value in any communication lies in the experience one accrues from it.”164  
This is true both of viewing films and of reading criticism. If criticism is to be considered an 
artistic activity, there is a need to reaffirm just how critics make themselves central to their writing 
by fusing two modes of communication which blend more or less seamlessly within the matrix of 
rhetoric. Elam would probably say that critics draw on a personal reservoir of emotions tied to their 
personal experience, as well as their qualities as writers and the clarity of their thinking. Stephen 
Prince has put the matter concisely: 
There are two sources of pleasure in good criticism. The first derives from re-experiencing the film through the 
critic's descriptions; the second derives from the critic's use of language. Many people read criticism not because they 
necessarily agree with the critic, but because they like the way the critic writes or talks about movies.165. 
 
Prince's arguments are basically sound, but he fails to mention the enjoyment and the intellectual 
rewards that often may arise from disagreeing with a critic. Such instances may force us to 
reconsider our reactions, or conversely, devise new arguments that may reinforce our initial 
reactions. By definition, this dialogical process between reader and text is predicated by value 
judgements. For a critic/historian like Sarris, a film history as well as a criticism without value 
judgements is unthinkable. “Film history devoid of value judgements would degenerate into a hobby 
like bridge or stamp collecting, respectable in its own esoteric way, but not too revelatory.”166 The 
revelatory power of value judgements deserves attention in its own right. Referring to value 
judgements, Virgil C. Aldrich points out that:  
 
In talking about works of art, people will frequently say that they like one better than the other, or that they 
simply can't stand it. These remarks are plainly about the speakers. They are primarily expressions about 
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subjective responses, though one may infer something from them if one is acquainted with the speaker, his 
taste, his expertise in such matters etc.167 
 
Aldrich seemingly offers an exact reprise of Ducasse's view, but not quite. By explicitly pointing 
towards inferential reasoning, Aldrich hints at the rich possibilities of a more systematic meta-
criticism. What one is able to infer from the evaluative elements in critical bodies of work along 
with the descriptive ones, may well be just as interesting and illuminating as a dry summation of 
empirical facts. In meta-criticism, a study of reasons is perhaps a more pressing concern than the 
causes, even if an absolute separation of the two serves primarily an analytic function.  We should 
not conceal the fact that Sarris and Kael are interesting not least for their tastes and how they 
verbalize and dramatize their likes and dislikes. 
  It is here, I think, that Ducasse is mistaken. Echoing Weitz, philosopher and art critic Jerome 
Stolnitz has chided Ducasse for not making a distinction between the aesthetic object as the cause 
of our pleasure or displeasure, and our private psychological reasons for liking or disliking an 
aesthetic object.168 This is a particularly relevant point in terms of Pauline Kael's criticism. Plenty of 
commentators have found Kael's critical method (lacking as it does Sarris’s preconditional 
contextual superimposition between the auteur and his films) disconcertingly haphazard and purely 
impressionistic. Writing with qualified admiration, Edward Murray cannot conceal that he is 
exasperated by Kael's Godardian love of spontaneity and improvisation:  
 
Pauline Kael has won many followers because she writes in a dazzling style, because she has a strong personality which 
is conveyed in everything she says, because she makes whatever interests her at the moment – even a trashy film – 
sound important, and because she discusses with intelligence subjects that most readers want to hear discussed.169  
 
Kael's slangy style, “straight from the lip,”170 is an indispensable correlate to her ideas (quite 
different in feel from Sarris’s more deliberate and formal use of alliteration) and was apparently 
formed during her time at Berkeley. “My vocabulary loosened up during my freshman year at 
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Berkeley, and I was quite pleased when my mother remarked that the more educated I got the more 
I sounded like a truck driver.”171  
   Not least by going for a distinctly colloquial writing style, Kael deliberately blurs the 
distinction between causes and reasons for liking or disliking a film. Even more importantly in this 
context,   the dominant source of her criticism is always and unapologetically herself.   
   In a 1991 interview, when the initial auteur controversy had long since faded, Sarris 
commented on his erstwhile enemy thus, declaring how he felt about being bracketed together with 
Kael as the premier American film critic. The comparison alone is enough to make him uneasy:   
 
I feel uncomfortable with it because I know how to distinguish myself from Pauline [Kael] as a critic in the 
sense that she makes herself the centre of the piece. She makes it the job of the filmmaker to astonish her, and 
if he fails, you know, “Off with his head!” [...] What I do journalistically to this extent is to say, “Well, this is 
how I see it and you may see it differently, and I have to give it to you so that you can calibrate it and relate it 
to your own experience.”172 
 
Kael did like to be astonished in the darkened theatre, and she liked to respond, provided there was 
something to respond to. The consistent use of first-person plural in her criticism served to place her 
in the audience; she was watching the audiences as well as the films. The early film historian 
Benjamin B. Hampton's observation that “the general astonishment value” had been the chief reason 
for movies' initial success and appeal has since become conventional wisdom, and has been 
substantiated by empirical studies of the early “cinema of attractions.”173 Kael, however, like no 
other critic of her stature before or since, seems to have been sustained and driven by the need to be 
astonished and overwhelmed. Like someone reeling (significantly, Reeling was the title of her 
favourite collection of her own work) from having discovered movies for the first time, Kael equates 
film art with physical excitement. Her prose throbs with a vibrant, participatory relish: 
 
Art is the greatest game, the supreme entertainment, because you discover the game as you play it. There is 
only one rule, as we learned in Orphee: Astonish us! In all art we look and listen for what we have not 
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experienced quite that way before. We want to see, to feel, to understand, to respond in a new way. Why 
should pedants be allowed to spoil the game?174 
 
Though Kael often complained that the ambiguity of modern art films tends to reduce criticism to 
autobiography, I would be hard pressed to find a more autobiographical film critic. Kael’s criticism 
can be intensely personal. Nowhere is this more evident than in her famous review of Vittorio De 
Sica's Shoeshine (1947) where the opening passage is nakedly and somewhat awkwardly 
confessional: 
 
When Shoeshine opened in 1947, I went to see it alone after one of those terrible lovers' quarrels that leave one 
in a state of incomprehensible despair. I came out of the theatre, tears streaming, and overheard the petulant 
voice of a college girl complaining to her boyfriend, “Well, I don't see what is so special about that movie.” I 
walked up the street, crying blindly, no longer certain whether my tears were for the tragedy on the screen, the 
hopelessness I felt for myself, or the alienation I felt from those who could not experience the radiance of 
Shoeshine. For if people cannot feel Shoeshine, what can they feel?175 
 
This is candid in the extreme, a passage which is the stuff of harrowing, trembling melodrama, that 
most subversive and feminine of genres. Was Kael ever confessional about her womanhood 
specifically? Since Kael was a brilliant female critic, the thorny question of her professed feminism 
is bound to present itself sooner or later, but there are no simple answers. 
     What is beyond question is that Kael's prose does disclose a distinctly feminine voice, and a 
feminine voice with a sexualized outlook, at that. Like sex, films have the capacity to affect us at so 
many sensory levels as to make us emotionally accessible, despite our thinking selves:176  
 
Movies, which arouse special, private, hidden feelings, have always had an erotic potential that was stronger 
than that of live theatre. People bred on TV and weaned on movies often feel sensually starved at a play – and 
they experience that starvation as boredom. When they are used to movies, live theatre no longer works for 
them on a fantasy level. There aren’t enough elements going for them in a play; they miss the constant flow of 
imagery, the quick shifts of place, the sudden rush of feeling.177 
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The first time Kael really asserted herself as a sexually alert critic was when she took the moralistic 
and highly influential New York Times critic Bosley Crowther to task for a comment he made in an 
otherwise laudatory review of Hud (Martin Ritt, 1964). It is also, in my view, the single most 
problematic piece of writing in all her criticism. Crowther had denounced the title character (played 
by Paul Newman) as a dangerous social predator for indulging himself with the neighbour's wife. 
Kael duly supplied a very personal counterargument derived from her own life. “My father was 
adulterous and a Republican, who, like Hud, was opposed to any government interference, who was 
in no sense and in no one’s eyes a social predator.”178 Kael then points to an attempted “rape” scene, 
which was a major talking point of the film:  
 
I suppose we are all supposed to react on cue to movie rape.  Alma (the housekeeper) obviously wants to go to 
bed with Hud, but she has rejected his propositions because she doesn't just want to be another casual dame to 
him; she wants to be treated differently from the others. If Lon hadn't rushed to protect his idealized view of 
her, chances are that the next morning Hud would have felt guilty and repentant, and Alma would have been 
grateful to him for having used the violence necessary to break down her resistance, thus proving she was 
different. They might have been celebrating ritual rape annually at their anniversaries.179 
 
Even today, accustomed as we are to art historian and all-purpose intellectual Camille Paglia's 
ludicrously attention-grabbing “look-at-me-I-am-so-decadent-and-depraved” pronouncements, this 
is pretty strong stuff. Does it make her an anti-feminist or a feminist? Well, this is an almost 
impossible question to answer in a satisfactory manner. She of course cannot be classified as an 
orthodox feminist, though she certainly believed in equal rights for men and women. But what, 
ultimately is academic feminism today? The aforementioned outrageous provacateur Camille Paglia 
once declared with her customary hyperbole that Madonna was nothing less than the future of 
feminism180 Madonna is nakedly ambitious, loves sex and never lets us forget it. At fifty, that trick 
is more impressive than at twenty-five; and  more subversive.  By this standard, Kael could possibly 
be hailed as an extraordinarily modern feminist for her time. But is this really adequate? Current 
feminists are obsessed with sexuality, even if gender theories cannot reconcile the contradiction 
between sex as a biological fact and gender as social construction. Still, there are disagreements 
over Kael's status as a feminist. 
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         Hurt by her anti-auterist fervour, Sarris accused her  of misapplied feminist zeal and thought 
she had made to much of  an issue of her womanhood.181  Predictably, the radicals fault her for 
being something close to an anti-feminist, if not quite a misogynist. Robin Wood has remarked that 
Kael's feminist consciousness was so underdeveloped that it could barely be described as embryonic 
- apparently because she responded to movies in the same way so many men do.182 What this 
response consists of exactly, however, is left unresolved in Wood's argument.   The very partisan 
writer Craig Seligman, (who was also a personal friend)  calls her  a proto-feminist, but I think all 
this is beside the issue  is beside the issue of the attempted rape scene in Hud. I certainly don't think 
she was making a simple “No means Yes” argument. 
          Kael had certainly been around the block enough times to recognize that sexual attraction and 
its inevitable power relationships between men and women (laying same-gender sexual relationships 
to one side) have little to do with lofty schoolgirl notions about love—or about society's real need 
for gender equality. Her best argument for this position is to be found in another, later think-piece 
on Bertrand Blier: 
 
The social comedy in Blier's work is essentially sexual comedy; sex screws us up, we get nicked in the groin 
and jumped from behind, idiots make out better than we do, and some people are just so twisted that no matter 
what we try to do for them they wreck everything. And sex between man and woman is insanely mixed up with 
men's infantile longings and women's maternal passions. Sexually, life is a keystone comedy, and completely 
amoral—we have no control over who or what excites us.183 
The view may be cynical, but at least it does seem Kael is making Blier's statement her own. I will 
not venture into deeper waters and entangle myself completely in Kael's sex life and her views on it, 
private or public, but simply let that sleeping dog lie from here on out.   
Sarris, on the other hand, may not be quite as adept as Kael at what critic and filmmaker 
Paul Schrader has called the “bully pulpit techniques”184 demonstrated above, so typical of Kael's 
style—even if he is no stranger to invective. What I want to stress is that Sarris makes himself just 
as central to his own writing as Kael does to hers, even if this is perhaps slightly less obvious. Like 
Kael, Sarris established the links between film and the erotic. His capsule review of the re-release of 
Georges Franju’s Judex is at once hilarious and as sexually tinged as anything by written by Kael:  
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For those who are wary of Batman, Captain Marvel, Superman and Flash Gordon, but who still are not ready 
to turn to the revivals of Potemkin and The Bicycle Thief, I would like to recommend Georges Franju’s Judex 
as a lovely bit of business without foolishness. Nothing great, mind you, but not to be missed by retarded types 
(like this reviewer) who have never quite got over the feeling that pretty ladies in tights contain all the secrets 
of the universe.185 
 
Kael was regrettably precluded from writing about hardcore pornography by her editor 
William Shawn, who did not want to soil the pages of the New Yorker with a review of Deep 
Throat, but Sarris was given the opportunity to offer his reflections on pornography in the 
seventies, a decade or so before home video made pornography a private affair: 
 
As I sit in the porn palace minute after minute in front of lingering close-ups of gigantic genitalia from another 
planet on which gynecologists are the only known inhabitants, I note that the predominantly male audience is 
so deathly quiet that one can hear a penis drop. As my mind strays from the sleazy spectacle, I wonder if we 
have permanently traded in the kind of movie in which one would say “this is where I came in” for the kind of 
movie in which one will say “this is where I came.” What else are critics talking about when they use the term 
“turn on” in this context? And should this term be used only for hard-core pornography, where it so often does 
not apply? Why not apply the term to Bunuel and Bergman and even Bresson for Belle de Jour and The Silence 
and Au Hasard Balthazar? Why not go ooh-la-la over the sex passages in Last Tango and Swept Away instead 
of prattling away about alienation, role-playing and the class struggle? Why not fight to return eroticism to the 
mainstream of cinema instead of segregating it in the swamps of hard-core porn? […] If we are talking about 
authentic turn-ons, it is time the critics stopped referring euphemistically to the filthy industrial documentaries 
posing as fantasies, and thus misleading audiences into paying through the nose for eroticism, and getting 
engineering instead.186 
 
We might detect a slightly off-hand condescending tone towards the European art film in this 
passage, but who can really contest that the nudity and relatively carefree depiction of sexuality in 
such aesthetic non-starters (albeit contemporary art house standbys) like I Am Curious (Yellow) 
(1967)—not to mention the more pornographic but educational Language of Love (1969) (which, 
memorably, years later, made possibly the most beguiling character of modern American cinema, 
Travis Bickle, peek through his fingers in fascination and disgust)—was not the main attraction?  
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Few things in life reduce communication to so basic a level as sex, and nothing is as 
personal. As Kael would stress again and again, “Sex is the great leveller, taste the great divider.”187 
That both Kael and Sarris felt confident enough to draw on their own erotic obsessions and their 
sexual biographies and preferences, is probably a reflection on the sense of liberation that occurred 
in the sixties, which set in motion the current shift towards hedonism. Equally importantly, it 
discloses that Kael and Sarris both wanted to be personal in their rapport with readers.  
 
In Sarris’s most influential work, The American Cinema: Directors and Directions, the mere act of 
forming opinions and classifying discrete films within the matrix of directorial careers was seen as a 
tool of empowerment for the critic and reader alike, while its basic rationale was wholly 
idiosyncratic. Helen Stoddard contends that 
 
 “Sarris’s tabling impulse resulted in his construction of a critical “pantheon” of great auteurs within 
which directors were ranked hierarchically on a sliding scale of the more or less great, the criteria 
for entry onto which remained entirely personal to Sarris.”188 
 
 While Sarris attempted to establish guidelines and criteria for film criticism and film scholarship, I 
think it would be safe to say that he in general agrees with Stoddard's assessment of his outlook. As 
Sarris would claim in “Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1962”:  
“Since it has not been firmly established that the cinema is an art at all, it requires cultural 
audacity to establish a pantheon for film directors. Without such audacity I see little point in being a 
film critic.”189 
Recent film scholarship has striven towards more clearly intersubjective criteria. One 
forceful method has been an attempt to bypass the axiological aspect of film criticism altogether, 
opting instead for film analysis. Like most of the concepts used to theorize about film—a film 
criticism attempting to do its work without resorting to value judgements—a criticism seeking to 
explain films rather than assess them has its precedence in literary theory. The acknowledged 
forbears of this trend are Russian formalists of the 1920s such as Viktor Shlovsky, but in postulating 
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a sharp split between criticism and the history of taste, an unacknowledged influence closer to home 
is Northrop Frye: 
 
The demonstrable value judgement is the donkey`s carrot of literary criticism and every new critical fashion 
[…] has been accompanied by a belief that criticism has finally devised a definitive technique for separating 
the excellent from the less excellent. But this always turns out to be an illusion of the history of taste. Value 
judgements are founded on the study of literature, the study of literature can never be founded on value 
judgements. Shakespeare, we say, was one of a group of English dramatists working around 1600, and also one 
of the great poets of the world. The first part of this is a statement of fact, the second part a value judgement so 
generally accepted as to pass for a statement of fact. But it is not a fact. It remains a value judgement, and not a 
shred of systematic criticism can ever be attached to it.190 
Here, Frye is claiming that no systematic criticism can be attached to the singular value judgement 
that places Shakespeare among the world’s greatest poets. Even the most superficial glance at the 
history of criticism will reveal that this claim is absurd, since much, perhaps even most, of what is 
considered systematic literary criticism has had Shakespeare’s pre-eminence among poets as a basic 
premise. That Shakespeare is one of the world’s greatest poets is a value judgement. Is it not also 
true? Furthermore, the implication of Frye’s argument is that value judgements are invariably so 
subjective as to epistemologically worthless. Northrop Frye is an extreme case, but it is worth 
dwelling on his example to illustrate a general point which has a direct bearing on the state of film 
studies for the past two decades. 
   As indicated, the outlook that underlies Northrop’s extreme objectivism is very much a basic 
component in the current academic vogue in film studies, which has variously been termed 
neoformalism, historical poetics or cognitive film theory. One of its chief practitioners, Kristin 
Thompson, sees neoformalism as an approach that bypasses value judgements and downgrades 
interpretation in favour of an objective description of how the viewer comprehends film through 
supposedly universal cognitive processes, which form the spectator's experience of a film's 
referential meaning and complete it. The term neoformalism points to an essential, but actually quite 
limited and rudimentary spectator activity, which in effect stops once basic comprehension of what 
is shown on screen is attained. In adhering to this approach, Thompson writes, “For the 
neoformalist, interpretation is only one part of the analysis, the main critical activity is analysis.”191  
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    This approach is clearly set apart from criticism as practised by Sarris and Kael because it is 
not committed to, and indeed distrusts, self-exposure. The basic premise of neoformalism seems to 
be the universality of narrative as an organizing mental principle common for all film viewers. The 
neoformalists seem to have fashioned a descriptive and historically informed film aesthetic out of 
what art historians have always known: the commonplace truism that perception gives form to 
sensory experience.  
  Both Sarris and Kael have pointed out the primacy of narrative throughout their criticism 
without reference to a theory that pretends to reach for something close to a positivistic ideal of 
objectivity.  We may disagree with Thompson's basic theory and the application thereof, but since 
her tastes are rendered irrelevant, they are effectively perceived as being beyond reproach. While I 
am not asking for the kind of annual ten-best lists that Sarris still provides in the pages of the New 
York Observer,  is it not supposed to matter to us as readers how these scholars feel about specific 
films? Would these serious scholars feel awkward if put on the spot? Is it an utterly irrelevant 
question for those concerned with filmwissenschaft?  
     We have seen that Weitz believes in the possibility of theoretically and practically 
separating our evaluations from our habitual preferences, which is correct, but this in no way means 
that value judgements are unimportant. Weitz does not argue for an absolute split between 
interpretation and evaluation; he is merely saying that our evaluations need not be identical with our 
preferences. The shift from interpretation and evaluation in a critical piece is often so gradual as to 
be imperceptible. The neoformalists take a semantically fancy way out of this issue by going a long 
way towards substituting analysis for interpretation, without really coming to grips with the element 
of subjectivity, which is a necessity because of the fact that the objects of criticism are, as we saw 
Elam point out, intentional objects. This brings us back to the point with which this chapter began, 
namely that film criticism is indeed a form of rhetoric, where the value judgement is an essential 
component. While it is possible to minimize our reliance on value judgements and make them less 
explicit, issues of value are inevitable for anyone who uses language. Timothy Corrigan asks us to 
bear in mind that 
 
[e]ven those essays that appear to be chiefly descriptive or analytical—biographical or historical writings or 
essays that aim at an objective analysis of a sequence of shots—involve a certain amount of personal choice 
and evaluation. In some essays, factual description may be more prominent than evaluative judgements, but the 
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difference is one of degree, not kind. Most writing about film involves some personal opinions and 
evaluations.192 
In the cases of Sarris and Kael, their personal opinions and evaluations constitute something close to 
intellectual and emotional autobiographies with a lifetime of at once ephemeral and lasting celluloid 
impressions as the raw materials, at least seen in retrospect. It thus seems fitting to consider the 
changing nature of American film criticism in the 1950s by way of one of Pauline Kael’s earliest 
polemical pieces, “Movies, the Desperate Art”, which details the curious position in which the 
American critic found him- or herself at that particular time. Out of the same conditions grew 
Sarris’s romantically infused auteur theory, which utilized the youthful, localized reaction of young 
French filmmakers and turned it into a device to study old American movies in an aesthetically new 
light. 
 
Movies, the Desperate Art 
Kael begins “Movies, the Desperate Art” by detailing the curious position of film criticism and films 
proper in the mid-1950s. It is piece written by someone clearly dismayed by the state of 
contemporary American film.  
It is also one of her earliest pieces, and it has an academic feeling of restraint that is absent from 
most of her later work. In his very perceptive comparative study, Sontag and Kael: Opposites 
Attract Me, Craig Seligman notes the stylistic development of Kael’s prose style, while putting it in 
a proper perspective: “Kael made much of her progress from the semi-formality of her earlier essays 
to the unbuttoned exuberance of the later ones, but I think this mattered more to herself than it did to 
her readers, for whom the early writings were already a jolt.”193   
     Kael’s inclination to castigate other critics is already in evidence in “Movies, the Desperate 
Art”.  Her identification with the mass audience is still somewhat underdeveloped, but the 
characteristic rhetorical ploy of blasting away at both sides of an issue, playing both sides against 
the middle, is firmly in place. She had not yet, however, established the habit for which she became 
famous, a rather militant “one viewing, one ruling” policy. A habit, quite frankly, she seemed to 
form primarily as a conscious act of wilful defiance to all those auteurist cinephiles (like Sarris) who 
had taken to watching films dozens of times. In “Movies, the Desperate Art”, Kael admits, 
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“Renoir’s lovely comedy The Golden Coach was described as ‘slow’ (and died at the box office), 
though after sitting through it twice I still haven’t found time to catch up with everything in it.”194  
A key concept in her essay is film's relationship with television—which of course was seen as much 
less benevolently reciprocal in 1956 than it would be fifty years later. 
Not surprisingly, Kael comments extensively and incisively on the ever-increasing scale of 
the big productions that largely carried the transitional film industry around the time this particular 
article was written: 
 
 
Hollywood films have attempted to meet the “challenge” of television by the stunningly simple expedient of 
expanding its size; in the course of this expansion the worst filmic tendencies of the past thirty years have 
reached what we may provisionally call their culmination. Like a public building designed to satisfy the widest 
public's concept of grandeur, the big production loses the flair, the spontaneity, the rhythm of artist working to 
satisfy his own conceptions.195 
 
Here we plainly see that Kael believes the inflation in size and length of the typical Hollywood 
product resulted in bland and stodgy films, films that bear no relation with personal vision and 
artistry. In her eyes, these are disenchanted films. These typical Hollywood blockbusters of the late 
1950s and early 1960s must be distinguished from the artist-initiated epic where the artist, as Kael 
would have it, is working to satisfy his own conceptions:  
 
The artist-initiated epic is an obsessive testing of possibilities, and often comes out of an overwhelming desire 
to express what the artist thinks are the unconscious needs of the public. It comes, too, from a conviction, or a 
hope, that if you give the popular audience the greatest you have in you they will respond. The moviemaker 
has an idealistic belief that no matter how corrupted mass taste is, people still retain the capacity to receive a 
vision. These epics try to vault over the film industry and go directly to the public.196 
This last quote is taken from Kael’s review of Bernardo Bertolucci’s 1900 (1976). I think she is 
correct, and her argument could be equally applied to silent films. Indeed, Kael’s point goes a long 
way towards explaining the pre-eminence of figures like D.W. Griffith, Erich Von Stroheim and 
Abel Gance. Being a sensationalist, it is not surprising that Kael responded to their films. I have 
deliberately invoked the names of directors in place of discrete films here, so as to better make the 
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point that Kael’s argument rests on auteurist underpinnings. (Correlated to directors, the films could 
be, for instance, Intolerance, Greed and Napoleon.) 
  It is an argument, moreover, that is actually something of a double-edged sword. Could it 
not be argued with conviction that the most charismatic Hollywood producers, past and present, 
from David O. Selznick and Howard Hughes to George Lucas and Jerry Bruckheimer, have seen 
themselves as “artists” in exactly this way? While I cannot really bring myself to call a single one of 
these impresarios major artists, they are certainly major visionaries integral to audience expectations 
of epic film spectacles. I know, I am being difficult. But it is worth pointing out that Kael is using an 
auteurist template to distinguish between artistic and non-artistic epics. In fact, I take her to mean 
that some sort of artistic vision is necessary to give epics urgency. The templates for this sort of epic 
come from the silent era and remain so to this day: Intolerance and Napoleon, both of which Kael 
wrote upon extensively. We might begin with the Kael’s assessment of the Griffith film: 
 
No simple framework could contain the richness of what Griffith tried to do in this movie. Intolerance is 
charged with visionary excitement about the power of movies to combine music, dance, narrative, drama, 
painting and photography—to do alone what all the other arts together had done. And to do what they had 
failed to. Griffith's dream was not only to reach the vast audience but to express it—to make of the young 
movie-art a true democratic art. Griffith's movies are not great because he developed the whole range of film 
techniques—the editing, the moving camera, the close-up, the flexible use of the frame so that it becomes a 
pin-point of light or a CinemaScope shape at will—but because he invented or pioneered those techniques out 
of an expressive need for them.197 
The sensationalism of this passage could quite easily be understood as a frenzied nostalgia for silent 
films, but I don't think that is what she intended. Rather, Intolerance embodies Kael's sense of 
movies as what in the 19th century was referred to as Gesamtkunstwerk, the total intermedial artwork 
that originated with Richard Wagner but   in practice it  has been traced back to the baroque epoch 
of the visual arts in the 17th century. Unlike its pre-photographic forebears, the filmic 
Gesamtkunstwek  takes its inspiration not primarily from European elitist high art, but rather from 
popular culture, which above all is American culture. The need to be affected viscerally and 
simultaneously on several levels never left her.It is here Kael's romanticism comes into play: “In 
movies, sanity is too neat, too limiting.198” 
     At a revival of Napoleon in 1981, she still had an appetite for sensations. As readers of 
Kael’s review, we become intensely aware of Kael the critic being energized by the spectacle on 
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display. Kael’s description of Gance as an avant-garde DeMille serves brilliantly to underline this 
particular filmmaker’s strengths and flaws. It is also indicative of Kael’s unique conception of film 
aesthetics: 
 
Gance has a nineteenth century theatrical sensibility, but he is also obsessed with the most avant-garde film 
techniques, and he uses these advanced methods to overpower you emotionally. When he succeeds, you’re 
conscious of the humor of the situation, you applaud, you cheer, because the exhilaration of his technique 
freshens the stale, trashy ideas, gives them a grand lunacy.199 
 
It would take an Italian-American who re-imagined American gangster myths on enormous 
canvasses, and a Jewish wünderkind as American as apple pie to make Kael as excited about film 
epics again.  Abel Gance on one side and Francis Ford Coppola and Steven Spielberg on the other 
are separated by a fifty-year divide in film history. Whereas Gance had used avant-garde techniques 
and applied them to trashy ideas, the other two would perfect the Hollywood way of doing things, at 
the same time redefining it. The epic films of the period when “Movies, the Desperate Art” was 
written, however, were another matter altogether. Their lethargy had become deadening: 
“Spectacles will cease to be events, people can be more comfortably bored at home.”200 Kael likens 
the big runaway American productions in foreign settings (when Hollywood studios capitalized on 
so-called “frozen assets” abroad), so typical of the fifties and early sixties, to travelogues, calling 
them “commonplace, anachronistic and reassuring.”201 The foreign settings are not integrated, but 
serve merely to give an air of novelty to shopworn material. Kael especially sees the biblical and 
historical epics as amplifications of this general tendency: “The split between background and 
foreground in pictures with foreign settings develops into schizophrenia in historical and Biblical 
epics.”202 
   
  Kael is correct in arguing that the dubious notion of quality in these films is tied to the most 
spurious ideas of “realism” and “authenticity”. “‘Accuracy’ (or what passes for accuracy) in 
background detail becomes enormously important—it gives the shoddy, sexy films the sanction of 
educational and religious values.”203 What Kael eruditely points out is that the expense lavished on 
historical surface detail in these films deflects attention from their basically atavistic or archaic 
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character. It was no coincidence that the enormously durable and relentlessly wooden vulgarian 
Cecil B. DeMille's career flowered in the 1950s, long after his contemporary Erich Von Stroheim 
was a spent force as a filmmaker. “The wide screen has restored film to its second childhood. In the 
thirties we thought DeMille passè; the American film of 1955 represents his full triumph.”204 
     After Kael establishes what she perceives to be the regression of American film in the 
1950s, “Movies, the Desperate Art” moves into meta-criticism. Here Kael discusses what she 
believes to be critical fallacies current at the time, a practice she would return to again and again 
throughout the sixties, most famously with “Circles and Squares”. Decades before reception studies 
became a systematic discipline in film studies, Kael was a critic who intently studied other critics 
and the audience. She could not resist attacking the essentialistic or ontological inclinations still 
argued by many serious critics at the time: 
 
So many film pedants have insisted that one portion “belongs” to the camera and another portion “belongs” to 
the screen that it has become a mark of culture to discuss film in terms of their cinematic properties and their 
theatrical deviations.205  
We may digress that Sarris, who in another context has derided Kael as a lapdog of the literati, 
agrees with her on this: “It is always literary people who seem most concerned by what is or is not 
‘cinematic.’ Yet excessive technical flourishes very often signal the director’s condescension to a 
genre or to the medium itself.”206 
Kael rejects “the chase” and “tracking shots” as more essentially cinematic (a word she 
could never utter with a straight face) than theatrical staging. Indeed, Kael is probably correct in 
arguing that modern dramatists like Strindberg and Ibsen taught film how to behave by reforming 
stage movement.207  Just as the mass audience has learned to respect the size and labour that went 
into these films, to admire what Kael calls their academic craftsmanship, the educated audience 
seemed to her taken in by these films’ pious, liberal ideas.  
If the colossal spectacle was the financial locomotive of an industry in turmoil in the 1950s 
and early sixties, the mark of artistic quality and prestige was often claimed to be films which dealt 
with social problems, i.e. message movies with carefully sign-posted and underlined significance 
and the safe and familiar values of the American left. The social problem film was pervasive enough 
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in Hollywood in the forties for the wittiest writer-director of the era, Preston Sturges, to mock it in 
his delicious comedy Sullivan's Travels (1942.) 
  In our general chapter on criticism, we saw that Kael sees art as the “supreme 
entertainment”. At the heart of entertainment is enjoyment, something the “prestige film” seems 
ready-made to combat: 
 
Our films are stuffed with good intentions. [...] Art, perhaps unfortunately, is not the sphere of good intentions. 
Work without joy is [perceived to be] respectable; it doesn't raise doubts that it might not be serious. Cocteau, 
with his enigmas and ambiguities, is he perhaps not trying to put something over? His high style is suspicious; 
members of the serious audience don't want to go on a limb for something that might turn out to be just chic 
and fashionable, they still want the fat of visible artistic effort. And there is something they value even higher 
than “artistic values,” the fat of important ideas and paraphrasable content. While the less educated mass 
audience may be in awe of the man-hours and banker's dollars that go into a colossal production, the educated 
audience, uncertain and self-critical, respects the good a movie will do for others.208 
Then, Kael shows her hand as a uniquely American critic: “Representations of Americans in foreign 
films always feel wrong to an American audience. It is true that we are shallow, but we are not 
carefree and irresponsible, we are shallowly serious.”209 In her last collection, Movie Love (1991), 
she points out that scores of moviegoers loved Dances with Wolves (Kevin Costner, 1990) because 
the moral issues in the plot had been made so simple. It is not enough for the Indian to be a victim— 
he must be innocent, pure, and in touch with himself and nature:  
 
This is a nature boy movie, a kid's daydream about being an Indian. When Dunbar has become a Sioux named 
Dances with Wolves, he writes in his journal that he knows for the first time who he really is. Costner has 
feathers in his hair and feathers in his head.210 
 
Unfortunately for Kevin Costner, Kael’s review was quoted by virtually everyone who wrote her 
obituary a decade later. In hindsight, Kael’s judgement of Dances with Wolves seems eminently fair. 
We probably remember less about Costner the filmmaker than marvel at how far the intransigent all-
American blandness of his acting carried him, even if his image has faded badly in the past decade 
or so.  
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     Quality in films such as these—a prevalent mode of filmmaking in the 1950s, and still a major 
source of self-congratulatory prestige in the Hollywood community—is a rather spurious notion: 
films are reduced to a socio-aesthetic that feeds on simplistic pathos and sentimental concepts of 
morality. Kael holds no brief for these films because they substitute one set of supposedly 
unenlightened cultural stereotypes for another in the name of good intentions, where characters are 
still made to represent their ethnic group because filmmakers distrust the audiences' intelligence. 
The question of racial stereotypes of course reaches much wider than the conventions of cinematic 
genres and meta-genres, and in fact permeates culture as a whole. Because art is derived from 
human experience, Kael contends, don’t unenlightened cultural stereotypes sometimes carry a germ 
of observed truth?  
 
The situation is not simple. Art derives from human experience, and the artist associates certain actions and 
motivations with certain cultural and vocational groups because that is how he has observed and experienced 
them. Would Jews be so fearful of the depiction of Jewish characters as ostentatious and vulgar, aggressive and 
secretive, if they did not recognize that these elements often converge with “Jewishness”? Would negroes be so 
sensitive to the images of sullen bestiality and economic irresponsibility if they did not feel the impact? It is a 
germ of observed truth that pressure groups fear – a germ which affects only the individual but which the 
groups treat as an epidemic.211   
 
It is worthwhile to consider this quotation about ethnic stereotypes with a digression about a film 
Kael reviewed seventeen years later, Martin Scorsese’s Mean Streets (1973). This well-known work 
about lower-level Italian-American Mafiosi with Roman Catholic hang-ups is rightly seen as an 
emblematic work in what is routinely and often uncritically termed the New Hollywood Cinema. 
This is a film where ethnic stereotypes are neither reproduced uncritically nor dressed up as a moral 
problem solved in advance, but embedded in the film’s theme. What is significant is that Kael (who 
loved the film, calling it a triumph of personal filmmaking) had not changed her mind about ethnic 
stereotypes in movies: 
 
The zinger in this movie—and it’s this, I think, that begins to come together in one’s head when the picture is 
over—is the way it gets the psychological connections between Italian Catholicism and crime, between sin and 
crime. Some editorial writers like to pretend this is all a matter of prejudice; they try to tell us there is no basis 
for popular ethnic stereotypes—as if crime among Italians didn’t have a different tone from crime among Irish 
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or Jews or blacks. Editorial writers think they’re serving the interests of democracy when they ask us to deny 
the evidence of our senses.212 
 
It is obvious from the review just quoted, and the overall ideas expressed in “Movies, the Desperate 
Art”, that Kael feels that film artists should deal with stereotypes with more honesty and less facile 
pseudo-sincerity. 
  No doubt for the same reasons she loved the vitality of Hollywood's 1930s comedies, Kael 
was dismayed by the protagonists in American films of the 1950s, even if she greatly appreciated 
and saw hope in the startling sexual magnetism of young method actors like Marlon Brando—while 
fearing that he would be cut down to size and remade to fit stodgy movies: 
 
The new heroes of film and television are dismaying [...] because they represent the death of drama as we 
know it; they are not protagonists in any meaningful sense; they represent the voice of adjustment, the caution 
against individuality, independence, emotionality, art, ambition, personal vision. They represent the antidrama 
of American life. Biblical spectacles convey magnitude of character by magnitude of close-up.213 
  
At the same time, Kael ends the article by acknowledging what we noted in the last chapter, that the 
demographics of moviegoing were changing and that there was a new kind of audience: an audience 
for avant-garde films and foreign art films and the art house audience that came to exist alongside 
mass audience, serviced by  the inflated blockbuster designed as road-show event-movies that would 
lure them,  the infrequent  moviegoers who grew and has continued to grow in importance since. 
Kael was one of the very first commentators to be acutely aware of this situation, and was clearly 
playing both sides against the middle, declaring her dissatisfaction with this polarisation and finding 
aesthetic deficiencies with both trends at the at opposite ends of the spectrum: 
 
It is clear now that there is more than one audience, and that the artists must judge their own obligations. [...] 
The poisonous atmosphere of Hollywood premières is distilled to pure pretension at avant-garde premières. 
Object to the Hollywood film and you're an intellectual snob, object to the avant-garde film and you're a 
Philistine. But while in Hollywood, one must often be a snob; in avant-garde circles, one must often be a 
Philistine.214 
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It seemed particularly necessary, in Kael's view, to be snobbish and dismissive to the prestigious 
middlebrow message movies by Stanley Kramer and Fred Zinnemann, which are best described as 
highly praised but plodding exercises in moral coercion of the audience. Kramer and Zinnemann 
were congratulated as filmmakers for their noble intentions:  
 
Intentions, despite what schoolteachers say, are what we shouldn't have to think about in the arts, and don't 
think about except when they're not achieved. Kramer asks for congratulations on the size and importance of 
his unrealized aspirations. In politics a candidate may hope to be judged on what he intends to do, but in art we 
judge what is done. Stanley Kramer runs for office in the arts.215  
 
I am unsure whether to press the issue here of whether or not Kael is a consistently die-hard anti-
intentionalist.216 One thing is certain: she knew, and believed in, Archibald MacLeish's celebrated 
bon mot, “A poem should not mean, but be”—to say nothing of D.H. Lawrence's (like Kael, a 
deeply carnal writer) even more imposing “Never trust the teller, trust the tale.” These ideas 
reappear in Kael's criticism in statements like:  
 
And for the greatest movie artists there is a unity of technique and subject, one doesn't need to talk about 
technique much because it has been subsumed in the art. One doesn't want to talk about how Tolstoy got his 
effects, but about the work itself. One doesn't want to talk about how Renoir does it; one wants to talk about 
what he has done.217  
 
This is a problematic position, relegating the separation of form and content to a secondary function 
of criticism and as a purely scholastic exercise. But anti-intentionalist or not, that matters less than 
the common-sense realization that good intentions and high aspirations are not the only, or even the  
most important qualities we should take note of in a work of art, and furthermore that good 
intentions can be excruciating in a work where they are clumsily underlined.  However, in my view, 
intentions, though never enough, are always present in our interactions with works of art. I have 
already quoted Katarina Elam who, you will remember, termed the objects of criticism intentional 
objects. 
       I feel the need to clarify my position at this juncture. If we disregard the artist’s intentions, 
we are still left with the intentions of the interpreter/critic, from which we can never escape. As 
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philosopher Anne Shepard points out, it is no more out of place to take intentions into account when 
talking about works of art than when dealing with the evidence and sworn statements in a court case. 
Let me explain further. According to anti-intentionalist thinking, which Kael at the very least courts, 
intentions are neither available nor desirable in the interpretation of artworks. We can all agree that 
the meaning in a work need not be the same as authorial meaning, and this is what, in the main, Kael 
means. Nevertheless, I find Sheppard's analogy apt, at least if we believe that artworks are the 
physical and material consequences of intentional action:  
 
The intention with which an action has been performed is of the greatest moral and legal importance. Intention 
means the difference between taking something by mistake and stealing it, between manslaughter and murder. 
When we make moral judgements and legal decisions, we certainly regard knowledge of an agent's intentions 
not only desirable but available.218 
 
While Kael's professed anti-intentionalism might have enhanced her modernist credentials in her 
own eyes, she would actually modify and restrain this strand of her thinking in a 1980 conversation 
with fellow critic Stephen Schiff:  
 
I think very often the way a movie is taken becomes what the director says he intended. Look, for example, at 
Apocalypse Now, which was originally a movie that was supposed to show you the horrors of war and then 
became a kind of psychedelic turn-on – and then became advertised as a head-movie on the order of 2001. And 
that was certainly was not the original intention.219  
 
I am willing to say that Kael is correct in this case, but she does refer to an original intention that 
was not achieved because not visible in the final film. This does not square too well with the idea of 
intentions as irrelevant or unavailable. 
  Anyway, this philosophical digression is less important regarding Kael's work as a whole 
than the purely critical function of Kael's statement on Stanley Kramer, in terms of what kinds of 
film were getting unjust praise—at the expense of better, livelier and just more sheerly enjoyable 
films.  
Sarris’s antagonism towards the social problem movie was quite as deep-seated as Kael's. 
Here is what Sarris has to say about Zinnemann:  
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Zinnemann has finally settled down to being a semi-realist, stepping gingerly around such subgenres as the 
moralistic melodrama (Act of Violence), the anti-populist anti-western, the empty pavement stage adaptation 
(Member of the Wedding, A Hatful of Rain), the pig-pen musical, and the painless political allegory (Behold a 
Pale Horse). By draining every subject and every situation of any possible emotional excitement, Fred 
Zinnemann is now widely considered in academic circles to be the screen's most honest director. [...]  his true 
vocation remains the making of anti-movies for anti-moviegoers.220 
 
In this climate, which alternatives did the film critic have? When programming a repertoire house, 
Kael had established her credentials as a FOOF (Friend of Old Films). Herein lies perhaps a central 
clue to the breakthrough of auteurism as Sarris practised it. For neither Sarris nor Kael saw the 
avant-garde cinema as a viable option. In fact, Sarris’s marked hostility towards avant-garde films 
left him feeling somewhat guilty: 
 
My heart and mind were so overwhelmingly committed to the “narrative” film that it seemed to me 
unconscionably frivolous to flail away at a fringe subject. […] Live and let live has been my motto, and since 
most American avant-garde filmmakers have tended to be as poor as church mice, it seemed unduly cruel to 
heap abuse upon neglect.221   
 
 So, another course of action was needed. If the American cinema was at its low ebb critically at the 
end of the 1950s and the beginning of the 1960s, one way to assert the value of American film was 
to burrow into its past with a new critical lexicon that enabled the critic/historian to see American 
films in a new light and break away from a moralistic socio-aesthetic way of judging movies. 
Sarris’s strategy was to borrow a pair of quasi-mystical terms from French critical discourse.  
 I now want to examine auteurism in general, and make special note of the distinction 
between the French La Politique des Auteur and Sarris’s subsequent readjustment and refitting, 
which became auteur theory. 
Auteurism – French and American 
We might begin this chapter with an obvious tautology: the auteur theory is a theory of authorship. 
We must now define what an author is. My definition makes no great claims to originality, and is in 
fact lifted directly from intentionalist philosopher Paisley Livingston:  
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“author = (def.) an agent who intentionally makes an utterance, where the making of an utterance is 
an action, an intended function of which is expression or communication.”222  
 
Those familiar with postmodern thinkers like Michel Foucault and Roland Barthes may argue that 
my definition of author is a tad too traditional to be current in academic discourse, but it must be 
remembered that when Roland Barthes performed his autopsy on the authorial text, he was primarily 
making a defiant gesture which provided some much-needed room for the reader in our 
confrontations with texts, or more properly speaking, with mediated material of any kind. 
Given the definition postulated by Livingston, which I think both Sarris and Kael would 
accept, we can quite easily understand Sarris’s confessional admission: “On the whole, I prefer the 
classical cinema to the modern, but classicism and modernity are terms inseparable from the notion 
of individual authorship.”223 Which is to say that ideas of authorship are intimately related to our 
ideas about art, since author, or auteur, stands for artist in a wider sense. And here we have a vital 
clue to understanding both the French Politique and the Sarrisian auteur theory. 
      Auteurism of both strands postulates that both classical cinema, or if you will, the 
entertainment film on the one hand and the art house film on the other, can be evaluated and 
explained by reference to directorial style and attitude, where the director of course is the 
metaphorical author.  Before the auteur theory took hold, it would have been virtually unthinkable to 
discuss Nicholas Ray and Satyajit Ray more or less on the same level of achievement and with the 
same terminology. Nicholas Ray became a bone of fierce contention among auteurists, largely 
because his films often had socially conscious ideas and contrived plots while being conspicuously 
stylish and enlivened with inspired directorial mannerisms that seemed uniquely Ray's own.224 
Andrew Sarris relates:  
 
American films are often discriminated against in America because the ear takes precedence over the eye. By 
contrast, the French were able to provide a detailed visual analysis of American movies precisely because they 
were undistracted by the dialogue. To an American ear Rebel Without a Cause is still gravely flawed by its 
undigested clinical dialogue. But one would have to be blind to fail to realize that Ray has transcended the 
tedious social-worker rhetoric of the film with a succession of striking initiatory ceremonies all filmed with 
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profound splendor. [...] While the New York critics were honoring Stanley Kramer's The Defiant Ones, the 
Cahiers critics were cheering Orson Welles' Touch of Evil. Obviously their eyes were quicker than our ears.225 
 
 What redeems the film Sarris holds forth as an example is directorial style, which auteurists 
generally define as an attitude rather than just mere technique. A director's style and attitude 
(analytically, at least, the two must be separated) are detectable through a concept vital to all auteur 
critics: mise-en-scène, which may be termed the how of a film as opposed to the what:  
 
The choice between a long shot and a close-up, for example, may quite often transcend the plot. If the story of 
Little Red Riding Hood is told with the wolf in close-up and Little Red Riding Hood in long shot, the director 
is concerned primarily with the emotional problems of a wolf with a compulsion to eat little girls. If Little Red 
Riding Hood is in close-up and the wolf in long shot, the emphasis is shifted to the emotional problems of 
vestigial virginity in a wicked world. Thus two different stories are being told with the same basic anecdotal 
material. What is at stake in the versions of Little Red Riding Hood are two contrasting directorial attitudes 
toward life. One director identifies more with the wolf—the male, the compulsive, the corrupted, even evil 
itself. The second director identifies with the little girl—the ideal and hope of the race. Needless to say, few 
critics bother to make any distinction, proving perhaps that direction as creation is still only dimly 
understood.226   
 
There is more to be said about mise-en-scène aesthetics, most notably that it privileges the actual 
shooting of the film on the set and on location and puts primary emphasis on the factors over which 
the director has direct and immediate control. It is no wonder, then, that the mise-en-scène-oriented 
auteur critics, at least initially, downgraded not only the script, but also the editing process so vital 
to montage theories of filmmaking (significantly, few directors in the old American studio-system 
had rights to the final cut), preferring instead the plastic continuity of the framing and a long take 
aesthetic inherited from their idol (and in the case of the French,  practical mentor), the founder and 
editor of Cahiers du Cinema until his death from leukaemia at forty in 1958, Andrè Bazin. 
Auteurists will frequently find pointed and intensified flourishes of meaning in expressive gestures 
within the frame, preferably carried over from film to film within the director's oeuvre:  
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No director in the history of cinema can match Sternberg's preoccupation with the harmonies of hand signals. 
This realm is usually restricted to actors only, but Sternberg ignored the taboo at his own peril. To light a 
cigarette, to grasp a coffee cup, to fondle one's furs, is for Sternberg, equivalent to baring one's soul.227 
 
Sarris, however, was not the first in America to think in terms of a long take aesthetic as opposed to 
montage. As early as 1950, Morris Weitz took stock of the very notion of a mobile long take 
aesthetic: 
 
[T]he medium of the motion picture is essentially the external projection on the screen of the visual and 
physical mobility that is afforded by the camera and its film. This is the uniqueness of the motion picture: that 
it can show physical fluid action of all sorts with a speed that no other art can achieve. [...] The medium 
remains an ancillary art. [...] To what is the medium ancillary? To dramatic action, I think: to story, plot and 
character.228 
 
     I would like to make a point about auteurism which is emphatically evident in the folk-tale 
parable on mise-en-scène provided by Sarris: namely, that auteur criticism was the last outpouring 
of romantically tinged existentialist philosophy in France, altogether more open and flexible than the 
semiotics and structuralism that finally supplanted not only existentialism as a philosophical 
tradition, but indigenous French film criticism and theory as well. In fact, this fateful process was 
nearly completed by the time Sarris carried the auteur theory across the Atlantic.  
     The auteur theory, or auteur policy as it was originally called, has been around so long that 
we tend to take it for granted. However, when young French Cahiers du Cinema critics took up this 
idea in earnest in the mid-fifties, after having emerged from the illuminated darkness of the 
screening rooms at La Cinemateque Francais with a burning desire to make films, it was intended 
as a rebellious stance against the powers that be in the French film industry at the time. 
      What Truffaut was rebelling against in his seminal 1954 essay, “A Certain Tendency in 
French Cinema”, was a scenarist's cinema: well-written, well-made films from prestigious literary 
sources (brimming with the kind of academic craftsmanship we have already seen Kael rebel against 
in “Movies, the Desperate Art”, published only two years after Truffaut's text), where the director's 
job was merely to illustrate rather than interpret (or write) the script.  This is usually called the 
Tradition of Quality, and we should not forget, as modern film history books often condition us to 
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do, that this mode of filmmaking produced some genuinely great films. Indeed, it would be difficult 
to think of a more piercing and darkly ironic work from the early fifties than Forbidden Games 
(1952) (a film that had no less than four credited writers, including director René Clément).  
     However, for a new generation of critics trying to break into films, the problems with this 
mode of filmmaking were evident. This ingrained tradition had made it difficult to think of the 
director as the author of a film even in a metaphorical, non-literal sense. David Thomson provides a 
telling anecdote in this context about the very early meta-movie Thomas Graal's Best Film (1917). 
Its plot is apparently very similar to Fellini's 8 ½ (1963), but the lead character is a scenarist rather 
than a director.229  Film scholar Virgina Wright Wexman points out that the term auteur was first 
used in reference to the film director by artist and avant-garde filmmaker  Jean Epstein in 1921.230  
Even if the film auteur was a European notion, the director was not entirely absent from American 
critical discourse in the  silent era. In 1922,  Peter Milne's Motion Picture Directing: Facts and 
Theories of the Newest Art was published. Here the author distinguished between 'the great and the 
less great directors.'  The book's first paragraph reads: 
“What is the fundamental asset that makes a great motion picture director? The requisite that distinguishes the real artist 
from the rank and file? It is really the same asset that distinguishes the great artist in any walk of life from the less great. 
[…] Other requirements are important, vastly so, but first of all and in capital letters EXPERIENCE.231” 
A long time would pass before ideas  about the primacy of the director gained widespread 
acceptance, even though many critics and scholars were familiar even  with Epstein's  quite radical 
use of the term auteur. As late as in  1946, Jean Benoit Levy would write: :  
 
What, then, is the definition of film author? Before going on, let me specify, that the title generally accorded 
this function (in France, metteur-en-scène sic; in Germany, regisseur; in America, director) actually applies 
only to one phase of the creative work, namely that which is concerned with actors on the set. The designation 
film author comprises a far more extensive role, for it denotes the creator of a complete work.232 
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A veritable quantum leap in the development toward La Politique des auteur appeared two years 
after Benoit-Levy's book, in the shape of Alexandre Astruc's widely read piece, La Camera Stylo.   
In it, the author postulates the continuity between cinema and the traditional fine arts: 
 
[T]he cinema is quite simply becoming a means of expression, just as all the other arts have before it, and in 
particular painting and the novel. After having been successively a fairground attraction, an amusement 
analogous to the boulevard theatre, or a means of preserving images of an era, it is gradually becoming a 
language. By language I mean a form in which and by which an artist can express his thoughts, however 
abstract they may be, or translate his obsessions exactly as he does in a contemporary essay or novel. This is 
why I would like to call the new age of cinema the age of camera-stylo.233 
 
The missionary zeal of Astruc's formulation was not lost on the Cahiers group, who would fulfil 
Astruc's dream a decade later. It is impossible to disagree with film scholar James Monaco's 
assertion that Astruc's text became a declaration of independence for a “New Wave” in film.234 
      So the concept of directorial authorship was not new, but it needed a polemical writer with 
Truffaut's rare rhetorical powers to break down the traditional resistance towards this romantic 
notion in a collective art, which was actually more of an ideal than an idea. He did  this by 
enthroning some French directors, like Renoir and Bresson as auteurs,  while arguing that 
filmmakers like Rene Clement and Henri-Georges Clouzot (that darkest of all misanthropists in the 
history of film) were mere metteurs-en-scène who decorated scripts rather than express themselves 
artistically. What is more, he redirected critical attention by issuing a sly rallying cry of “look to 
America and American films”, which probably had more to do with romance and fascination than 
any actual insight into how the American film industry worked. For the French, interference from 
the front office and genre conventions made the considerable achievement of American film seem 
almost heroic. A few years later, Sarris would concur on this point.  
     As for Truffaut's resistance to the scenario-driven films of what we might term cinema de 
papa, we can deduce that it was largely a strategic, though heartfelt move, considering he (as a 
major name in the French and international film industry) would go on to direct The Story of Adele 
H. (1975)—a glorious specimen of the Tradition of Quality if ever there was one. In America, on the 
other hand, Sarris had no desire to step into the director's chair. What he did have, which the French 
to some extent lacked, was the desire to be a systematic critic and historian of the American screen, 
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and to redeem many great American film careers since Griffith from undeserved neglect and 
condescending snorts of derision, by insisting that foreign films were not the only ones with a high 
quota of artistic glories and aesthetic epiphanies.  In fact, the impulse to be an auteur-oriented critic 
was present with Sarris from the beginning, even if he had yet to experience his Parisian conversion. 
In 1955, his first year as a professional writer, he would review an adaptation of The Rose Tattoo by 
Tennessee Williams in these terms: 
 
[T]he main problem with The Rose Tattoo is the absence of any unifying tone. The line between drama and 
farce are always very thin in a Williams play. Williams has them separated in his mind, no doubt, but unless he 
has a director like Kazan to keep the line rigid, his scripts degenerate in the playing. Daniel Mann is still 
relatively new in the film medium, and although his direction does show some promise, he is still weak in 
developing a unified conception for his actors.235 
 
Note that Sarris places the blame for a lack of unified conception with director Daniel Mann, rather 
than the screenwriter or the playwright.  It would be seven years before Sarris had built up enough 
courage to elaborate this into a theory of sorts. This must be explored in depth. 
 
Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1962 
Now that a firm holding context for the auteur theory has been established, I think we can finally 
focus on a primary text that underpins all of Sarris’s writing, even it is far from his best or most 
lucid piece. Sarris had first become familiar with developments in France through his friend Eugene 
Archer, a Fulbright scholar in Paris, who had sent Sarris a few issues of Cahiers du Cinema. This 
was followed by an extended sojourn in Paris. 
    Before the publication of “Notes On The Auteur Theory in 1962” in the winter issue of Film 
Culture, Sarris had been writing criticism for seven years without attracting much attention: 
“Criticism is simply a job of work, and if one person doesn't do it, another will, and most of the 
hostility aroused by a critic's ego-crushing labors can be anticipated in advance.”236 How wrong this 
would turn out to be! It is ironic but not entirely out of place that Sarris credits Kael’s critique of his 
original article on the auteur theory for “making him.” 
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      I shall now present Sarris’s article with my own critical comments, and then subject Kael’s 
rebuttal, “Circles and Squares: Joys and Sarris”, to the same rigorous treatment. 
    Sarris’s article, although published as a single piece, is neatly divided into two parts. He 
begins by presenting Bazin’s reservations about the auteur theory. Then he offers his own attempt at 
providing a definition of the auteur theory. I shall not retrace the arguments of the first part, but 
merely point out that here Sarris already reveals how he intends to use the basic assumptions of the 
auteur theory. This also clues us in to the project he would finalize six years later with The 
American Cinema. In fact, Sarris furnishes us with the thesis on which his uniqueness as a scholar as 
well as a journalist is based: 
 
Where I wish to redirect the argument is toward the relative position of the American cinema. […] Like most 
Americans who take films seriously, I have always felt a cultural inferiority complex about Hollywood. […] 
After years of tortured revaluation, I am now prepared to stake my critical reputation, such as it is, on the 
proposition that Alfred Hitchcock is artistically superior to Robert Bresson by every criterion of excellence, 
and further that, film for film, director for director, the American cinema has been consistently superior to that 
of the rest of the world from 1915 through 1962. Consequently, I now regard the auteur theory primarily as a 
critical device for recording the history of the American cinema, the only cinema in the world worth exploring 
in depth beneath the frosting of a few great directors at the top.237 
 
That the auteur theory for Sarris is intended as a tool for the film historian is expressed most clearly 
in “Towards a Theory of Film History”, which deserves attention in its own right. “Notes on the 
Auteur Theory in 1962”, however, is chiefly important because for the first time, Sarris postulates 
what he believes the auteur theory to be. Since the latter half is the main body of the article, 
consequently, it should be the part most thoroughly analysed. 
     Sarris begins by conceding Truffaut’s assertion that his original article was a polemical 
weapon at a given place and given time. After all, when Sarris was writing in 1962, the New Wave 
had long since exploded in France, and national equivalents were springing up elsewhere in Europe, 
even in politically oppressive regimes east of the Iron Curtain. In any case, the certain tendency was 
no longer operative in a dominant way.    
    “Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1962” is an article where Sarris primarily postulates, with 
some reservations, the premises for his criticism, instead of illustrating how he uses them in 
practical criticism. Similarly, I too now want to concentrate on the premises themselves. When 
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Sarris looked back on his original article in 1968, he said that he thought it had been written in a 
modest, tentative, experimental manner.238 In many ways this is true. There is little in the opening 
paragraphs that smacks of a manifesto. Sarris begins the main body of text by paying his dues to 
Truffaut’s original article, Bazin’s friendly critique, and to the British auteurist and writer in Movie, 
Ian Cameron. 
     Then Sarris goes on to tentatively describe what he believes Auteur theory to be. One is 
struck by the reservations that buttress his arguments:  
 
 
The Auteur theory cannot possibly cover every vagrant charm of the cinema. […] 
First of all, the auteur theory, at least as I understand it and now intend to express it, claims neither the gift of 
prophecy, nor the option of extra-cinematic perception. 
Directors, even auteurs, do not always run true to form and the critic can never assume that a bad director will 
always make a bad film. No, not always, but almost always, and that is the point. What is a bad director but a 
director who has made many bad films? 239 
 
There can be little argument that good directors make more good films than bad ones, even if 
“good” and “bad” are left undefined; by Sarris’s admission, these absolute values are difficult to 
define abstractly. 
  Then Sarris ventures into somewhat hotter waters by postulating three criteria that must be 
fulfilled by the genuine auteur. After insisting that entertaining movies can be made without 
directors, with Marlon Brando’s One-Eyed Jacks (1961) as an example, Sarris continues by saying 
that a badly directed or undirected film has no importance on a scale of values:  
 
 The first premise of the auteur theory is technical competence in the director as a criterion of value. […] By 
the auteur theory, if a director has no technical competence, no elementary flair for the cinema, he is 
automatically cast out of the pantheon of directors. A great director has to be at least a good director. This is 
true in any art.240 
 
   Sarris predicted there would be less disagreement about the first premise than the other two, 
something which proved not to be the case. The auteur theory, as advanced by Sarris, is usually 
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thought of as being romantic, and the reader will notice I have said as much myself in the previous 
chapter. On the whole, this is true, but it is not quite the long and short of it. The first premise of 
Sarris’s theory is actually more properly classical than romantic. If this first premise were the only 
one, a great director would find his precise historical analogy in the Renaissance painter as a 
flawless draughtsman capable of drawing perfect circles (no pun intended) with the free hand. 
   
The second premise of auteur theory, according to Sarris, is the one most commonly accepted by 
laymen, or for that matter undergraduates in film studies: 
 
The second premise of the auteur theory is the distinguishable personality of the director as a criterion of value. 
Over a group of films a director must exhibit certain recurrent characteristics of style, which serve as his 
signature. The way a film looks and moves should have some relationship to the way a director thinks and 
feels.241 
 
Unlike the first premise, the second one is squarely and genuinely romantic, since it envisions a 
revelation of character on the part of the director, mediated by and expressed through a visual style. 
Presented by itself, as I have done so far, the premise is arguably entirely uncontroversial. The next 
paragraph, however, serves to underline why the auteur theory initially scandalised much 
established criticism, and even more to the point, it underlines why the many who still think that the 
auteur theory was intended primarily as a tool with which to study immensely and self-consciously 
premeditative European and Asian film-makers like Carl Theodor Dreyer, Robert Bresson, Ingmar 
Bergman, or Kenji Mizoguchi are badly mistaken. Indeed, it seems superfluous to belabour the point 
that someone like Dreyer is an auteur. Here is Kael on Day of Wrath (1943): “This psychological 
masterpiece is the expression of a single personality, built up from Dreyer’s script, choice of camera 
angles, editing, and his control of every nuance of performance.”242 
Sarris, however, insisted on an American perspective on the auteur and mise-en-scène as a tool to 
analyse the auteur, insisting on visual and thematic authorship for directors without script credit: 
 
Because so much of the American cinema is commissioned, a director is forced to express his personality 
through the visual treatment of the material, rather than through the literal content of the material. A Cukor, 
who works with all sorts of projects, has a more developed abstract style than Bergman, who is free to develop 
his own scripts. Not that Bergman lacks personality, but his work has declined with the depletion of his ideas 
                                                 
241
  Ibid. 
242
  Pauline Kael (1970) Kiss Kiss Bang Bang. London. Calder & Boyars. p. 254. 
93 
93 
largely because his technique never equalled his sensibility. Joseph L. Mankiewicz and Billy Wilder are other 
examples of writer-directors without adequate technical mastery. By contrast, Douglas Sirk and Otto 
Preminger have moved up the scale because their miscellaneous projects reveal a stylistic consistency.243 
 
The basic assumption expressed in this paragraph is not only that American entertainment films may 
be vehicles for artistic expression, but also that American directors more or less set within the studio 
system, making entertainment films from miscellaneous scripts written by others, are somehow 
more likely to express themselves more fully and more cogently as artists than directors working in 
a supposedly freer environment in Europe. We should also note that writer-directors, represented by 
figures as diverse as Bergman, Wilder and Mankiewicz, are downgraded as auteurs. It should be 
noted, in extension of this, that the most conspicuous casualty of Sarris’s historical approach to the 
auteur theory when it was put into practice as a roadmap to American film history in his American 
Cinema: Directors and Directions 1929-1968, was John Huston. Huston had ironically been the 
subject of a proto-auteur article by James Agee in Time Magazine in 1950.244 When Sarris wrote in 
1962, he claimed that Huston was virtually “a forgotten man with a few actors’ classics behind 
him.”245 Regarding the relative stature of Billy Wilder, however, it must be pointed out that this 
particular very barbed and ironic writer-director was welcomed into the fold when Sarris reversed 
his position in the article “Billy Wilder Reconsidered” in 1975—after having seen Wilder’s later 
film, The Private Life of Sherlock Holmes246 (1969). 
 
   The third premise of Sarris’s auteur theory ventures, in a sense, into the province of 
mysticism, where Sarris concerns himself with a concept he designates interior meaning. This 
premise grows out of and deepens the second premise:  
 
The third and ultimate premise of the auteur theory is concerned with interior meaning, the ultimate glory of 
cinema as an art. Interior meaning is extrapolated from the tension between a director’s personality and his 
material.247 
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One might easily infer that interior meaning is simply a shorthand for the patterns of style and theme 
that emerge in the director’s oeuvre, but surprisingly, it is not quite that straightforward. Sarris says 
that interior meaning is close to concept of mise-en-scène, but not quite. Neither is it quite the vision 
of the world a director projects, nor quite his attitude towards life, but in fact, as Sarris presents it,  
one easily gets the impression that it is all of those things. At any rate, Sarris admits the enormous 
ambiguities of the concept interior meaning: “It is ambiguous, in any literary sense, because part of 
it is imbedded in the stuff of cinema and cannot be rendered in non-cinematic terms.”248 It is 
tempting to translate interior meaning into what film analyst Stephan Scharff has termed the cine-
aesthetic elements of film.249  But this is arguably to empirical a notion for Sarris's liking. I rather 
think he saw interior meaning as an ineffible quality that defies precise definition.  
What clearly emerges from this is that Sarris’s concept of style could be said to be somewhat shaky 
if submitted to purely empirical inspection. Sarris certainly never treats cinematic style as 
empirically as the statistical mise-en-scène critics of later years, as typified by Barry Salt. I shall 
have more to say on this matter later, but the deeper reasoning behind this is not obscure. After all, 
any cinematic style may be mechanically duplicated, something which does not befit a genuinely 
romantic conception of cinematic art. For Sarris, any style must ideally have a corresponding 
personal theme that cuts across the barriers of genre, time, censorship and other impediments. 
     After groping slightly for a clarification by referring to Truffaut’s idea of interior meaning 
as the temperature of a director on the set, Sarris takes the plunge by calling interior meaning the 
èlan of the soul, the soul being that intangible difference between one person and another when all 
other things are equal. 
    This assertion paves the way for last part of the article, where Sarris asks the reader to 
visualize the three premises of the auteur theory as three concentric circles: 
 
The three premises of the auteur theory may be visualized as three concentric circles: The outer circle as 
technique; the middle circle, personal style; and the inner circle, interior meaning. The corresponding roles of 
the director may be designated as those of technician, a stylist and an auteur. […] After a given number of 
films, a pattern is established.250 
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After that, Sarris’s definition of the auteur theory begins to wind down, after four pages. Sarris 
points to two anthology films that were all the rage in the early sixties, but are largely forgotten 
today: Boccacio 70 and The Seven Deadly Sins, with Sarris claiming that these films unwittingly 
reinforced and vindicated the auteur theory by confirming the relative standing of its directors: 
 
The point is that even in these frothy, ultracommercial servings of entertainment, the contribution of each 
director had less in common stylistically with the work of other directors on the project than with their own 
previous work.251 
 
This, I think, for good or ill, is the constant variable of the auteur theory, or is perhaps the auteur 
theory in a nutshell. Sarris would later elucidate the implications of this when he put the auteur 
theory into practice as a way, so to speak, of making a path out of the forest of American movies 
and into the trees, which proved to be a rewarding avenue to explore. 
“Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1962” ends with a highly controversial coda.  It is the most 
vulnerable part of the text, on which Kael would pounce hungrily. Since the concluding passage of 
Sarris’s article is also quoted in full near the beginning of Kael’s rebuttal, it will be reproduced in 
the next chapter.  
 
“Circles and Squares: Joys and Sarris” – Kael’s Rebuttal 
At the outset, one thing I would like to point out is that Kael’s dismantling of the auteur theory was 
originally printed not in a general interest magazine like the New Yorker, but in the academically 
very well respected Film Quarterly. For this reason alone, I think “Circles and Squares” is better 
known among film scholars than her almost book-length study of Citizen Kane. Nowhere in Kael’s 
writing is her background in philosophy more evident than in the former article. “Circles and 
Squares” is a companion piece to “Is There a Cure for Film Criticism?”, published in 1962, where 
Kael had rejected the film theories of Siegfried Kracauer. These two pieces disclose an analytical 
side to Kael that her detractors almost universally refuse to recognize. 
    It is almost impossible not to point out the parallels between Kael’s systematic attack on the 
assumptions about the auteur theory held by Sarris as well as the more extreme auteurist group 
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centred around the periodical Movie in Britain, on the one hand, and philosopher Noël Carroll’s 
similarly thorough rejection of psychoanalytic film theory almost a generation  later on the other.252 
     In marked contrast to “Trash, Art and the Movies”, which highlights Kael as a sensationalist, 
“Circles and Squares” finds Kael casting herself in the role of a “square.” “Circles and Squares” 
perhaps finds Kael in a more analytical mood than usual, but is nevertheless a characteristic article 
because it highlights one of her strongest, not to mention most entertaining, assets as a writer—
something which the more reserved Sarris lacks in his polemics and theoretical formulations, but 
which are often amply evident in his reviews—the ability to dramatize one’s hostility into a 
tremulously emotional and slightly daunting performance.  
      I will now retrace “Circles and Squares” step by step. I should also point out that I will give 
more extensive coverage to Kael’s digressions about the relative merits and demerits of Alfred 
Hitchcock and John Huston than is usual when this article is discussed. In the original text, Kael 
uses these directors to illustrate her general points. These comments are like asides to the text as a 
whole, but help illustrate her perceptiveness and the advantages of not being committed to a 
theoretical credo. What it perhaps also will demonstrate are the inconsistencies in her own criticism 
as a whole, besides those concerning the tensions between trash and art, which we have already 
noted.   
     After having presented Sarris’s three premises of the auteur theory and quoted the entire last 
paragraph of his original auteur article, Kael launches her rebuttal: 
 
Sometimes a great deal of corn must be husked to yield a few kernels of internal meaning. I recently saw Every 
Night at Eight, one of those maddeningly routine films Raoul Walsh has directed in his long career. This 1935 
effort featured George Raft, Alice Fay, Frances Langford and Patsy Kelly in one of those familiar plots about 
radio shows of the period. The film keeps moving along in the pleasantly unpretentious manner one would 
expect of Walsh until one incongruously intense scene with George Raft thrashing about in his sleep, revealing 
his inner fears in mumbling dream-talk. The girl he loves comes into a room in the midst of these unconscious 
avowals of feeling and listens sympathetically. This unusual scene was later amplified in High Sierra with 
Humphrey Bogart and Ida Lupino. The point is that one of the screen’s most virile directors employed an 
essentially feminine narrative device to dramatize the emotional vulnerability of his heroes. If I had not been 
aware of Walsh in Every Night at Eight, the crucial link to High Sierra would have passed unnoticed. Such are 
the joys of the auteur theory.253   
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This last paragraph of Sarris’s article compounds the slightly confused character of his text as a 
whole, and leaves it wide open to attacks. Not surprisingly, Kael, with a philosopher’s acute 
analytical ear, or more properly eye for language, begins her retort by dismantling the paragraph 
sentence by sentence: 
 
Perhaps a little more corn should be husked; perhaps, for example, we can husk away the word “internal.” (Is 
internal meaning any different from meaning?) We might ask why the link is “crucial.” Is it because the device 
was “incongruously intense” in Every Night at Eight and so demonstrated a try for something deeper on 
Walsh’s part? But if his merit is his “pleasantly unpretentious manner” (which is to say, I suppose, that 
recognizing the limitations of the script, he wasn’t trying to do very much, then the incongruous device was 
probably a misconceived attempt that disturbed the manner – like a bad playwright interrupting the comedy 
scenes because he can't resist the opportunity to tug at your heartstrings. We might also ask why this narrative 
device is essentially feminine: is it more feminine than masculine to be asleep, or to talk in one’s sleep or to 
reveal feelings? Or, possibly,  does Sarris regard the device as feminine because the listening woman becomes 
a sympathetic figure,  and emotional understanding is, in this “virile” context, assumed to be essentially 
feminine? 254  
 
From a logical standpoint, Kael discredits Sarris even before she has taken stock of the ideas which 
Sarris, perhaps somewhat clumsily, had attempted to express. She then returns to the more 
colloquial style for which she is known: 
 
Sarris has noted that in High Sierra (not a very good movie), Raoul Walsh repeated an uninteresting and 
obvious device that he had earlier used in a worse movie, and for some inexplicable reason, Sarris concludes 
that he would not have had this joy of discovery without the auteur theory.255 
 
This, of course, cuts right to the heart of whether it is valid to call the auteur theory a theory at all. It 
does so by raising the question of whether simple observations necessitate a theory. Kael’s 
reasoning is spelled out as follows: 
 
In every art form, critics traditionally notice and point out how the artist has borrowed from himself (as well 
as from others) and how the same devices, techniques and themes reappear in their work. […] We take it for 
granted that this is how we perceive the development or the decline of an artist.256 
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Kael is right in arguing that this has been self-evident in older and traditionally more venerated arts 
without any particular need to add “theory” as a suffix to this critical process. Sarris was of course 
equally aware that this had been a standard procedure for describing and evaluating artworks. True 
to the term auteur, he thought in terms of the novelist and his work. The roots of this idea are 
actually older than the novel, and go as far back as 1550, when the mannerist court painter Giorgio 
Vasari presented the first real narrative on the visual arts, and one of the first modern historical 
narratives of any kind. Vasari established painting, sculpture and architecture as the basic disciplines 
of art history in his vastly influential Lives of the Artists.257 Here, Vasari combined biography 
(micro-history) with acute stylistic analysis of the works, using the concept Disegnio (drawing) as a 
common denominator for all visual arts. 
     For Sarris, as well as the earlier French auteurists, this time-honoured tradition was exactly 
the point.  Films, especially Hollywood films, had not previously been evaluated systematically in 
this way, even if the moviegoing audience had built-in expectations when going to see an Alfred 
Hitchcock movie as early as the end of his British period in the late thirties. This part of Kael’s 
critique of the auteur theory would probably be even more damaging to Sarris’s case if she could 
conclusively offer evidence to indicate that clustering films together by directors, as well as 
studying these clusters critically as a whole body of work, did not represent any significant 
modifications of abiding critical conventions. 
    What is irrefutable about Kael’s argument is that Sarris’s first article on the auteur theory 
actually begs the question of theory instead of providing one. Kael then poses two rhetorical 
questions that sum up her first objection and introduce a new element, which is possibly even more 
damaging to the way Sarris poses the auteur theory:  
 
Would Sarris not notice the repetition in the Walsh films without the auteur theory? Or shall we take the more 
cynical view that without some commitment to Walsh as an auteur, he probably wouldn’t be spending his time 
looking at these movies?258 
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The latter question is certainly a valid objection on Kael’s part. Sarris concedes that the first 
example of his Walsh anecdote, Dinner at Eight(1935)  despite one incongruously intense scene, is 
a maddeningly routine film. More than that: it is one of many such films in Walsh’s career. A 
commitment to a particular auteur can thus under some circumstances be said to have certain biases 
built in a priori which may have precious little to do with the singular whole of concrete films. We 
are now approaching the main body of Kael’s critique, where the three concentric circles that 
constitute the premises of Sarris’s theory are put under the microscope.    
Sarris’s outer circle of meaning posits, as we have seen, technical competence on the 
director’s part as the first criterion of value. Kael is the first to admit that this premise appears to be 
both basic and reasonable. But only apparently so. Here is perhaps a clear indication that Kael’s 
views on art are of a more modern shading than Sarris’s.  
 
Sometimes the greatest artists in a medium bypass or violate the simple technical competence so necessary for 
hacks. […] An artist who is not a good technician can indeed create new standards, because standards of 
technical competence are based on comparisons with work already done.259 
 
On this score, Kael seems be on the same page as the irrepressible Oscar Wilde in a way that is, if 
anything, more swooningly romantic than Sarris’s formulation of the auteur theory:  
 
Technique [in an artistic sense] is really personality. That is the reason why the artist cannot teach it, why the 
pupil cannot learn it, why the artist cannot teach it.. To the great poet, there is only one method of music – his 
own. To the great painter there is only one manner of painting – that which he himself employs. The aesthetic 
critic, and the aesthetic critic alone can appreciate all forms and modes. It is to him that Art makes her 
appeal.260  
 
 I shall not go into Kael’s examples, which concern Antonioni and Cocteau, but instead point to a 
very obvious example: the early films of the French New Wave. The chief aesthetic quality of those 
films, their reckless vitality (exemplified by the startling jump cuts in Breathless [Godard, 1959]), is 
absolutely inseparable from their stylistic sloppiness. These were films that very purposefully and 
purposively violated the conventions of the highly polished and competent Tradition of Quality. In 
the early films of Godard, with their skewed reformulation of Hollywood style, or Americana (not 
the shallowly serious kind, but the spirited, irresponsible, trashy kind), Kael found a worthy subject: 
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Breathless […] is a frightening little chase comedy with no big speeches and no pretensions. […] Part of the 
peculiarity of the work – its art – is that while you’re watching it, it’s light and playful, off-the-cuff, even a 
little silly. It seems accidental that it embodies more of the modern world than other movies. 261 
 
 Godard appealed more to Kael than to Sarris, but I can think of no film that so vividly illustrates the 
strengths and weaknesses of auteur criticism as Breathless. The film was, of course, directed by 
someone who was an auteur critic himself at that point in time. The doting pastiche of American 
genre films is revealed most clearly in Jean-Paul Belmondo`s performance. The riff on Bogart is not 
based in the best performances of Bogart the actor (snapping in homicidal psychosis in The 
Treasure of Sierra Madre and In a Lonely Place), but in Bogart the romantic-cynic star persona of 
Casablanca.  As such, Breathless is both the apotheosis of the auteur theory and its negation, for its 
sly suggestions are that the medium is stronger than its directors, and that the audience sees neither 
directors nor screenwriters on the screen, but actors indulging us with make-believe and allowing us 
to see them as captains of their own destinies. But of course, Sarris knew all this, as he had never 
claimed that the auteur theory is sufficient to encompass everything the cinema has to offer. 
Indirectly, Sarris provides support for my Bogart/Belmondo example in his summary of Michael 
Curtiz's career. The director's one enduring masterpiece, is of course, Casablanca, the happiest of 
happy accidents and the most decisive exception of the auteur theory.262 Sarris did not question  the 
fact that the commercial filmmaker's job is less solitary and more collaborative than that of the 
novelist or painter: 
  
Movies have never been particularly free. Censorship is but one of their problems. The high cost of production 
(compared to other art forms), the restrictions of distribution, and the barbarities of exhibition have been 
additional handicaps. But the medium is endowed with an inherent facility for rendering lifelike illusions with 
dreamlike intensity. And it doesn't take genius or even talent to ignite the moviegoer's imagination, if only for 
an instant, with the most exquisite imagery. Some of the most hauntingly beautiful moments in the movies are 
sheer accidents, and it seems unfair somehow to the toilers in the other arts.263 
Going back to Kael's argument in “Circles and Squares,” one problem remains. I don’t think Kael 
makes this clear in her own line of argument: that there is a difference between merely being 
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incompetent on the one hand, and deliberately overturning conventions which by force of habit are 
deemed competent on the other. The viewer of a film will generally perceive when cuts between 
camera setups are mismatched deliberately and when they are unintentional. This judgement can 
only be made on the basis of the concrete, total viewing experience. While not always easy to 
ascertain, our familiarity with earlier films will usually give us an indication as to whether a director 
subverts conventions or merely fails to master them adequately. 
  This means, I think, that Sarris’s first premise is debatable, at the very least. In fact, Kael is 
too caught up in the flow of her relentless rhetoric to admit that she actually, by and large, agrees 
with Sarris in substance while disagreeing in words. As she would claim a few years later in her 
review of Michael Cacoyannis's The Trojan Women (1971): 
 
I question whether a director with so little feeling for the most basic elements of movie-making can ever be a 
good movie director. A director with a “film sense” knows where to put the camera so you don't question the 
shot; for others, every set-up looks arbitrary.264 
 
Isn’t technical competence roughly the same as film sense? Kael's argument here seems to point to 
precisely what Sarris had described as an elementary flair for the cinema. If Kael thinks Sarris is 
advocating the kind of slick academic craftsmanship that we have seen her criticise in “Movies, the 
Desperate Art”, she is obviously attributing attitudes to Sarris in an ad hominem way that is 
somewhat unfair. 
Kael certainly did not think technique unimportant, even if she rarely discussed it explicitly. “Art is 
the expressive use of technique, [but] technique is hardly worth talking about unless it is used for 
something worth doing.”265 What exactly, then, is technique in general? Philosopher Arnold 
Isenberg offers the following general and actually quite prosaic description of the term: 
 
Technique is an ability acquired by practice, assuring dependable performance. This suggests the idea of a 
standard quality in the result, attainable at will—some general feature of style common to an entire profession 
or school and to all the works of an individual; and it follows that a technical achievement is eminently 
communicable, teachable, imitable.266 
 
                                                 
264
 Pauline Kael (1973) Deeper Into Movies: The Essential Kael Collection from '69 to '72.  London: Marion 
Boyars. p. 304. 
265
  Pauline Kael, (1970) Going Steady. Boston: Little, Brown & Company. p. 95.  
266
 Arnold Isenberg “The Technical Factor in Art”, William Calaghan et. al. (eds.) (1973) Aesthetics and the 
Theory of Criticism: Selected Essays of Arnold Isenberg. Chicago & London. Chicago University Press. pp.53-61. 
102 
102 
Given this description, which I think Sarris and Kael in fact shared, we can probably understand 
Sarris’s desire to partially separate style (the creation of meaning through execution) from “mere” 
technique in his formulation of the auteur theory.  
   The second premise, or “the middle circle” in Sarris’s formulation, is according to Kael even 
more problematic in all its romanticism. This premise posits the distinguishable personality of the 
director as a criterion of value. This, Kael believes, is a romantic fallacy that collapses the entire 
edifice of civilized taste: 
 
Traditionally, in any art, the personalities of all those involved in a production have been a factor in judgement, 
but that the distinguishability of personality should in itself be a criterion of value completely confuses normal 
judgement. The smell of a skunk is more distinguishable than the perfume or a rose. Does that make it 
better?267  
 
Even more interesting is the rejoinder of this argument: 
 
Often the works in which we are most aware of the personality of the director are his worst films – when he 
falls back on the devices he has already done to death. When a famous director makes a good movie, we look 
at the movie; we don’t think about his personality; when he makes a stinker we notice his familiar touches 
because there is not much else to watch.268 
  
It follows, then, that for a film to be truly successful, a director’s personality or signature should not 
be a criterion in itself, and if such a signature exists, it should be embedded in the totality of the 
work rather than as extraneous touches to dull material. 
To reinforce this already pretty strong argument, Kael makes a reference to the career of 
Alfred Hitchcock, who of course was the original test case of La Politique in France, ever since l 
Eric Rohmer and Claude Chabrol  wrote a book-length auteur study on him.269 It must be noted that 
despite being an eminently commercial entertainer, Hitchcock’s career followed a very different 
pattern from most Hollywood filmmakers, mostly because Hitchcock found his commercial and 
artistic core very early and was able, for all intents and purposes, to invent and continually reinvent 
his own genre. What Kael has to say about Hitchcock is as follows: 
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It could even be argued, I think, that Hitchcock’s uniformity, his mastery of tricks, and his cleverness at getting 
audiences to respond according to his calculations – the feedback he wants and gets from them – reveal not so 
much a personal style as a personal theory of audience psychology, that his methods and approach are not 
those of an artist but a prestidigitator. The auteur critics respond as Hitchcock expects the gullible to 
respond.270 
 
Hitchcock did nothing to deny such an interpretation himself. On the contrary, his sly, aphoristic 
sense of humour rather seemed to support it—and not just because he was a teasing trickster who 
poked fun at earnest questions. What he told screenwriter Ernest Lehmann during the shooting of 
North by Northwest (1959) seems to be a full and blunt justification of Kael’s view:  
 
The audience is like a giant organ that you and I are playing. At one moment we play this note on them and get 
this reaction, and then we play that cord and they react that way. And some day we won’t even have to make a 
movie – there’ll be electrodes implanted in their brains, and we’ll just press different buttons and they’ll go 
“ooooh” and “aaaah” and we’ll frighten them and make them laugh. Won’t that be wonderful?271 
 
This gives a very different picture of Hitchcock than that of a metaphysician which pervades the 
first auteur study on him, which emphasises the biographical fact of his Jesuit training and how its 
views on guilt shaped his films. Kael’s is probably the more correct assessment of Hitchcock’s great 
achievement within a very narrow format. Seen in this light, Sarris’s preference for Hitchcock over 
Bresson “by every criterion of excellence” does seem somewhat strange. Certainly, it seems strange 
to contemplate Hitchcock as a Catholic filmmaker in the explicit sense that Bresson is one. Kael still 
thinks of Hitchcock as an artist, however 
Not only do movies combine many of the tricks of the other media, but there are many genres in which the 
operator's tricks seem perfectly legitimate. In a Hitchcock thriller, it's fun to be in the position of the mouse 
nibbling at the cheese, to experience danger vicariously. We know we're being teased and played with, and 
that's just what we wanted. An artist has to win our consent to his vision so we can see as he does. 272 
 
 Being an expert manipulator, then, does not exactly disqualify Hitchcock’s achievements as an 
artist. I happen to think Kael is correct in arguing that Hitchcock’s filmmaking career, to a large 
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extent, was  determined by a theory of audience psychology. But how would he achieve that end 
without a style that is calculated for such an effect?  
    After digressing about Hitchcock, possibly the one director most firmly established in the 
auteurist pantheon, Kael moves on to a director left conspicuously out of it: John Huston. Kael asks 
us to consider whether or not the auteur theory is a hindrance to clear judgement regarding Huston’s 
movies and his career:  
 
Disregarding the theory, we see some fine film achievements and we perceive a remarkably distinctive 
directorial talent; we also see intervals of weak, half-hearted assignments. [...] This kind of career seems more 
characteristic of film history, especially in the United States, than the ripening development and final mastery 
envisaged by the auteur theory. […] How is it that Huston’s early good – almost great – work must be rejected 
along with his mediocre recent work, but Fritz Lang, being sanctified as an auteur, has had his recent bad work 
praised along with his good? […] It is an insult to an artist to praise his bad work along with the good: it 
indicates that you are incapable of judging either.273  
Few careers throw the weaknesses and limitations of the auteur theory into so clear a relief as that of 
John Huston. His career as director began very conspicuously (even if was soon eclipsed by another 
debut director, Orson Welles) with The Maltese Falcon and went through ups and downs for nearly 
fifty years with a string of literate and often ambitious films which reflect Huston’s background as a 
screenwriter. It is no wonder that Kael, a connoisseur of performances (performers are usually the 
first thing we respond to going to the movies as kids) would rate Huston more favourably than 
Sarris. Film historians Wheeler Winston Dixon and Gwendolyn Audrey Foster have summed up 
Huston's career quite adequately: “Huston established an individual style that favored actors over 
camera movement and evinced a strong instinct for narrative drama.”274 Still, there is something to 
be said for Sarris’s argument that Huston failed his acid test: “The turning point of Huston's career 
was probably Moby Dick (1956). In retrospect, he should have acted Ahab himself and let Orson 
Welles direct.”275 Counterfactual history is a risky business, but what a film it would have been! 
John Huston was such a commanding actor, whereas Gregory Peck could never quite shake his 
image as a goody-two-shoes. While Huston's films in the seventies like Fat City (1972) and Wise 
Blood (1979) are clearly the works of the kind of mature and expressively aging filmmaker that the 
                                                 
273
 Pauline Kael  (1963) "Circles and Squares: Joys and Sarris," Pauline Kael (2002[1965] I Lost it at the Movies: 
The Essential Kael Collection 54'-65. London: Marion Boyars p.292-319. 
274
 Wheeler Winston Dixon & Gwendolyn Audrey Foster (2008) A Short History of Film. New Brunswick, New 
Jersey: Rutgers University Press. p. 121. 
275
 Andrew Sarris (1996 [1969]) The American Cinema: Directors and Directions – 1929-1968. New York: 
DaCapo Press. p. 157 
105 
105 
auteurists envisioned, his greatest gift to the screen is his performance as Noah Cross in Roman 
Polanski's Chinatown (1973). As Huston played him, he is the most frightening villain in American 
film, believable because grounded in an everyday domestic reality.  
  Even if Huston could be disqualified as an auteur (which is doubtful, to say the least, and 
ultimately, uninteresting), his career poses the question as to whether it is more important to display 
a surface consistency or signature than to make good films, or to actually attempt to make good 
films. In the case of Otto Preminger, one of the more controversial filmmakers to be bestowed with 
auteur status, Kael argues that this director’s alleged consistency in wildly diverse material is a 
function of his limitations rather than his virtues. Still, I think Sarris’s evaluation of Preminger is 
essentially correct. He would elaborate his critical position and Preminger's problematic standing in 
The American Cinema: 
 
To read all sorts of poignant profundities in Preminger's inscrutable urbanity would seem to be the last word in 
idiocy, and yet there are moments in his films when the evidence on the screen is inconsistent with one's 
deepest instincts about the director as a man. It is at these moments the serenity of his style seems to   
transcend the limitations of his sensibility. [...] Bonjour Tristesse, far from being a merry Gaelic romp, is 
transformed by Preminger's color/black-and-white duality into a tragedy of time and illusion.276 
 
If I may be permitted a purely personal opinion, Bonjour Tristesse (1960) is the most 
exemplary melodrama in American film, with a subdued sense of cool objectivity which is 
diametrically opposed to the currently more fashionable Sirkian excess. David Niven is 
perfectly cast as an ageing playboy, and Jean Seberg, fresh from her breakout success with 
Godard, is not only supremely photogenic but utterly believable as the sullen and precocious 
yet dangerously childish teenager.  
   Disagreements over Preminger notwithstanding,   Kael’s Huston example is very difficult to 
argue against if we agree that discrimination between works is what a critic should be concerned 
with. She claims that auteur criticism closely resembles buying clothes by the label,277 something 
which ultimately makes viewing the work on which a judgement is based and rendered superfluous. 
In fairness, Sarris had always been aware of this danger, and he made this awareness explicit when 
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he warned that the auteur theory could potentially become a snobbish racket like that associated 
with the merchandising of paintings.278  
     Kael holds no brief for the auteur theory in large part because, not without some 
justification, she believes that the ranking of directors is arbitrary in a way that reduces criticism to 
mystical insight. If the unfortunate formulation elàn of the soul (which, word for word, is actually 
more nonsensical than barbarous) is to be taken as the constant factor of the auteur theory, it 
becomes difficult to deny Kael’s assertion that the auteur theory is fundamentally based on a cult of 
personality, even if we allow for the exceptions and qualifications that Sarris uses to buttress his 
theory. Kael proposes a different and less mystical conception of elàn: “May I suggest that a more 
meaningful description of elàn is what a man [sic] feels when he’s at the top of his powers—and 
what we respond to in works of art […] a response to his joy in creativity.”279   
The third premise of the auteur theory as Sarris poses it is the most controversial aspect of 
the entire article, since interior meaning is held to be “the ultimate glory of cinema as an art.” If we 
take the metaphor of concentric circles seriously, we might say that interior meaning constitutes the 
essential core of his theory. But what is it? Supposedly, it is “extrapolated from the tension between 
the director and his material.” According to Kael, this formulation is at odds with what has always 
been taken for granted in the arts, that the artist expresses himself through the unity of form and 
content, a unity which is most likely to be found, according to Kael, in writer-directors like 
Bergman and Huston rather than the typical contract director: 
 
What Sarris believes to be the “ultimate glory of the cinema as an art” is what has generally been considered 
the frustrations of a man [sic] working against the given material. […] What is all this nonsense about 
extrapolating interior meaning from the tension between the director and his material? A competent 
commercial director generally does the best he can with what he’s got to work with. Where is the tension? And 
if you can locate some, what kind of meaning could you draw out of it except that the director is having a bad 
time with lousy material or material he doesn’t like? Or maybe he his trying to speed up the production so he 
can move on to something he has some hopes for? Are these critics honestly (and futilely) looking for interior 
meanings or is this just some form of intellectual dibbling that helps to sustain their pride while they are 
viewing silly movies?280 
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The concept of interior meaning is ill-defined in Sarris’s article, and too ambiguous to be tenable as 
an approach to film aesthetics:  
  
Interior Meaning seems to be what those in the know know. It’s a mystique and a mistake. The auteur critics 
never tell us by which divining rods they have discovered the èlan of a Minnelli or a Nicholas Ray or a Leo 
McCarey. They are not critics – they are inside dopesters. There must be another circle which Sarris forgot to 
get to – the one where secrets are kept.281 
 
With this, Sarris’s original article is unceremoniously discarded, but Kael’s article still has two more 
chapters, which help throw additional light on her own critical practice, as well as further deepening 
the reader’s understanding as to why she is so adamant that the auteur theory is a critical fallacy. 
This might be called, as Kael states in the chapter’s heading, “moving outside the circle.” 
These chapters of “Circles and Squares” read like a post scriptum to the main body of the 
text, and find Kael reflecting on criticism in general. They begin with something like a warning 
about the dangers of narrow-minded cinemania among the new auteurist breed of film critics; I 
daresay that this warning is directed not so much at Sarris as at the Movie-critics in Britain. The 
intense cinema-worshippers like V.F. Perkins, Rudi Franchi and Mark Shivas were, according to 
Kael, in danger of forgetting that art (cinematic or otherwise) is an expression of human experience:  
 
[I]f they don’t have interests outside film, how can they evaluate what goes on in films? Film aesthetics as a 
distinct, specialized field is a bad joke; the Movie-group is like an intellectual club for the intellectually 
handicapped.282 
 
This observation ties in as much to the practice of criticism itself as to the works that are subjected 
to criticism. For Kael as well as Sarris, the example of Bazin looms large, despite the fact that he 
was more essentialist than either of them. Kael lists the traditional virtues of criticism that she 
associates above all with Bazin and Agee, who brought their entire range of experience and taste to 
bear when watching and  offering critiques on movies. Kael then lists a range of qualities usually 
attributed to great critics: Intelligence, knowledge, experience, sensitivity, perceptiveness, fervour, 
imagination, dedication and lucidity.283 Kael reiterates her anti-theoretical and pluralistic stance, 
while at the same time maintaining that standards for art and criticism exist: 
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I believe that we respond most and best to work in any art form (and to other experiences as well) if we are 
pluralistic, flexible, relative in our judgements, if we are eclectic. But this does not mean a scrambling and 
confusion of systems. […] The critic is expendable if categories replace experience; a critic with a single 
theory is like a gardener who uses a lawn mower on everything that grows.284  
 
Kael seems to think that a pluralistic approach is especially rewarding when discussing movies:  
“[…] criticism is exciting because there is no formula to apply […] and film criticism is particularly 
exciting because of the multiplicity of elements in film art.”285 
The question of whether Sarris actually was the chief culprit against which the blast of 
almost militant good sense that constitutes “Circles and Squares” was directed, is a question worth 
asking, and I do not think it particularly forward or daring to indicate an answer. To utilize a device 
with which Kael excels, the rhetorical question, we might ask: was Sarris’s approach to criticism, if 
we look outside of the strict confines of “Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1962”, really all that non-
pluralistic? As Sarris would write in 1968, in a way that echoes the pluralistic impurity of the 
movies so dear to Kael, even if Sarris laments this as a slightly unfortunate predicament: 
 
Unfortunately, the screen is too prolific a medium to sum up in a handful of Aristotelian axioms. The trouble is 
that the cinema, unlike painting and sculpture, is only partly visual. Like music, cinema exists in time, but only 
partly. Like literature, it is locked in language, but only partly. It is like photography, but only partly. Truly, the 
cinema requires no less than a renaissance man to encompass all its aspects.286 
 
The most widely-read American general interest film critic of the post Sarris/Kael generation, Roger 
Ebert, has made an interesting, albeit puzzling point about the heated controversy that their 
disagreement spawned: “If there was a fight between Kael and Sarris I’m not sure what it was about, 
because if you read Kael’s criticism it is very director-oriented.”287 Indeed, her criticism was 
director-oriented, despite making ample room for the written script as the starting point for films.  
Later in her career, she would famously champion screenwriters like Herman Mankiewicz and 
Samson Raphaelson,288 which must be construed as an explicit awareness of the scripted subject 
matter that precedes and determines the mise-en-scène. The latter was where auteur critics 
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discovered virtually all expressive meaning as well as style. Kael is also much more actor-oriented 
than most auteur critics, who sometimes treat actors as neutral instruments that the director uses to 
express their visions. She did not, however, seriously question the primary importance of either the 
director or the presence of an authorial voice: 
 
A director with something like magical gifts can make a silk purse out of a sow’s ear, but if he has it in him to 
make more than silk purses, the triumph is minor – even if the purse is lined with gold. Only by the use of the 
auteur theory, does this little victory become “the ultimate glory.”289 
 
Kael’s disagreement with Sarris is a disagreement about the extent of theory, about its necessity and 
validity, but it is equally a perceived disagreement not about individual tastes, but about the exercise 
of taste: 
 
How can these critics, sensible enough to deflate our overblown message movies, reject the total content of the 
work and concentrate on signs of a director’s personality and interior meaning? It is understandable that 
they’re trying to find movie art in the loopholes of commercial production – it’s a harmless hobby and we all 
play it from time to time. What is incomprehensible is that they actually prefer their loopholes to unified 
expression.290 
 
In a way, this argument brings us back to the second premise as Sarris formulated it, and the alleged 
cult of personality that this premise entails, because the concept of artistic unity is transferred from 
discrete films to directorial careers. In the very first paragraph of “Notes on the Auteur Theory in 
1962”, one finds the following sentence: “Like the alchemists of old, auteur critics are notorious for 
rationalizing leaden clinkers into golden nuggets.”291 The operative and relevant question here is 
whether or not Sarris has ever fallen into the trap he warns against. Roger Ebert seems to think not: 
“You could never catch Sarris praising a film because the director was in the pantheon, or disliking 
it because the director's previous work had not passed muster. You felt that Sarris went to every 
movie hoping to be delighted.”292 
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The second sentence of Ebert's quote is undoubtedly correct: the infectious delight and 
enormous scope of Sarris’s cinematic references are what distinguish him from virtually every other 
critic, past or present. There is however, one glaring instance where Sarris praises a film he clearly 
thinks is bad, due to a prior commitment to this particular auteur. The film? Nicholas Ray's Party 
Girl. The review is worth quoting in full: 
 
On its own terms, Party Girl is a garish blend of the Hollywood musical and the gangster melodrama. Cyd 
Charisse's flashing sequins and Corey Allen's checkered suits are swept together into a memorable riot of 
color, and Ray's flair for cinematic movement lingers in the mind long after the trivial plot details and atrocious 
acting have been forgotten. Far being a collection of x images, Party Girl is a flow of x3 movements, and 
nothing is more vitally cubistic or visually dynamic than Cyd Charisse going into her dance. It is possible to 
dismiss the film as the limited triumph of form over content, but in Ray's wild exaggerations of decor and 
action, there arises an anarchic spirit which infects the entertainment and preserves the interior continuity of 
the director's work. One may chose to confront or to ignore the disturbing implications of Party Girl, but the 
choice involves more than one film and one director. It involves the entire cinema, past, present, and future.293 
 
The quasi-scientific turn of introducing totally undefined unknowns into the veritable equation is 
 absurd, and in fairness, an anomaly in Sarris’s criticism. But what does this amount to exactly? 
Is it a case of grotesquely misplaced loyalty to a supposed auteur, or simply a regrettable but 
forgivable overflow of enthusiasm? Kael would probably insist on the former, but I am not entirely 
convinced. It may be that the problems run deeper than that. The reason for what might be called 
the auteurist fallacy, for lack of a better term, lies more in enthusiasm than a cynically strategic 
underplaying of weaknesses. The auteurist fallacy, as I see it, crystallises a problem which may 
arise for any writer working within the humanities generally. I think film scholars Thomas 
Sobchack and Tim Bywater have come to the very heart of this problem. Writing from the 
perspective of 1989, they noted: “[T]he auteurist approach to film is still popular and as widely used 
as any other. Like most humans, film critics enjoy seeing traces of human individuality and 
creativity, even when the manufacture of those objects most often appears mechanical and 
anonymous.”294  
I really cannot feel too aggrieved about Sarris’s review of Party Girl, which for him represents a 
desire to find something worthwhile in the film.  
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         In fact, Kael’s criticism of the auteur theory would be more consistent if she hadn’t 
committed the sin of over-praising and practiced the obscure cult of personality criticism herself. In 
the seventies, Kael began to praise promiscuously. Perhaps heady with her own power, it seemed 
that her favourite directors could do no wrong. Her loyalties seemed to lie with the new breed of 
American directors she knew personally, like Brian De Palma and Sam Peckinpah. Kael`s 
dedication to De Palma reached absurd heights with her extremely panegyric review of the 
decidedly average Vietnam movie (a latecomer in that particular category), Casualties of War 
(1989). Her most obscure piece of writing ever, and the one most damaging to her credibility as the 
world's foremost anti-auteurist, was a review of Sam Peckinpah's The Killer Elite (1975). Ironically, 
and ominously for Kael's integrity as an anti-auteurist, she called the review “Notes on the Nihilist 
Poetry of Sam Peckinpah”.  This review is full of feeble attempts to commend a private, closed-off 
mess of a film that does nothing so much as underline Peckinpah’s drug-induced paranoia that 
gravely affected the quality of his work at the time, and worse still, is clearly the work of a 
filmmaker who radiates unmitigated contempt for his audience.  
It a wonder Kael's praise is so glowing, considering she correctly identifies the film as a private 
rather than personal film: 
 
There are so many elisions in The Killer Elite that it hardly exists on a narrative level, but its poetic vision is all 
of a piece. [...] The film is airless—an involuted corkscrew vision of a tight modern world. In its obsessiveness, 
with the questions of sequences a matter of irrational poetic connections, The Killer Elite is closer to The Blood 
of a Poet than it is to a conventional thriller made on the  C.I.A. assassins subject, such as Three Days of the 
Condor. And, despite the script by Marc Norman and Stirling Silliphant that United Artists paid for, the film 
isn't about C.I.A.-sponsored assassinations—it's about the blood of a poet. [...] There is no way to make sense 
of what has been going on in Peckinpah's recent films if one looks only at their surface stories. Whether 
consciously, or as I think, part unconsciously, he's been destroying the surface content.295  
 
To rephrase her own argument from “Circles and Squares” on Sarris’s idea of interior meaning: Is 
surface content any different from content?  And if the film is all subtext, how can we fashion any 
reasonably precise interpretation from the experience of having seen the film? 
It is almost embarrassing to point out how completely Kael made a fool of herself here. Few 
critics have been as defensive about their own intellectual ad hoc rationalizations, but it is obvious 
what happened here, though I can hear Kael snarling at the suggestion I am about to make. 
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  Kael is clearly using the criterion of tension between the director and his material here as a 
strategy to import praise, which was of course exactly what she had accused Sarris of doing with his 
vague and ill-explained concept of interior meaning. The title of Kael`s review is a surefire 
giveaway for the unfortunate sort of auteur-rationalization of a movie that simply does not work 
which she had so warned against. 
   “Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1962” and “Circles and Squares” are the centrepieces of the 
Sarris-Kael feud; by comparison, later polemics about the pros and cons of the auteur theory are 
actually quite weak rejoinders. Sarris’s direct reply, “The Perils of Pauline”, cobbled together earlier 
articles on the auteur theory and made no reference to Kael except in its title. Sarris would revisit 
the auteur theory in several later articles, but the fervour of Kael's rebuttal hurt him. I think it would 
be fair to say that Kael’s main criticism of the auteur theory is less about directorial or literary 
authorship, than about the classic and modern ideas of totality in unified form and content. She also 
felt strongly that the auteur theory had been misappropriated in America and Britain simply because 
it originally performed a very different function in France. This is the subject of the last chapter in 
“Circles and Squares”, and it demonstrates that even in the pieces that most polarize Sarris and Kael, 
there is at least one very fundamental point of consensus: 
 
The French auteur critics, rejecting the socially conscious problem pictures so dear to the older generation of 
American critics, became connoisseurs of values in American pictures that Americans took for granted, and if 
they were educated Americans, often held in contempt. The French adored the American gangsters, and the 
vitality, the strength of our action pictures. In one sense, the French were perfectly right – these were often 
much more skilfully made, and far more interesting visually than the movies with a message that the 
Americans were so proud of, considered so adult. Vulgar melodrama with a fast pace can be much more 
exciting – and more honest too – than feeble, pretentious attempts at drama, which usually just meant putting 
ideas into melodrama anyway. Where the French went off was finding elaborate intellectual and psychological 
meanings in these simple action films.296 
 
The abiding impression left by this is that Kael saw the original impetus behind the auteur theory as 
a valuable corrective, maybe even a necessary one. As we have seen, Kael believes that crude 
vitality, cultivated especially in American movies, is one of the chief pleasures of the movies, but 
she still wants more from the medium. The auteur theory came about in France because the French 
cinephiles saw something in American films that their own films lacked. The gist of this, as Kael 
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sees it, is that the auteur theory in its original form was a function of French needs, not necessarily 
only as a polemical weapon, as Truffaut claimed, but also because American movies (significantly 
released almost in bulk with the end of the German occupation of France, after being held up in 
distribution) gave these young men aesthetically pleasurable experiences that they could not find 
elsewhere. 
    In America, Kael argued, writing from the perspective of 1963, the situation was different.    
Different not in the sense that socially conscious film critics were beginning to lose sway vis-a-vis 
the cinephiles, but rather in the sense that Kael felt a need for a different kind of American film that 
was more responsive to the current American experience. Kael’s bold contention, that Anglo-
American auteurism in the early sixties played an anti-intellectual, anti-art role, in contrast to being 
a primer for an outburst of creativity in France, must be read against this background.297 
 
There was no special need for the French critics preoccupied with their needs to become sensitive to ours. […] 
What has happened to the judgement of the English and New York critics who have taken over the auteur 
theory use to erect a film aesthetics based on those commercial movies that answered the needs of French, but 
which are not merely ludicrously inadequate to our needs, but the result of system which places a hammerlock 
on American directors.298 
 
It is evident from this that Kael wanted a new kind of American film, one that retains and cultivates 
its trademark vitality while expanding its scope. The way she responded to what has been routinely 
labelled “New Hollywood Cinema” supports this. 
     It must be admitted that Kael`s rejection of the auteur theory is very difficult to argue 
against—that is, the rejection of the auteur theory as a theoretical approach to film aesthetics. We 
shall return to the implications of the auteur theory as an approach to aesthetic film history, where it 
has played a much more prominent role.  In film studies at large, the auteur theory soon faced 
competition from other approaches. While its influence on the practice of film history from the 
sixties onward proved immense, it was soon challenged and supplemented by other approaches. In a 
reformulation  of her anti-auteurist polemic, Kael would offer just such a challenge. With a text that 
aspired to film history rather than simply criticism, she fixed her attentions on Orson Welles and the 
most studied film in history: Citizen Kane. “Raising Kane” was to prove her only foray into 
explicitly historical writing, and it turned out to be her most controversial work.  
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Raising Kane: Kael as Film Historian 
 
When Andrew Sarris lauded Richard Lester's emblematic film of the swinging sixties, A Hard 
Day’s Night (1964) in a review, he did so by declaring that this movie was the Citizen Kane of the 
jukebox musicals.299 The most doting compliment in that statement is thus to Kane and its director, 
Orson Welles. That Citizen Kane did not win the Oscar for Best Picture in 1941 has been taken as 
irrefutable proof that the Academy voters are unreliable or even incompetent judges in matters of an 
artistic nature.  Despite its losing out on the two most prestigious awards (Best Picture and Best 
Director to John Ford's How Green Was My Valley), it is almost universally considered the apogee 
of cinematic art:  
 
When in 1952 the British film magazine Sight & Sound published the results of an international poll to 
discover “the ten best films of all time”, Orson Welles' Citizen Kane fell just short of the magic number, tying 
with Jean Renoir's La Grande Illusion and John Ford's The Grapes of Wrath for the eleventh position. In a 
similar poll ten years later, sent to substantially the same group of film critics and historians, Citizen Kane was 
the clear-cut victor – the best film of all time, if one were to read such listings literally.300   
 
    Astonishingly, the film's position has remained practically unchallenged ever since.  It was 
with full knowledge of this situation that Kael launched her only real attempt at film historical 
writing on a major scale: “Raising Kane” (1971), which originally ran as an article in two parts in 
the New Yorker. In fact, the status of Kane as sui generis was vital to Kael's line of argument. The 
stature of “Raising Kane” as an important work in film historical scholarship was enhanced 
considerably when it was published in book form as The Citizen Kane Book, where it accompanied 
the film's shooting script, later that same year. 
       I have already indicated that Kael's perspective in “Raising Kane” is a reformulation of 
many of her anti-auteurist arguments in “Circles and Squares”, but it is also, in another way, a kind 
of practical application of the aesthetic she had developed in “Trash, Art, and the Movies” and 
elsewhere in her writing. I will now proceed by offering a thorough analysis of Kael's article, but I 
will also deliver the counterpoint to our findings here with what Sarris has written about the same 
film, both prior to and later in response to “Raising Kane”. 
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    On one count, Kael is entirely in unison with everyone else who has written about Kane, in 
that it was made with an unusual degree of artistic freedom and control for a studio-financed film of 
the era. Moreover, this freedom manifested itself on two different levels: “Citizen Kane [...] was not 
an ordinary assignment. It is one of the few films ever made inside a major studio in the United 
States in freedom—not merely freedom from interference but in freedom from the routine methods 
of experienced directors.”301 The many bits of technique that were perfected, if not actually 
introduced in Welles' debut film, bear out that the young inexperienced director had an eagerness to 
try out new ideas which influenced the entire technical crew and inspired them to reach new 
heights. 
    Kael starts off her narrative on the making and reception of Citizen Kane with an analysis and 
judgement of the film's quality of experience (i.e. its aesthetic), which was just as controversial as 
the purely empirical or factual information she would present later in the piece. The one 
pronouncement many found particularly troubling was Kael's insistence that Kane was a (gasp) 
shallow work. There is no doubt, however, that she loved the film; she called it, after all, “a shallow 
masterpiece”.302  Moreover, it apparently looked all the better for it from the perspective of 1971: 
 
Citizen Kane is perhaps the one talking picture that seems as fresh now as when it opened. It may seem even 
fresher. A great deal in the movie that was conventional and almost banal in 1941 is so far in the past as to 
have been forgotten and become new. The Pop characterizations look modern, and rather better than they did at 
the time. New audiences may enjoy Orson Welles' theatrical flamboyance even more than earlier generations 
did, because they are so unfamiliar with the traditions it came out of.303 
I will answer the implicit question contained in the passage quoted above, but first I think it 
expedient and pedagogical to first examine what tradition Kael thinks Welles's theatrical 
flamboyance and Citizen Kane as a whole do not belong to. She certainly does not think the film's 
artifice and self-reflexivity, designed to keep the audience alert of a mysterious yet transparent 
movieness, is out of the same tradition as the modern novel (though Welles would eventually direct 
The Trial in 1960). I will now answer the question of Kael's view on the film's roots positively, but 
in a roundabout way. Here is what a young Andrew Sarris had to say about Kane, a few years 
before he became an auteurist and before Kael attacked him in print:  
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Within the maze of its own aesthetic, Kane develops two interesting themes: the debasement of the public 
figure, and the crushing weight of materialism. Taken together, these two themes comprise the bitter irony of 
an American success story which  ends in futile nostalgia, loneliness and death. The fact that the personal 
theme is developed verbally, while the materialistic theme is developed visually, creates a distinctive stylistic 
counterpoint. Against this counterpoint the themes unfold within the structure of a mystery story.304 
Despite the sombre overall tone of this passage by Sarris, he notes that the film uses a popular form, 
the mystery story, to make its points and work out its themes. (Mystery, you will remember, falls 
under the sensational, one of the five elementary qualities of the popular outlined by Bong-Park.) 
Kael would expand on this notion of popular forms, to move violently away (as Sarris does not) 
from a modern or modernistic interpretation. Referring to the film's central enigma or mystery, 
Rosebud, Kael writes damningly:  
 
The mystery in Kane is largely fake, and the gothic thriller atmosphere and the Rosebud gimmickry (though 
fun) are such obvious penny-dreadful theatrics that they`re not so very different from the fake mysteries that 
Hearst's American Weekly used to whip up—the haunted castles and the curses fulfilled.305 
Kael goes on to elaborate: 
 
[T]here are articles on Citizen Kane that call it a tragedy in fugal form and articles that explain that the real 
hero of Citizen Kane is time – time being the proper sort of modern hero for an important picture. But to use 
the conventional schoolbook explanations for greatness and pretend that it's profound is to miss what makes it 
such an American triumph - that it manages to create something aesthetically exciting and durable out of the 
playfulness of American muckraking satire. Kane is closer to comedy than to tragedy, though so overwrought 
in style as to be almost a gothic comedy. What might possibly be considered tragic in it has such a Daddy 
Warbucks quality that if it's tragic at all, it's comic-strip tragic.306 
So, Kael informs us, Kane is actually a comedy conceived in a gothic style, a muckraking satire 
with its roots in quintessentially American forms of the 1930s, for screen and stage. This tradition is 
today most visibly present in the screwball comedies of the thirties—films that still sparkle with 
wit, wisecracks and innuendo so as to remind us how simple and ordinary most movies are. The 
artifice and self-consciousness of the genre are every bit as intent on commenting on their own 
contrivances and improbabilities as the European art films of later years, even if they’re played for 
laughs. As she reinforces this argument, we are allowed to witness Kael the anti-auteur critic in full 
swing: 
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It's easy to see why Europeans, who couldn't follow the slang and the jokes and didn't understand the whole 
satirical frame of reference, should prefer our action films and westerns. But it's a bad joke on our good jokes 
that film enthusiasts here often take their cues of the American movie past from Europe, and so they ignore the 
tradition of comic irreverence and become connoisseurs of the “visuals” and “mises-en-scene” which are too 
silly even to be called reactionary. They are sub-reactionary – the antique melodramas of silent days with noise 
added – a mass art better suited, one might think, to Fascism, or even feudalism, than to democracy.307 
 
Kael's putdown of action films seems a little strange when considering other aspects of her 
criticism, for not only did she fight for the aesthetic values of films notorious for their violence, like 
Bonnie and Clyde and Taxi Driver (which she would actually help get into wide release), she would 
also, some years after “Raising Kane” was written, become the most eloquent defender action 
director Walter Hill308 has ever had. She did believe, however, that democracy somehow influenced 
American films aesthetically. “She [Kael] sees American film as unique not only because it's 
accessible to and seductive of mass audience, but because Hollywood grew up in and produces for a 
democratic society.”309 In terms of film content, Kane as a study of power is arguably a perfect 
example of such a film. The argument made within the context of a study of Citizen Kane is worth 
noting—and I believe, substantially correct. Central to democracy is the concept of the Fourth 
Estate, and this has a bearing on Kael's interpretation of Kane. 
   You may remember that Charles Foster Kane's meteoric rise as a public figure begins when 
he hits on the notion that it would be fun to run a newspaper. My point is that Kael sees the film as 
the culmination and transcendence of the fast-paced newspaper comedies of the era, like The Front 
Page (Lewis Milestone, 1931) and His Girl Friday (Howard Hawks, 1940), both of which were 
adapted by Charles MacArthur and Ben Hecht from their smash Broadway play, The Front Page 
(1928).  
    In a sense, this undermines Kane's status as something wholly unique in the history of 
American film. Jonathan Rosenbaum has found Kael's interpretation not only incorrect, but 
distressing:  
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[Kael views Kane] as the apotheosis of the Hollywood newspaper comedy, [and thus] we wind up with a mainstream 
domestication of Welles' first feature. For roughly three decades after it was made, Kane remained a troubling anomaly 
in American film history, an unclassifiable object that was neither fish nor fowl.310 
 
    While it is certainly true that Kane cannot be classified simply as a genre film, Rosenbaum's 
assertion, that it was an unclassifiable object in American film history for thirty years until Kael's 
interpretation domesticated it, does seem somewhat puzzling. Its links with the long-standing and 
critically venerated “biopic” tradition strikes me as obvious. As far as domestication of the film 
through critical interpretation goes, there is a core of truth to his argument. However, Rosenbaum 
fails to mention that most of Kane's stylistic innovations were domesticated by other filmmakers 
long before 1971.  I am thinking here of the film's influence on the extraordinarily fruitful noir 
cycle  in the forties and fifties, which proved to be immense—something that has been thoroughly 
documented and analyzed by, among others, film historian Thomas Schatz.311 
This being the case, there was clearly sufficient continuity between Kane and the film mainstream 
at the time for Welles's stylistic and structural innovations to be rapidly assimilated into the 
Hollywood idiom. 
        I argued in the introduction that the analytical separation between criticism and history 
strikes me as an artificial distinction which cannot, and indeed should not, be maintained without 
severe qualifications. For the sake of argument, however, I now want to stress the distinction rather 
than nullify it. Though “Raising Kane” is a striking attempt at film history, the issues in the article 
we have dealt with thus far are issues of interpretation that typically lay within the province of 
practical criticism as such. Other aspects of the article are historical in a more obvious and direct 
sense, in that they illuminate a piece of the past through sources presently available to the 
writer/historian. As an essay in film history, it attacks the underlying premise of a film history 
written from an auteurist perspective—and even more importantly, the article relies heavily on non-
filmic evidence to make several of its key points. 
      What Kael attempts is to elucidate the historical context that is relevant for Kane's qualities 
of experience as a projected film. As such, it is a text in aesthetic film history. But, as we shall see, 
it is also a film historical narrative that in many ways was ahead of its time, because it illuminates 
another context: the filmmakers' thorny relationship with William Randolph Hearst. This is highly 
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relevant, because Citizen Kane must be interpreted partly as a conscious and deliberate comment on 
contemporary American history and current affairs. We shall deal with “Raising Kane” from the 
point of view of aesthetic history first.  
       The impulse behind “Raising Kane” lies in the only recorded instance where Kael actually 
systematically reversed an original opinion rather than simply contradict herself. While her feelings 
about the film had not changed by the time of “Raising Kane”, her understanding of the film's 
genesis had:     
 
In 1941 the most controversial one-man show in film history was staged by a twenty-five year old writer-
director-star Orson Welles when he dramatized the life of William Randolph Hearst, who had quite a 
reputation for his own one-man show, i.e. the Spanish-American War.312 
The idea of Welles as a misunderstood solitary genius (in the same vein as Erich Von Stroheim), an 
awesome unequalled talent who was destroyed by unfeeling money-men in a creative industry more 
focused on the bottom line than on Art, is still very much alive in film history today. The most 
recent example is probably Clinton Heylin's monograph Despite the System: Orson Welles Versus 
the Hollywood Studios.313  
    The major critical point and key thesis of “Raising Kane”, contrary to Heylin’s perspective, 
and indeed contrary to Kael's own earlier review, is to stress that the film was not a one-man show. 
Specifically, Kael would proceed to resurrect the screenwriter Herman J. Mankiewicz, and in so 
doing, she stressed the collaborative nature of commercial filmmaking, and furthermore elaborated 
in narrative form the common-sense idea that the script is something more than just a sketch to be 
transcended by the director's mise-en-scène.  I will return to Mankiewicz shortly, but I first want to 
detail Kael's perspective on Kane's striking visuals, which, she argued, were also a matter of 
collaboration. Intimately connected to mise-en-scène is cinematography, and Kael directed a lot of 
praise for Kane's distinctive look towards cinematographer Gregg Toland and his four-man camera 
crew—more, in fact, than had been usual up to that point.  
    Kael could not bring herself to believe Welles's curious boast that the only real preparation 
he had had before directing Kane was having watched John Ford's Stagecoach (1939) forty times. 
Kael asked herself: “Why should Orson Welles have studied Stagecoach and come up with a film 
that looked more like The Cabinet of Caligari?” Like any proper historian and (dare I say it) like an 
inverted, archivally oriented auteurist with an appetite for trivia and a compulsion to sniff out vital 
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clues, Kael went to work sifting through Toland's earlier work as cinematographer and camera 
operator. She found was she was looking for in the shape of an obscure horror film, Mad Love (Karl 
Freund, 1935). Freund had been a leading cameraman at UFA in Germany, and was as directly 
responsible for the look of German Expressionism as John Alton and Nick Musuraca were directly 
responsible for the distinctive look of American film noir. Mad Love even featured a heavily made-
up Peter Lorre, who bore a striking resemblance to the aged Charles Foster Kane as played by 
Orson Welles. 
     If “Raising Kane” actually falls short of obscuring or minimizing the contribution of Orson 
Welles, Kael in any event redirects much of the attention and praise to others involved in the 
creative work: Welles's collaborators in general, and Joseph Mankiewicz in particular. Kael saw 
Mankiewicz as a forgotten protagonist in getting the movie done. A man hidden for a generation 
under Welles' enormous, indeed overwhelming shadow:  
 
[Welles] has never again worked with a subject with the immediacy and impact of Kane. [...] This particular 
kind of journalist's sense of what would be a scandal as well as a great subject, and the ability to write it, 
belonged not to Welles but to his now almost forgotten associate Herman J. Mankiewicz, who wrote the script, 
and inadvertently destroyed the picture's changes. There is a theme that is submerged in much of Citizen Kane 
but that comes to the surface now and then, and it's the linking of Hearst and Mankiewicz and of Welles—the 
story of how brilliantly gifted men who seem to have everything it takes to do what they want to do are 
defeated. It's the story of how heroes become comedians and con artists.314 
Narratives with fateful premises and themes such as these are common in the literature about Orson 
Welles, but they also occupy an even greater tradition with respect to historical narratives in 
general. Welles is the ideal figure for this kind of historical writing, since he started at the top with 
the full backing of the best studio resources and ended up as something close to a guerrilla 
filmmaker, scrambling to get his many aborted projects off the ground. All because, according to 
Kael, that without his collaborators through which he could harness his and others' creativity, 
behind and in front of the camera, he flew apart and became disorderly.315 There is a kind of arch 
fatalism in Kael's passage here which embodies the entire text's function as a historical narrative 
and sums up where Kael would find herself in this context—by which I mean the context in which 
historians typically find themselves while pursuing their profession.  
    Kael conducted interviews with a host of figures involved in the making of Citizen Kane, 
but like any historian, she (perhaps a bit unscrupulously in this case) marshalled the evidence to fit 
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her conception of what kind of narrative she was writing. What French biographer Andrè Maurois 
noted in connection with his particular profession is equally true for every other kind of historian: 
“It must not be forgotten that the marshalling and grouping of facts is itself an interpretation.”316 
    Kael did not interview Orson Welles during her almost two-year long period of preparation 
for her article. She argued that Welles had been interviewed about Kane so many times, that it was 
easy to infer what he would have said had Kael consulted him. “I talked to everyone I thought could 
help me. [...] But I was very selective about whom I interviewed. Mainly, I guarded against people I 
felt might be too emotionally involved.”317 For that reason, Joseph Mankiewicz (Herman's younger 
and more successful brother) was omitted from the list of interviewees along with Welles. One 
person Kael did interview, however, was Herman Mankiewicz’s secretary, Mrs. Rita Alexander. It 
was apparently Alexander who provided Kael with the juiciest bit of information in “Raising 
Kane”: that Herman J. Mankiewicz had dictated the entire shooting script to her, without the 
assistance of Welles in the actual writing process.318 Welles, of course, shared the Academy Award 
for best screenplay with Mankiewicz, but ironically, lost out as lead actor and director. 
The claim concerning Mankiewicz as the sole writer of the shooting script, though 
sensational, has turned out to be the Achilles heel of “Raising Kane” as a work in film historical 
scholarship. Robert Carringer's book, The Making of Citizen Kane (1985), would conclusively 
disprove Kael's finding that Herman Mankiewicz was the sole person responsible for Kane's literary 
authorship.319 Carringer, however, wholeheartedly endorsed Kael's controversial re-
contextualization and revisionist interpretation of Citizen Kane as a film continuous with the 
American mainstream of its era.  With Carringer's subsequent aid, Kael's interpretation of Kane has 
entered our common understanding of the film, and that is probably the highest honour any film 
historian should allow themselves to hope for—and the ultimate compliment. 
     Kael's canonisation of Herman Mankiewicz can only be understood against the backdrop of 
the auteur theory and its impact on the practice of film historical writing, and the implicit 
downgrading of the script this entails. In particular, “Raising Kane” can be seen as an attack on a 
particular tradition within auteurist film scholarship. I am speaking, of course, of the auteur 
interview:  
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The new generation of film historians have their own version of “Look, no hands”; they tape-record interviews. 
Young interviewers particularly, don't bother to check the statements of their subjects – they seem to regard 
that as outside their province – and thus leave the impression that the self-aggrandizing stories they record are 
history. [...] This worship of the director is cyclical – Welles or Fellini are probably adored no more than Von 
Stroheim or DeMille was in his heyday – but such worship generally doesn't help sorting out what went into 
the making good pictures or bad pictures.320 
 
While most of us may readily admit that interviews with film directors more often than not have a 
kind of chatty and somewhat inconsequential air about them, and are often made up of little more 
than charming and superficial anecdotes, I still feel the need to ask a nagging question: Has Sarris 
been a film historian or critic of the kind that Kael criticises here? Sarris’s compatriot from Film 
Culture, Peter Bogdanovich, would certainly have to be considered the foremost representative of 
this kind of film historian in America.321 Sarris’s case is far from clear-cut, and although he has 
edited two anthologies of director interviews, Interviews with Film Directors (1967) and Hollywood 
Voices (1971), he has never considered the interview an indispensible weapon in the critic's arsenal. 
I want to stress this aspect of Sarris’s thinking here because Sarris’s biographically tinged approach 
to film history, dependent as it is to some extent on a kind of aesthetic intentionalism, is more 
thoroughly thought through than Kael's half-baked and confused flirtations with anti-intentionalism, 
which we discussed in our general chapter on axiological criticism. Nowhere is Sarris’s sensible 
position more emphatically evident than in his digressions on the epistemological problem of thet 
auteur interview as a mode of historical enquiry. Sarris had interviewed American film's foremost 
satirist, Preston Sturges, as early as 1957. He recalled the meeting thus:  
My deepest critical instincts urge me to minimize the fact that I interviewed Preston Sturges in the summer of 
1957. Why? Because, I suppose, I believe less than ever in the truth of direct personal confrontations between 
the artist and the critic. All directors, even the great ones, are human beings, but they are also something more 
or something less, or perhaps even something else. The link between artistry and psychology is still tenuous to 
me, and the traits of character, common to millions of otherwise miscellaneous individuals, consequently seem 
as relevant as the sign of the zodiac. [...] I must admit that Preston Sturges looked every inch a director.  His 
eyes retained a thoughtful glitter and the greyness of his fifty-nine years was more imperial grey than sparrow 
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grey. However, I already knew he was a director, so how could I truthfully read the tea-leaves of character 
analysis? It is hardly a secret that an experienced interviewer can usually mould a personality to specifications 
by asking the right questions. [...] Of course there is a grain of truth even in the lies inevitably elicited by 
inquisitors who know the answers before they ask the questions.322 
 
Precisely. Though Kael is of course correct in the particular case of Orson Welles, and in the 
general assumption that the auteur interview, when left to stand alone, is a most dubious form of 
film scholarship, it is nevertheless legitimate as one approach of several as long as we remember 
that the directors interviewed usually offer a retrospective interpretation of their intentions rather 
than a simple statement of intentions. Much less still are they indicators of the fulfilment of their 
intentions.  This, I think, is the implicit reservation in Sarris’s statement. The total communicative 
statement, such as it is, is preserved in the film (or rather, is the film), but a director's interpretation 
of his intentions and how they were achieved, or if indeed what became preserved in the film were 
someone else's intentions, can only be checked by turning to other relevant filmic and non-filmic 
evidence. And so, the auteur interview marks another point where Sarris and Kael apparently 
disagree in words but agree in substance. 
     I have argued during the course of this chapter that “Raising Kane” as a text in film history 
was ahead of its time. One reason for this is of course the re-casting of Kane itself as a sort of 
popular genre exercise that transcended its origins. Another reason, as already noted, is Kael's 
analysis of both the film as a comment on contemporary America and the relationship between 
Welles, Mankiewicz, and William Randolph Hearst. “Raising Kane” thus predates the current 
vogue for “contextual” film history by about twenty years. 
Kael details the facts and the gossip about William Randolph Hearst and his wife Marion 
Davies (Susan Alexander in the film), including the revelation that Mankiewicz knew Hearst 
socially, along with several other writers of the New Yorker at that time and the magazine's editor 
and founder, Harold Ross. 
      What remains most fascinating, however, from the point of view of American popular 
democracy, which Kael stressed in connection with Citizen Kane, is that Hearst represented a new 
type of power—the power of the media. This is a kind of power Hollywood people understand 
better than most. “Though Hearst made some direct attempts to interfere with the film, it wasn't so 
much what he did that hurt the film commercially as what others feared he might do, to them and to 
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the movie industry. They knew he was contemplating action, so they did the picture in for him.”323 
The studio head at RKO, George J. Schaefer, was apparently called to New York by Nicholas 
Schenck, chairman of the board of Loew's International, who made a cash offer of $842,000 from 
the MGM head of production Louis B. Mayer to destroy all the negatives before the film had 
opened.324  
     Had Schaefer accepted, film history as past, and as subject, would have been very different. 
As it turned out, hostility from the Hearst-controlled press and the fear of media power, probably 
coupled with the film’s daring inventiveness, prevented it from being a commercial success. In the 
1950s, RKO would eventually (as the only “major”) succumb to chronic financial difficulties, 
because it could not meet the challenges of television and a dwindling cinema audience.  
    So where, exactly, does “Raising Kane” stand? There is certainly little doubt about who 
wrote it. It remains arguably the most cogent aesthetic statement and stylistic document of Kael's 
career, mixing as it does biography, criticism, history and even autobiography (Kael relates an 
episode from 1938, when she actually encountered Hearst on a dance floor and was mightily 
impressed by his imperial appearance). Even Sarris was reluctantly impressed by Kael's article: 
 “Raising Kane” bears the byline of Pauline Kael and of Pauline Kael alone. [...] Miss Kael deserves credit because she 
has shaped her material, much of it unoriginal, into an article with a polemical thrust all her own. Her selection and 
arrangement of material constitutes a very significant portion of her personal style.325 
Summing up, there are two main lines of argument in “Raising Kane”. One of them is that 
filmmaking is a collaborative art. This in itself is not particularly original today, nor was it so in 
1971. Ernest Lindgren, author of the much-read The Art of the Film (1948) had in fact devoted his 
entire first chapter to “The Division of Talent”.326  Kael's work was, however, a timely reminder to 
all the auteurists in creation at university campuses across America. 
    Film scholar Howard Suber has recently restated the strong collaborative strand in Kael's 
text on the genesis of Citizen Kane, and in fact adds a twist of his own by including composer 
Bernard Herrmann in the film's key collaborative nucleus: 
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Orson Welles had passion, inventiveness, brilliance and courage, but he was only twenty-five and had never 
made a feature film before. Herman Mankiewicz, the screenwriter who wrote almost all the dialogue and 
scenes, was a middle-aged cynic who had long since given up finding a vessel into which to pour his 
considerable wisdom, and he needed to have his creative prowess harnessed to a worthwhile end. Gregg 
Toland, the middle-aged cinematographer, was one of the great technological innovators in motion picture 
photography. [...] Bernard Herrmann was a temperamental young guy who turned out to be one of the most 
inventive geniuses in movie music. Two younger men collaborated with two older and experienced artists. The 
young ones had no sense of the limits of the medium, but the older men knew how to go beyond them. 
Together, these four collaborators produced something that was beyond anything each had produced before or 
would ever produce again.327 
Here we can see to what extent Pauline Kael's perspective on the film has shaped current 
scholarship on Welles. Suber arguably takes Kael's collaborative perspective on Kane too far. Can 
Bernard Herrmann's work on Kane really hold a candle to his best scores for Alfred Hitchcock? 
 Where “Raising Kane” really excels as a text is in joining the sense of filmmaking as a 
collaborative art with her recasting of the film as the crowning achievement of American popular 
genres usually completely  overlooked by Academy voters, unless, as in the case of Kane, it is laced 
with tragedy, despair, or pathos.  Kael's summary of the vivid trashiness that vitalizes Kane as a 
movie, I find practically impossible to argue with:   
 
It is both a limitation and in the nature of the appeal of popular art that it constructs false, easy patterns. [...] 
Kane has a primitive appeal that is implicit in the conception. It tells the audience that fate or destiny or God or 
childhood has already taken revenge on the wicked – that if the rich man had a good time he has suffered 
remorse, or, better still, hasn't really enjoyed himself at all. [...] In popular art, riches and power destroy people, 
and so the secret of Kane is hat he longs for the simple pleasures of his childhood before wealth tore him away 
from his mother – he longs for what is available to the mass audience.328 
 
As this stands, Citizen Kane is arguably the prime example of kitsch redeemed—kitsch transformed 
into art. Did Kael think it was the best film ever made? It is probably more correct and relevant to 
say that she saw the qualities of Kane as being characteristic of great movies—that it has the 
elements that make most great movies exactly that. There is, however, one instance where she 
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indicated that there exists another kind of film art which is even greater. Kael ended a 1961 
broadcast review of La Grande Illusion (Jean Renoir, 1937) thus:  
 
In cinema there is artistry that brings the medium alive with self-conscious excitement (Eisenstein's Potemkin, 
Orson Welles' Citizen Kane) and there is the artistry that makes the medium disappear [Renoir's] La Grande 
Illusion, De Sica's Shoeshine). La Grande Illusion is a triumph of clarity and lucidity, every detail fits simply, 
easily, intelligibly. There is no unnecessary camera virtuosity: the compositions seem to emerge from the 
material. It's as if beauty just happens (is it necessary to state that this unobtrusive artistry is perhaps the most 
difficult to achieve?).329 
  
I will not be forced into choosing between Welles or Renoir by Kael's review, but I have included it 
here to once again demonstrate the constant duality of Kael's thinking. 
    A heated debate arose in the wake of “Raising Kane's” initial publication. Peter 
Bogdanovich, in particular, who was preparing a book on Welles at the time, took the whole idea of 
shallow masterpieces very badly.  When he quoted Welles, he also issued a warning to other critics 
and scholars: “Cleaning up after Miss Kael is going to take a lot of scrubbing.”330 
The reactions of another auteurist, Andrew Sarris, are more interesting for our purposes, and 
are also, it would seem, a lot more nuanced: 
 
Of course, the tactical point of [Kael's] hyperbole is to suggest that the later decline of Welles could be 
attributed to his loss of the story sense provided by Mankiewicz for Kane. In the end, however, Kael succeeded 
only in adding another layer of mythology to Welles as the man who “stole” Citizen Kane from Herman J. 
Mankiewicz. Earlier and later myths serve to entomb Welles as a burned out prodigy, a wastrel, an 
unappreciated visionary, a trickster, a Renaissance Man for all media – cinema, theater, radio, television; an 
egomanic, a compulsive storyteller right out of the ancient Mariner, a persecuted liberal and New Dealer 
without portfolio, a failed newspaper columnist, a huckster, a public clown, a martyr to Hollywood 
philistinism, a raging sexist, a baroque mannerist, a man who scared a nation, a twentieth century incarnation 
of Sigmund Freud's Leonardo Da Vinci, and an Oedipally crippled artist congenitally inhibited from finishing 
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his projects. The problem was that Welles was all these things and more. No single tag line was adequate. His 
“genius”, if it existed, was in recognizing his own complex personality and expressing it artistically.331  
 
Regarding Welles, it could be argued, despite the personal humiliation “Raising Kane” entailed, 
that Kael's text also served as a catalyst for creativity. I don't think it is far-fetched to see the 
sparklingly exuberant cinematic essay F for Fake (1972) in this light. Exposed as an egomaniac and 
a credit-grabber, Welles could finally let his flamboyance rip in the most joyous and life-affirming 
film of his career.  
“Raising Kane” did not facilitate a uniform or even very significant shift from politique des 
auteurs to politique des ècrivains, and conspicuously little has been written about writers within the 
classical Hollywood system—a fact which makes the volume The Hollywood Screenwriters, edited 
by Richard Corliss332, and above all Richard Fine's book, Hollywood and the Profession of 
Authorship 1928-1940,333 all the more valuable.  But creative importance need not be the same as 
creative power and control, and the one who should be in control during the actual shooting, so 
Sarris and Kael agreed, is the director. It was, after all, through such control that Orson Welles 
brought forth a miracle.334  
    I will now proceed with the final primary text treated in this thesis: The American Cinema- 
Directors and Directions 1929-1968. I shall deal with the main body of Sarris’s text first, then 
analyze his method as presented in the essay that accompanies the book, “Toward a Theory of Film 
History.” In so doing, I shall also contrast this method with the less  evaluative and critical  and 
more empirical and contextual  approach  outlined by  a new breed of film historians grounded in 
conventional historical scholarship.  
Sarris as Film Historian: Directors and Directions  Part One – The Rankings  
 
We have now reached the very pinnacle of Sarris’s writing, and one of the most discussed, classic 
texts of film historical scholarship—even if it has been more influential in spirit than in actual form:  
The American Cinema: Directors and Directions 1929-1968.  I shall deal with the actual ranking of 
directors which constitutes the main body of the book first, before, in the next chapter, inspecting 
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Sarris’s historical/critical method as outlined in “Toward a Theory of Film History”. There, I shall 
also consider the validity of Sarris’s method, measured against the new breed of so-called 
contextual film historians, who consciously distance themselves from Sarris’s personal and 
idiosyncratic approach.  However, I should first like to outline briefly the background of Sarris’s 
most important book.  
     Like most of the textual material treated in this thesis, Sarris’s magnum opus can actually, 
with some reservation, be said to have originated from the first Sarris/Kael debate, which we have 
seen  climax so violently with “Circles and Squares”. The book's origins can be traced back to the 
early sixties, when Sarris first ranked directors in the pages of a special issue of Film Culture 
(Spring 1963, No. 28) in an article that was, like the subsequent book, entitled The American 
Cinema. There are other half-baked journalistic attempts from Sarris to counter and incorporate 
Kael's critique, but The American Cinema, particularly in its incarnation as a book, is Sarris’s true 
vindication of the auteur theory as a wholly distinct critical and historical approach, which, as we 
have seen, he had already announced as forthcoming in “Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1962”.   
     In the original article, the number of directors ranked was 113, seven of which were foreign, 
and the directorial chronologies (i.e. the directors’ names) were placed in esoterically titled 
categories. Sarris began at the top with “Pantheon Directors” and worked his way down to the 
lowest rung on the auteurist ladder with the category “Oddities and One-Shots”.  
     By 1968, the ad hoc usefulness of the basic premise of directorial authorship was evidenced 
in the way the new programmes in film studies at American universities were organized, but a 
systematic, if wholly idiosyncratic, auteurist examination of the American cinema in the broadest 
possible terms did not exist before the publication of Sarris’s book. Motivated by his life- and 
career-changing spell in Paris, Sarris no doubt felt that the French had thrown down the gauntlet: 
“The critics of each country must fight their own battles within their own cultures, and no self-
respecting American film historian should ever accept Paris as the final authority on the American 
cinema.”335 In the book, vastly expanded from the original article, there are 198 directors arranged 
in eleven categories, ranging from “Pantheon Directors” all the way down to a new, dreaded 
category, “Miscellany”, which could only be described as a critical scrapheap.  
     The fourteen directors included in “The Pantheon” are all actually quite uncontroversial in 
terms of the overall, collective critical opinion of their work, but there are two facts of note about 
this category which merit close and extensive comments.  
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     While the careers and critical standings of Fritz Lang, Josef Von Sternberg, Max Ophüls, 
Ernst Lubitsch, and even Friedrich Wilhelm Murnau (because of Sunrise [1927]) are probably as 
much shaped by their American films as their European ones, and are mandatory inclusions in any 
American pantheon, Jean Renoir is also included despite having made only five American 
movies—all of which, relatively speaking, are minor works in a career which spans almost forty 
films.  
    This is a clear indication that Sarris quite consciously defined “American” as loosely as 
possible, in that the only minimal criterion for inclusion in his history of “the American Cinema” 
was that the filmmaker had to have directed at least one English-language film. How was this 
conspicuous choice motivated? Well, it must be remembered that the Andrew Sarris of 1968 was 
still a polemicist, championing commercial American films as a personal rather than social medium 
of expression.  
     Greg Taylor, one of the sharpest current observers of the American critical scene, sums up 
the justification for this loose definition of “American” in Sarris’s lexicon as a critic/historian:  
 
Long denigrated as nonartistic and homogeneous, American cinema was certainly being redeemed. If the 
auteur theory's emphasis on personality had allowed Sarris to assert that even despite middlebrow 
encroachment, this cinema was as rich and subtle as the directors working within it, the loose definition of 
“American” enabled him to claim that it was actually remarkably diverse, too.336  
 
Sarris would elucidate his reasoning in a way that actually seems quite fair by qualifying and 
modifying the term “American” in another, more prosaic and more plainly geographic sense: 
   
Since the criteria of selection for this historical survey are aesthetic rather than social or industrial, “American” 
will embrace many undubbed English-language films produced abroad. As much as this encroachment on 
British and international cinema may smack of imperialist presumption, the doctrine of directorial continuity 
within the cultural marketplace of the English language takes precedence here over ethnographic 
considerations. This point of view is perhaps more representative of New York, a distribution centre, than of 
Hollywood, a production centre.337 
 
In sharp contrast to Kael and her foray into historical writing, “Raising Kane”, Sarris thus de-
emphasised the Americana of American films, leaving ample room in his narratives of American 
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film since the sound era (though  D. W. Griffith is included in the pantheon as an all-important 
shadowy figure of American sound film, vital as its precondition and its all-defining prehistory) for 
exotic and refined continentals like Max Ophüls, Josef Von Sternberg and Erich Von Stroheim 
(who is actually placed in the second-level category, hovering just below the pantheon). 
     This perspective also enabled Sarris to include a sideways look at foreign directors, like 
Michelangelo Antonioni, Claude Chabrol and Roman Polanski, in his fourth-level category, “Fringe 
Benefits”. These were figures who had played a marginal role in American cinema (in Polanski's 
case, this was already changing) from the point of view of Hollywood productions, but who were 
being widely distributed and much discussed among intellectuals in a metropolis like New York 
City, even if their films barely made a commercial ripple outside the major metropolitan areas.    
     I have, as announced, one more major point to make about Sarris’s ranking of top-level 
auteurs, and that is the inclusion of a documentary filmmaker in a book otherwise exclusively 
concerned with the fiction film. Edward Murray, the thoroughly pedantic scholar with whom we 
have already been acquainted during the course of this thesis, finds the inclusion of Robert Flaherty 
puzzling, and claims that he does not belong in a book concerned with fiction film directors.338  
     Maybe so, but this is merely superficially true. For anyone who is intimately familiar with 
Sarris, the critic-as- historian, Flaherty's inclusion in the pantheon of American filmmakers really 
makes perfect sense. In fact, knowing Sarris’s criticism up to that point, it would certainly be a lot 
more puzzling had he not included Flaherty.  
    Sarris himself points out specifically that Flaherty is included for a very special reason: 
“The vast realms of documentary, animated, and experimental filmmaking are pointedly excluded. 
Flaherty is mentioned arbitrarily for the sake of an aesthetic principle.”339  
What, we must ask, is this principle exactly? It of course has to do with what is generally 
considered the mainstream of the non-fiction film, and Flaherty's place relative to it as a genuine 
auteur rather than as a social engineer: 
 
Robert Flaherty was not merely the “father” of the documentary but also one of its few justifications. Actually, 
his films slip so easily into the stream of fictional cinema that they hardly seem like documentaries at all. [...] 
What Flaherty understood so well was the potential degeneration of the documentary into voyeurism when the 
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images of the camera are not reprocessed in the mind of the artist. [...] Flaherty's cinema is one of the last 
testaments to the “cult of nature”, and, as such, is infinitely precious.340 
 
Even film historians who have written more extensively on nonfiction film, and are more 
sympathetic to the Griersonian tradition, cannot, by and large, seriously question Sarris’s trenchant 
and defiant analysis of Flaherty's career. The one commentator, however, who has been most in 
sync with Sarris on this score, is Robert Flaherty's widow, who became an eloquent defender of her 
husband's work after he had passed away: 
 
A Flaherty film is not a documentary, because a documentary film is preconceived. The great documentary 
movement fathered by John Grierson is all preconceived for educational and social purposes. The Russians 
preconceived their films for political purposes. Hollywood preconceives for the box-office. None of these is 
simply and purely, freely and spontaneously the thing in itself for its own sake. In other words, he had no axe 
to grind.341 
 
The persistent grinding of political axes and the propaganda of left-wing causes has always had a 
tendency to provoke Sarris, the centrist liberal, because it subordinates the human individual to 
fervently held ideas and political views, and in the Marxist understanding of the matter, huge 
dialectical forces.  Predictably, Sarris’s antipathy for the mainstream of the documentary tradition 
went quite a bit beyond the Griersonian school of social engineering. The one piece where Sarris 
really showed his hand as a consciously liberal critic concerned The Battle of Algiers (Gillo 
Pontecorvo, 1966). This much discussed semi-documentary about colonial warfare and 
terrorism/resistance in Algeria was at the time of its release hailed as great art, and enjoyed as great 
entertainment. Sarris was sceptical. Most of all, he felt uneasy with the audience reaction at a 
screening he attended: 
 
Some years ago a Lincoln Centre black tie stuffed-shirt audience cheered the demolition of a café full of 
unbilled French men, women and children by a revolutionary bomb squad in The Battle of Algiers. Somewhere 
behind my own stuffed shirt, I found the audience reaction hatefully obscene. They were cheering the deaths of 
allegorical unpersons, the same kind of unpersons who died in Buchenwald and Bangladesh, though under 
somewhat different auspices. An unperson is a creature whose murder causes exultation without any 
complicating feelings of pain, loss or waste. The whole point of Pontecorvo's staging is that the bombing is 
mercilessly indiscriminate because the revolution must be ruthless. And how often have we been fed that line 
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before? All right, you say you believe in indiscriminate violence. Then squeeze Robert Redford, Paul Newman, 
Jane Fonda, Jeanne Moreau, Cathrine Denueve, Marcello Mastroianni, Laurence Olivier, Vanessa Redgrave, 
Jean-Paul Belmondo, Peter Finch, George C. Scott and Diana Rigg into a crowded café in Algiers. Then let the 
bomb go off five minutes after the picture starts and show all our cameo stars as shattered corpses. It's not the 
same thing? Well then, close your eyes, and imagine that your wife or your husband, your parents and children, 
your friends and relations [...] are in that crowded café ready to be blown up. Is it still the same scene? Is it still 
an occasion for cheering? I think not.342 
 
I have quoted Sarris’s review at length here, because even if the film discussed is not a 
documentary, it nonetheless burrows into the stylistic lexicon and utilizes the surface mannerisms 
of the typical documentary to make its key political points—points which, when all is said and 
done, are all more common in documentary than in fiction.  In any event, Sarris’s personal tastes 
and distastes are in evidence here in a way that illustrates both the inclusion of Flaherty and the 
exclusion of other documentary filmmakers, not only from the pantheon, but from his canonical 
historical text as a whole. 
  At this point, it might be expedient to consider the ultimate consequences of an idea of film 
history as made up of  canonical works endowed with artistic value  Sarris has repeatedly stressed  
the apt analogy between films and architecture:  
If medieval architects and African sculptors are anonymous today, it is not because they deserve to be. When Ingmar 
Bergman bemoans the alienation of the modern artist from the collective spirit which rebuilt the cathedral at Chartres, 
he is only dramatizing his own individuality for an age which has rewarded him handsomely for the travail of his 
alienation343  
British architectual historian Ian Sutton has written the following on the idea of a canon: 
“The canon […] is based on the simple idea that architecture is an art, that certain buildings excel in 
that art, and that such excellence is to be (among other things) enjoyed.344” Substitute film for 
architecture, and we can see the the basic outline of what Sarris attempted with The American 
Cinema. 
  |There is not really all that much more to say about Sarris’s pantheon of directors. What the 
directors in the pantheon share is, in Sarris’s formulation:  
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These are the directors who have transcended their technical problems with a personal vision of the world. To 
speak any of their names is to evoke a self-contained world with its own laws and landscapes. They were also 
fortunate enough to find the proper conditions for the full expression of their talent.345 
 
That Orson Welles's inclusion among the gods of cinema strikes us as obvious, speaks volumes of 
the high plateau of technical resources as well as talent from which he began. But auteurists in 
general know, as Sarris certainly does, that most worthwhile movies or filmmakers do not reach 
such awesome standards, though they still can be great entertainment, and uneven filmmakers may 
occasionally make great works of art. This is the main reason why the most interesting films in 
every director's filmography are presented in italics in order to distinguish  them from those Sarris 
felt were less interesting.  
      A misunderstanding frequently attached to auteur critics,  closely related to the idea of canon 
that we have just outlined, and one which has proved almost impossible to eradicate, is that they 
were exclusively concerned with master filmmakers and their masterpieces. On the contrary. In fact, 
I would go as far as to say that auteur criticism as a systematic historical approach was the first real 
subversion of the masterpiece-tradition in film scholarship, simply because it extended the field of 
study so drastically.  It was above all when moving outside the established pantheon of directors 
(Hawks346 and Hitchcock were actually the only figures to enter the pantheon because they were 
championed by auteur critics) to discover lesser but vastly significant stylists, like Douglas Sirk347 
and Anthony Mann (the former for his baroque melodramas, the latter primarily for his violent, 
genuinely neurotic, and extraordinarily powerful westerns) that auteurism in general and Sarris in 
particular have been most useful to the study of American cinema. 
      I will spare the reader an extensive run-through of all eleven categories, but the second- and 
third-line categories, along with the very special fifth category, warrant special mention, not least 
because auteurism as practiced by Sarris, as I have just indicated, celebrated its greatest triumphs 
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when evaluating and explicating directors of considerable merit who were not considered among 
the greatest of filmmakers. 
      Sarris’s second-line category bears the moniker “The Far Side of Paradise”. Included here 
are twenty directors from Robert Aldrich to Raoul Walsh—the latter, you will remember, being the 
direct cause of Sarris’s drawing severe criticism from Kael as the epiphany of joy that concludes his 
“Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1962.”  
    By 1968, Sarris was able to place Raoul Walsh in a more dispassionate and measured 
perspective than he initially had done six years earlier: “His best films are genuinely exciting, 
though neither profound nor pretentious. If there is no place in the cinema for the virtues and 
limitations of Raoul Walsh, there is even less place for an honestly pluralistic film criticism.”348 
    It is exactly pluralism that is the prime virtue of The American Cinema as a book, though it 
might be argued that this was achieved at a cost. Sarris does not burrow particularly deep into single 
films, and the ranking of directors left entirely up to the critic's discretion has been accused of 
reducing film criticism and film history to an intellectual parlour-game. Such criticisms tend to miss 
the point, by failing to consider the journalistic aspect that characterizes The American Cinema, a 
feature it shares with David Thomson's later, somewhat different but equally opinionated The 
Biographical Dictionary of Film.349 While most professional academic historians’ ultimate aim is 
often simply to facilitate the writing of more history, Sarris (who, like Kael, succeeded better than 
most on that score) also wanted to provide the general reader with a rough guide to an uncharted 
cultural territory. 
     Once you accept Sarris’s subjective point of view, and a conception of film history that is 
episodic rather than simply chronological, The American Cinema becomes a fantastic book to argue 
with. Sarris’s historical approach, as Greg Taylor points out, and indeed, his entire critical strategy, 
at least in this specific book, was a broad cultism—a kind of vanguard oppositional fandom.  
“Participation in this new cultism was easy, in that it was now largely a matter of absorbing a large 
neglected body of cultural material (American film directors, whether notables or non-entities) and 
engaging with the critic's ranking of the material.”350   
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We may certainly argue that Preston Sturges deserves a place in the pantheon rather than 
lingering in “The Far Side of Paradise”, as we may also argue with justification that Billy Wilder 
and John Huston ought not have been relegated to the less than flattering fifth category, “Less than 
Meets the Eye.”, where most directors of prestigious “problem pictures” reside. Judging by what he 
wrote under the entry on Billy Wilder, it is hard to believe that Sarris really thought that Wilder 
belonged in a bracket of directors whose “personal signatures are written with invisible ink”: “If 
Billy Wilder's stock has risen slightly in recent years with the escalation of savage satire in Kiss Me 
Stupid and The Fortune Cookie, it is not so much because of the films themselves, but rather 
because Wilder has chosen to remain himself while almost everyone else has been straining to go 
mod.”351 Is this not an auteur credo if ever there was one? These inconsistencies in Sarris’s text 
were part of the whole shake-up. He knew there would be reactions.  If anything, Sarris welcomed 
relative disagreements such as the ones we have outlined, both in fun and as part of an 
epistemological broadening of the field. He inspired readers to make their own discoveries and 
perhaps elevate a hitherto unheralded and neglected filmmaker to the rich and exciting third tier of 
auteurs, aptly titled “Expressive Esoterica.” Here Sarris ranked, among others, quintessential 
auteurs of the American action genres like Budd Boetticher, Phil Karlson and Don Siegel. I will 
now simply mention the other categories included in the book that I have not touched upon, in 
descending order: “Lightly Likable”, “Strained Seriousness”, “Oddities, One-shots and 
Newcomers”, “Subjects for Further Research”, “Make Way for the Clowns” (about dominant comic 
personalities rather than directors—the piece on Jerry Lewis is one of the book's highlights) and 
finally, “Miscellany”. I daresay that these rankings have guided more impressionable young people 
to careers as film scholars, at least in America, than any other single book about film.  
     Before we conclude our analysis of the actual rankings, something also has to be said to 
indicate how authoritative and insightful Sarris’s broad and provocative gestures can be. The best 
examples are when he discusses directors just outside the hallowed pantheon. My examples are two 
directors who are very dissimilar in temperament, and who both dwell on Sarris’s “Far Side of 
Paradise,” King Vidor and Vincente Minnelli.  
“King Vidor is a director for anthologies. He has created more great moments and fewer great films 
than any director of his rank.”352 Sarris goes on to elucidate this somewhat cryptic and provocative 
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assertion with a cross reference in mise-en-scène between Vidor's The Big Parade (1925) and Lewis 
Milestone's All Quiet on the Western Front (1930):  
 
In the Vidor, an outraged American soldier pursues a German into a shell hole. When the American sees that 
the German is wounded, he is unable to finish the job but gives his enemy a cigarette instead. In the Milestone, 
a German soldier bayonets a Frenchman and then asks his victim's forgiveness. Both scenes are contrived to 
express human brotherhood and thereby attack the idea of War. Both scenes involve two figures in a depressed 
and isolated enclosure. The two-shot is almost mandatory here for both directors because cross-cutting would 
destroy the meaning of the scene. If two figures are shown in the same frame, a bond is established between 
them. Cross-cutting would establish separateness as the point-of-view changed back and forth. Both Vidor and 
Milestone understood this much, and thus the issue of montage never arises. Yet, though these scenes are 
identical in meaning and broadly equivalent in technical execution, the Vidor is both more moving and 
aesthetically superior to the Milestone. Why?  Well, not because the Vidor came first. Most critics under fifty 
probably saw the Milestone before they saw the Vidor. Not because Vidor has arbitrarily designated a better 
director than Milestone.  [...] Ultimately [...] the issue between the two scenes is resolved by the oldest criterion 
of the cinema, good old camera placement, an aesthetic factor that was as decisive in 1895 as it is today.  Vidor 
moves much closer to his characters, thus achieves greater dramatic intensity. By staying farther back, 
Milestone emphasizes the pictorialism of the scene. The frame in which the spectacle unfolds rather than the 
spectacle itself. Vidor's treatment is more forceful than Milestone's, hence more emotionally satisfying. Thus, 
in one sequence, two careers fall into place. [...] An auteur versus a technician. The auteur theory can only 
record the evidence on the screen. It can never prejudge it. Vidor is superior to Milestone.353  
 
Having seen the films, it is hard to withstand the sweeping force of Sarris’s argument, which has 
some of the dead-certain qualities of Moses laying down the law in stone tablets.354 As usual, 
Edward Murray picks out a flaw in Sarris’s argument. Murray is of course correct when he points 
out that it is, and indeed must be, the auteur theorist (rather than the theory itself) who records the 
evidence on the screen.355  
     Murray's second argument is that Sarris has indeed prejudged the evidence, despite his 
protestations to the contrary. This is actually an argument with less force than it seems. It is indeed 
difficult to see how any factual bit of evidence could not be, at least in some minimal sense, 
                                                 
353
 Loc. Cit,  
354
 Current film critic Kent Jones has noted: "The American Cinema has the authority of an orginary text – it does 
not appear to have been written as much as handed down from above and recieved by mankind." Kent Jones "Hail the 
Conquering Hero." Film Comment May/June 2005. World Wide Web: www.nyfilmfestival.net/fcm/5-6-
2005/Sarris.htm. Retrieved May 1. 2009.  
355
 Edward Murray (1975) Nine American Film Critics: A Study in Theory and Practice. New York. Frederick Ungar 
Publishing p. 54, 
137 
137 
prejudged. I have claimed earlier in this thesis that the auteur theory actually begs the question of a 
theory rather than providing one. Kael thought it was all simply a matter of discrimination, and I 
tend to agree. The auteur theory in Sarris’s formulation could, however, pass the minimum 
requirement for a theory if we were to follow Mieke Bal's lead: “A theory is a systematic set of 
generalized statements about a certain segment of reality.”356 If this is a true definition of theory, 
Sarris is a theorist in name and deed. In that case, is it also true, as the philosopher of science Paul 
Feyerabend claims, that any theory, be it in the humanities or natural sciences, generates its own 
data, from which we draw our conclusions?357   
     The hidden premise upon which Sarris operates here is actually not very well hidden at all, 
since it consists simply of his innate preference for the long-take aesthetic which he and other 
auteur critics filled with personal and subjective meaning, rather than the objective meaning it had 
had previously under Andrè Bazin’s aesthetic realism in the 1940s.   
     I shall now move on to my second and last example, Vincente Minnelli. I have chosen him 
because his films are indicative of stylish and hitherto downgraded genres and filmmakers who 
were discovered by Sarris. These were actually particularly feminine genres, something which goes 
against the popular complaint made by Kael and repeated by others, namely that auteurists were all 
emotionally regressive and developmentally stunted schoolboys masquerading as red-blooded men 
who preferred what we with a very Kaelian phrase might call the “Bang Bang” genres. I am talking 
about the melodrama and the musical, where Minnelli excelled.  
    Before the advent of auteur theory, both critics and the Hollywood establishment had long 
since discriminated against the female weepie in favour of the male weepies from home and abroad, 
the clearest indication of which perhaps being the sentimental humanistic dramas that are 
characteristic of Italian neorealism. 
       Minnelli, on the other hand, made his name as an extraordinary director of actresses, even as 
his very tastefulness and tact prevented him from entering the pantheon. Sarris’s piece on him is 
also an indirect response to the charge that auteurism necessarily entails a split between form and 
content, which had been one Kael's main criticisms in “Circles and Squares.” I know of no analysis 
of a filmmaker that so neatly summarizes the strengths and weaknesses not only of a director but 
also of the genres in which he preferred to work: 
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Minnelli has always required relatively luxurious projects on which to lavish his taste. If he has a fatal flaw as 
an artist, it is his naive belief that style can invariably transcend substance and that our way of looking at the 
world is more important than the world itself. Critic-filmmakers like Godard and Truffaut pay lip-service to 
these doctrines but they don't believe in them. Only Minnelli believes implicitly in the power of the camera to 
transform trash into art, and corn into caviar. Minnelli believes more in beauty than in art.358 
 
Directors and Directions Part Two: Toward a Theory of Film History 
I hope the selective analysis of Sarris’s rankings in the previous chapter serves to convey my deep 
respect for a book that can still yield surprising insights with respect to Sarris’s relationship with his 
material, even when it is opened at random by someone who has never heard of Sarris or is just 
beginning his discovery of classic American sound films. Sarris may have predicted that his method 
was too idiosyncratic not to be contested. Later film scholars grounded in the methods of 
conventional historical research have attempted to discredit Sarris as an ahistorical romantic whose 
methods must be swept aside for a more nearsighted empiricism and a more conscious and 
conscientious approach to economic, social and technological contexts.359 Context seems to be the 
catchword among the new breed of film scholars of a historical bent. This is just a guess, but 
knowing their persuasion, “Raising Kane” would almost certainly be closer to their idea of “proper” 
contextual film history than The American Cinema.  
I will not offer an extended analysis of this trend in contemporary film scholarship, but I 
must nevertheless acknowledge its existence and point out that Sarris belongs to a different 
category, one which is more obviously personal and openly rhetorical. The critique against 
evaluative film history as by and large a form of paradoxically ahistorical film history is outlined  
with regards to a specifically auteurist orientation by film scholar Christopher Faulkner, who speaks 
of the non-political practice of mise-en-scène criticism and the ahistorical nature of auteurism in 
reference to the French discourse on cinema in the 1950s.360 
I do not want to dismiss the accusation that could be levelled against Sarris that he is an ahistorical 
film historian outright.  I shall examine this further. Those who want discredit Sarris as an  
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ahistorical writer tend to focus on a polemical formulation from “Notes on the Auteur Theory  
1962.“  
 
Even if the artist does not spring from the idealized head of Zeus, free of the embryonic stains of history, history itself is 
profoundly affected by his arrival. If we cannot imagine Griffith's October or Eisenstein's Birth of a Nation because we 
find it difficult to transpose one artist's unified conceptions of Lee and Lincoln  from the other's dialectial conceptions 
of Lenin and Kerensky, we are nevertheless compelled to recognize other differences in the personalities of these two 
pioneers beyond their respective cultural complexes. It is with these latter differences that the auteur theory is most 
deeply concerned. If directors and other artists cannot be wrenched from their historical environments, aesthetics is 
reduced to a subordinate branch of entnography.361 
 
Taken at face value, there can be little doubt that the auteur theory as a critical approach devalues  
context. In other words; this approach   limits the historical context to a correlation between 
surrogate  author and text if practiced strictly. Still, the  words of Swedish philosopher Claes 
Entzenberg are worth noting: every context is the result on contextualization362   If it is the 
historian's duty to supply the context, we might say equally  with at least some justification,  that it 
is also his privilege.  
            The critique of Sarris's theory and approach  must be taken seriously,  but feel I must also 
point out that Christopher Faulkner has himself been accused of being ahistorical. This requires 
further explanation. Faulkner is an Althusserian  Marxist grounded in the British cultural studies 
tradition, and his work as  a film scholar and  historian is completely  informed by this.  In his book 
The Social Cinema of Jean Renoir, Faulkner delivers a blast against the romatic underpinnings of 
the auteur theory. His argument is that the auteur theory's focus on individual artistry and its 
tendency  to play down historical circumstance is but a form of [repressive] bourgeois ideology. 363 
For anyone grounded in art history it is not difficult to expose Faulkner own postion as 
ahistorical.364 I agree with the excellent Cuban film critic Gilberto Perez on this count:  
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[I]t must also be recognized that, no less than an emphasis on individual creation, an emphasis on historical 
circumstance is a bourgeois way of thinking. Faulkner appears to believe that the idea of wrenching the artist from 
history has reigned unbrokenly since the Renaissance, but Sarris (Following the American New Critics in this respect) 
was reacting against a historicism that had long been the dominant critical approach. Faulkner's charge of ahistoricism 
is itself unhistorical.365   
 
The  riddle  of ahistorical history runs deep in any kind of historical writing that has its core 
tangible entites or works. When film historian Kenneth  M. Cameron pondered the question 
whether or not films and history are antithetical,  what he had in mind  was  the factual fidelty of 
historical fiction films.366 I believe this exact same question is at once more interesting and more 
pressing when posed in connection with  the practice of film historical scholarship. The historian's 
field of study in the widest,  yet most basic sense of the term, is the human  past. The one feature 
which defines  the past is, quite obviously, that it is not available in the present. What is available to 
the historian are sources in the historian's present, physical traces of the past from which the 
historian   can illuminate  fragments of the past and fashion a historical interpretation that detail 
why and how things happened as they did. I argue that the history of art; film and literature are, in 
one respect, fundamentally different from conventional history. The painting, the  novel  or the 
film; what, we for want of better generic  term, may designate as  the text - is a different kind of 
source compared to those of the conventional historian, in  the sense that the film is  not simply a 
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residue of other social actions in bygone days  that speak to us about happened in past and serve as 
raw material for an interpretation of what took place in the past. On the contrary, the work or text 
typically exists as a coherent meaningful entity that may,  perhaps even must, be  experienced 
directly in the present. Still, this is not in any way a sufficient reason to claim that  contextual film 
history is unnecessary. There is, no doubt a strong argument for the position that the contextual 
focus of most film historians has been  unnecessarily narrow and that film historians  have made far  
too little use of relevant  non-filmic evidence compared to other “non-hyphenated” historians.   
   
   If Sarris must be classified as a historian, as he has indeed always perceived himself, we 
might designate him a critical historian. This description underlines the ultimate goals of his 
research—to evaluate films within the matrix of directorial careers, rather than simply describe 
production processes of singular films or draw extensively on sociological reception theory, for 
example. One must therefore stress that Sarris's outlook on the movie past is that of a film critic 
rather than that of a historian who simply happens to write about film. Sarris's ideas of context, in 
contrast to those of the more empirically-minded historian, are squarely centred around the 
relationship between himself and the films he sees. This relationship, however narrow, is viewed 
historically by Sarris, or perhaps we can limit the idea of history somewhat and rather say that it is 
viewed biographically or even autobiographically—the biography of course being that most 
personal and subjective of all micro-historical genres: 
 
Why then, do I persist in perceiving both myself and the film medium in the Hericlitian flux of history? I 
suppose because I am a revisionist in the most restless sense of constantly revising myself. Consequently, 
every movie I have ever seen keeps swirling and shifting in ever-changing contexts. On the whole, movies tend 
to be more complex than profound, but that makes them all the more difficult to pin down, describe and 
categorize for all time. What is particularly fascinating is how the same movie can keep changing its 
ideological coloration over the years. In our time, for example, many movies once dismissed as shopgirl 
fantasies have been rediscovered as feminist parables.367 
 
     It could be argued that this view is too limited to be called genuine film history, focusing as 
it does on the relationship between critic and film. But it is also very fluid and relativistic, 
emphasising as it does a belief in criticism as a restless, continuous activity.  By current standards of 
film history, it is arguably true that Sarris places too little emphasis on the  last semantic joint of the 
term  film history̅, understood as  the temporal  situations that the films grow out of—too much on 
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the films in their projected present tense. This is, and shall remain, the principle dilemma of film 
history vis-a-vis film criticism. While films as projected aesthetic objects in the metaphorical 
present, in the most basic, purely sensory rather than artistic meaning of the term, admittedly at the 
very least must claim a primus inter pares position among the film historian's sources, and lay great 
claims to a status as his primary concern,  it is also, on the other hand, quite legitimately the sole 
focus of a historian-as-retrospective critic like Sarris, and I cannot see any need for him to 
apologize for this.    
     Now that Sarris's relationship with newer academic trends in film history has been 
presented, we are ready to deal with Sarris's theoretical justification for his method:  
 
The ranking of directors is based on total rather than occasional achievement. But why rank directors at all? 
Why all the categories and lists and assorted drudgeries? One reason is to establish a system of priorities for 
the film student. Another is the absence of the most elementary academic tradition in the cinema. The 
drudgeries in the other older arts are performed by professional drudges. Film scholarship remains largely an 
amateur undertaking. In America, especially, the film historian must double as a drudge. The rankings, 
categories and lists establish first of all the existence of my subject and my attitude towards it.368 
 
Sarris conceived of his rankings as an inverted pyramid, because he wanted to get away from what 
he calls the pyramid fallacy of older film historians:  
 
The chronological division of the cinema as one entity tends to perpetuate what may be called the pyramid 
fallacy of many film historians. This fallacy consists of viewing the history of cinema as a process by which 
approved artisans have deposited their slabs of celluloid on a singe pyramid rising ultimately to a single apex, 
be it realism, Humanism, Marxism, Journalism, Abstractionism, or even Eroticism. Directors are valued 
primarily for their contributions to the evolution of a Utopian cinema efficiently adjusted to a Utopian Society. 
Once a formal contribution has been made, subsequent refinements are downgraded. In this system, stylists are 
the drones of the cinema.369 
 
Note here that Sarris’s conception of critical or aesthetic film history depends on what he has 
termed “a pleasurable response to the very act of moviegoing”370 as a minimum condition for its 
motivation. This is characteristic of the critic-as-historian, because it points to an inevitable dual 
role in aesthetic film history.  So it must be, because the field of aesthetics and the aesthetic 
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experience both deal directly with sensory data and sensory experience. This has been the case ever 
since Alexander Gottleib Baumgarten introduced the philosophical term in the 1750s with his book, 
Aesthetica. As of today, no English translation has been made available. It is a work that, in the 
words of Norwegian art historian and aesthetician Magne Malmanger, “is as widely known as it is 
rarely read.”371 Using Baumgarten's universally accepted definition of the aesthetic in a literal and 
slightly pedantic way, we might say that for Sarris, the strictly artistic aspect of his rankings grows 
out of and is predetermined by the aesthetic aspect—this being, quite simply, his direct process of 
actually watching the many singular films as they unfold in the illuminated darkness. In a 1991 
interview, Sarris commented: 
  
Look, I'm a historian. I am not a prophet. And I am not an activist or a revolutionary. I don't want to change 
movies. In fact, if I wanted to change movies, I'd go out and make them. But I have never had the slightest 
desire to make movies, or  even to write them or write stories for them, so I just sit in my bemused way and 
look.372 
 
 Looking is the first principle of any aesthetic criticism apart from literature or music, whether 
historically inflected or not. Sarris's great achievement in this context was introducing concepts of 
style and sequence, the typical concerns of classical art history, to film studies. Thanks to the 
concept of mise-en-scène, he was able to do this on the specific terms dictated by the film 
medium.373  
Watching a large body of films organized according to directors thus eventually leads Sarris 
to a critical, artistically weighted evaluation of a larger totality which opened the door to the widest 
possible practice of cross-referencing, not only of directors, but collaborators—technicians and 
performers from film to film. Here is where Sarris’s text, despite not really venturing outside the 
confines of personal critique, was a big advance on earlier works in film history. It constituted a 
revision of the masterpiece approach which was quite radical for its time, even if it was not an 
actual rejection of it:  
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Even though most movies are only marginally concerned with the art of the cinema, the notion of quality is 
difficult to grasp apart from the context of quantity. Comprehension becomes a function of comprehensiveness. 
As more movies are seen, more cross-references are assembled. Fractional responsibilities are more precisely 
defined; personal signatures more clearly discerned.374 
 
            It is clear that Sarris thought that earlier film scholars had neglected this most basic of 
critical acts because of undue a priori prejudices: “To put it bluntly, many alleged authorities on 
film disguise their ignorance of American cinema as a form of intellectual superiority.”375 These 
writers had written, according to Sarris, “self-proclaimed film histories in which old newspaper 
clippings are bound together with sociological glue”:376 
   
To the extent that the cinema is a creature of scientific spirit, it has inherited expectations of infinite 
development and improvement. It is as if this machine art were designed to transcend the vagaries of human 
inspiration. A Shakespeare may appear once in a millennium, but the express train of the twentieth century 
cannot wait a century or even a decade for the world to be remade from the moonbeams of a movie projector. 
Too much was expected of the medium and too little was demanded of its scholars. The extravagant rhetoric of 
disillusionment obscured the incredibly perfunctory attention given to thousands upon thousands of movies. 
Therefore, the first task of a theory of film history is to establish the existence of these thousands of movies as 
a meaningful condition of the medium.377 
 
But who were these previous scholars against whom Sarris reacts—those of whom he felt too little 
was demanded? It is of course all those sociologically inclined critics he takes to the cleaner's, once 
again. Sarris mentions Lewis Jacobs, John Grierson, Siegfried Kracauer, Paul Rotha, Richard 
Griffith, Jay Leyda, Georges Sadoul et. al. as belonging to an older, sociological tradition of film 
scholarship.  
    Sarris subsumes them collectively under the heading “forest critics”. For Sarris, these 
writers usually hailed the “big subject” and the foreign film, and clustered the defining majority, the 
collective idea of movies, around an idea of film as a social mode of communication and a mass 
medium rather than individual films as artworks and their directors as artists:  
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The trouble up to now has not been seeing the trees for the forest. But why should anyone look at thousands of 
trees if the forest itself is deemed aesthetically objectionable? Of course, the forest to which I refer is called 
Hollywood, a pejorative catchword for vulgar illusionism. Hollywood is a foresty world rather than a treesy 
world. It connotes conformity rather than diversity, repetition rather than variation. The condescending forest 
critic confirms his preconceptions by identifying those elements Hollywood movies have in common. [...] 
Hence the incessant carping on Hollywood “clichés”: Boy Meets Girl, The Happy Ending, The Noble 
Sacrifice, The Sanctity of Marriage, The Gangster Gets His Just Deserts, The Cowboy Outdraws The Villain, 
Boy And Girl Feel Song Coming On.378 
 
Sarris’s point is not to ignore that Hollywood films have been and are shaped by front-office 
interventions, censorship and formal conventions, above all those pertaining to genres. But Sarris 
wants to redirect attention to the individual beauties that, after all, emerged through the maze of 
conventions in the old Hollywood movies, because, he insists, the forest critics never championed 
individuality for its own sake, but on the contrary celebrated another, different ideal for films to 
conform to:  
 
Every movie would deal Realistically with a Problem in Adult Terms or Employ the Materials of The Medium 
in a Creative Manner. Thus the goals of forest criticism are ultimately impersonal. [...] The principle of the 
forest has been upheld at the expense of the topmost trees, and this is indeed the supreme irony of forest 
criticism. Far from welcoming diversity, the forest critic seeks a new uniformity.379  
 
     Genres are of course an important factor in the conformity that the forest critics wanted to 
replace. Significantly in this context, the United States has never been the land of film movements.   
 In Sarris’s formulation, genres are something to work against and employ, conditions for creation 
rather than slavish ideal forms for the filmmaker to adhere to. Genres took  care of audience 
expectations of a more functional cinema than the post-classical period from the 1960s onwards, 
while the auteur, in Sarris’s formulation of his theory, provided something extra.  Once again, mise-
en-scène is the key identifying factor. Since he also knew that art-house films have their own 
conventions, Sarris would frequently insist on the continuities between the popular and the 
artistically prestigious, often preferring the latter. As he said elsewhere:  
 
Genres and mise-en-scène. Are these the clues to my deepest concerns? It would seem that my strongest 
instincts are Christian rather than Marxist and that I believe more in personal redemption than social revolution 
and therefore I am more  moved more by the majestic camera-movements my Mizoguchi and Ophüls than the 
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meteoric montage of Eisenstein and Resnais. The ascending and descending staircases of Hitchcock are more 
meaningful than all the Odessa Steps.380 
 
     It could be said with justification that Sarris’s historical and critical approach to American 
film pays too little attention to genres, even if, for instance, it had been vital to resurrect the 
Western in order to redefine the critical stature of John Ford and place him in his rightful place in 
the pantheon. Sarris still proved important in establishing a new and more positive perspective on 
genre, however. Unquestionably influenced by Sarris’s unabashedly aesthetic and evaluative 
approach, but subtly reversing it, genre theorist Stanley J. Solomon would claim less than a decade 
after the publication of The American Cinema: 
 
The theory I advocate in this Introduction and will be developing throughout the following chapters starts with 
the view that the truly typical elements of genre, both visual and dramatic, are not necessarily the most obvious 
props and devices shared by bad films and television parodies. Secondly, and basic to the apprehension of 
qualitative variations – whatever these typical elements may be, they are not trite, repetitive patterns stored in 
film studio libraries or file cabinets, but artistic insights stored in the minds of such filmmakers as Alfred 
Hitchcock and John Ford.381 
  
In Solomon's text, there remains a personal and idiosyncratic evaluative orientation and an auteurist 
bias which is offset by a discursive shift towards the interlocking textual systems that shape genre 
movies rather than the individual filmmaker.  Such a proposition, postulating the aesthetic value of 
genres, must be counted as a marked advance in film scholarship, and would have been almost 
unthinkable without Sarris’s example. Sarris had not rescued the genre per se from aesthetic 
oblivion, but the genre directors and the films they made.  
     This takes us quite close to an alternative, non-auteurist history of the classic Hollywood 
system championed by Thomas Schatz. Borrowing a phrase from Andrè Bazin, Schatz wants to 
celebrate not the individual, heroic directors of Sarris’s book, but rather The Genius of the System. 
Schatz has no high regard for auteur theory, and he quotes the vulnerable conclusion of Sarris’s 
introduction in The American Cinema to vindicate his rejection of it: 
 
Sarris developed a simplistic theory of his own, celebrating the director as the sole purveyor of Film Art in an 
industry overrun by hacks and profitmongers. The closing words of his introduction said it all: “He [the 
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director] would not be worth bothering with if he were not capable now and then of sublimity of expression 
almost miraculously extracted from his money-oriented environment.382”  
 
 Schatz continues: “Auteurism itself would not be worth bothering with had it not been so 
influential, effectively stalling film criticism and film history in a prolonged stage of adolescent 
romanticism.”383 True, Sarris’s theory is reductive, but such is the nature of all theories, and Schatz 
clearly has some romantic heroes of his own—production executives like Louis B. Mayer, David O.  
Selznick and Irving Thalberg. Schatz is reasonable when arguing a case for creative control which 
belonged not with the director, but with the producers who oversaw their most consistent films. 
Such allowances as script control, script development and final say in casting within the studio 
system afforded to auteurs like Hitchcock and Hawks were, as Schatz quite rightly claims, a 
function of their roles as producers rather than directors. But there is no evidence in the cases of 
Hawks, Hitchcock, or even the later Robert Aldrich (who purchased his own studio, Aldrich Studios 
[1967-1973] ) of a conflict between the films they made for other producers and the kind of films 
they wanted to make. They became producers for commercial rather than artistic reasons. It is 
probably just as telling that someone like screenwriter Billy Wilder chose to become a director only 
to protect his scripts.384  
      There are cases to be made for the creative roles of producers, but what, after all, is 
Selznick's greatest triumph? I am sure he himself thought that it was that epitome of middlebrow 
kitsch, Gone with the Wind (1939, Victor Fleming) but by far his greatest achievement is not even 
so much the movie Rebecca (1940) itself, but the very contract that brought Hitchcock to 
Hollywood and bolstered the latter's personal style and technique with the greater resources 
afforded by the American film industry. A very distant second for Selznick was the agonizing and 
ecstatic effort to make a star out of his muse, lover and finally wife, the ravishingly beautiful 
Jennifer Jones. Thus Selznick proved, despite the hard-nosed reputations that executives cultivate 
about themselves, that auteur critics are apparently not the only romantics involved with film. 
    If Sarris has ever written, or even inferred, what Schatz claims of him, that the director is the 
sole purveyor of film art, I have yet to find it in any of his writings. What Sarris has written is this: 
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But a movie is a movie, and if by chance Robert Z. Leonard should reign over a respectable production like 
Pride and Prejudice, its merits are found elsewhere than in the director's personality, let us say in Jane Austen, 
Aldous Huxley, Laurence Olivier, Greer Garson and a certain tradition of gentility at Metro-Goldwyn-Meyer. 
[...] Studio domination in the thirties and forties was the rule rather than the exception, and few directors had 
the right of final cut. Educated Americans were brought up on the jaundiced Hollywood chronicles of F. Scott 
Fitzgerald, Nathaniel West, John Dos Passos, Ring Lardner and John O'Hara. The vulgar but vital producer-
entrepreneur was the sun king in this saga, and sensitive literary types were left out in the shade. In retrospect, 
however, the studio system victimized the screenwriter more than the director. It was not merely a question of 
too many scribes spoiling the script, although most studios deliberately assigned more than one writer to 
eliminate personal idiosyncrasies, whereas the director almost invariably received sole credit for his direction 
regardless of the studio influences behind the scenes. This symbol of authority was not entirely lacking in 
substance even in Hollywood, or perhaps especially in Hollywood, where the intangibles of prestige loom 
large.385 
 
The case Sarris makes for the auteur theory and film directors is actually rather more limited than 
Schatz makes it seem: 
 
The purity of personal expression is a myth of the textbooks. The camera is so efficient a manufacturer of 
“poetic” images that even a well-trained chimpanzee can pass as a “film poet.” For all its viciousness and 
vulgarity, the Hollywood system imposed a useful discipline on its directors. The limited talents of a Gregory 
La Cava could be focused on an exquisite department-store-window whimsy involving Claudette Colbert and a 
family of mannequins. The genre expectations of She Married Her Boss took care of the rest of the movie, but 
in those few moments in the department store window, the La Cava touch was immortalized as a figure of 
style.386 
 
The point is that Sarris is more cautious on behalf of the director and more aware of the production 
context of movies than his detractors make out. Despite his reasonable hypothesis and thorough 
documentation on the subject, I am not convinced by Schatz that the director, even in the most 
repressive Hollywood context, has a serious rival. Certainly, Pauline Kael did not think so either, 
for all her emphasis on film as a collaborative art and her canonization of Herman J. Mankiewicz.  
     I have made the point that Sarris is a critical film historian rather than a strictly empirical 
one, but in one respect his work is concurrent with current trends in properly non-filmic historical 
scholarship, which has become more sensitive to theory and more involved in synthesizing its 
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findings in overarching schemes.387 What is worth noting is that contemporary historians outside 
film studies tend to be more open about their own positions than their predecessors. Historian 
Thomas L. Haskell insists that the writing of history depends on explanatory schemes which should 
not be implicit.388  Sarris's formulation of auteur theory is exactly such an explanatory scheme, even 
if it is almost embarrassingly weak as a theory.  
   The subject of history in general is, like film studies, inevitably caught in an often painful 
process of continual renewal, but if a core difference is to be noted between history and criticism, 
we might say that history is determined by research and attempts to illuminate fragments of the past 
in a way that strives to go beyond personal reflections and at least be intersubjective, without ever 
achieving objectivity, if by the term “objectivity” one means a kind of valueless “neutrality”:  
 
There is no such thing as objective film history. Each historian weights his presentation by the arrangement of 
chapters, the length of his paragraphs, the tone of his sentences, the choice of words. The historian's categories 
are usually implicit in his text, but he usually strives to preserve a spurious facade of “objectivity” by not 
seeming to have strong opinions. I choose to make the categories explicit for the convenience of my readers. 
Also, I feel that marginal distinctions are the most important distinctions a critic can make. They indicate a 
critical sensibility at work over the entire expanse of cinema, not just in the currently fashionable sectors.389 
 
  Just how personal and subjective the entire project The American Cinema was for Sarris is 
indicated by the fact that its time frame almost perfectly corresponds with his own lifetime. But 
there is evidence that Sarris, contrary to the preceding quotation, actually believed that film history 
can at least attempt to be objective, and can in fact attain a status that, to put the matter in relative 
terms, is less subjective than the project he himself attempted. In fact, his quite damning piece on 
Fred Zinnemann can only be seen this light. After all, Sarris claims that “Zinnemann's inclusion in 
any objective film history is mandatory.”390  
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 This insight about “objective” film history is perhaps strange. Although he apparently sees it as 
theoretically feasible, this is certainly not Sarris's metièr. His own conception of film history can be 
characterized as either bold or reckless, and both descriptions are probably justified.  
     Basing his approach on the hypothetical notion of the auteur, Sarris’s synthesizing mode of 
history seems perhaps closest in spirit to the speculative thinker Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, 
though Sarris himself may well deny any such analogy: 
 
A history which aspires to traverse long periods of time, or to be universal, must indeed forgo the attempt to 
give individual representations of the past as it actually existed. It must foreshorten its pictures by abstractions, 
and this includes not merely the omission of events and deeds, but whatever is involved in the fact that 
Thought, is, after all, the most trenchant epitomist. A battle, a great victory, a siege, no longer maintains its 
original proportions but is put off with a bare mention.391 
 
Consider, in the light of Hegel's quotation, how Sarris can write of(f) the long-forgotten director 
Jack Garfein:  
 
One of the last and least of Kazan's imitators, Garfein attracted some attention with his first film, then dispelled 
any incipient hopes with his second. His style, such as it is, consists of little more than contrived hysteria. Until 
anger is considered an adequate substitute for talent, Garfein's status will remain dubious.392 
 
The Icelandic philosopher Stèfan Snævarr  has characterized Hegel as a romantic rationalist393, a 
description that perhaps can be applied to Sarris with equal justification.  
It is clear that Sarris sees film history essentially as a study of texts to unearth traces of dominant 
personalities who come to the fore through a heuristic deep structure in the correlation between the 
director and his films. As such, Sarris's perspective is unapologetically internalistic: “The thousands 
of sound films in the English language exist for their own sake and under their own conditions. 
They constitute their own history, be it sublime or ridiculous, or, as is more likely, a mixture of 
both.”394  This is clearly a textual idea, but the boundaries between text and context have blurred in 
recent years. A notion of not just films but also the entire realm of culture as a text has taken root in 
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some segments of film studies that are not particularly historically inclined. As Jeffrey Geiger and 
R.L. Rutsky point out: “A number of theorists have argued that the entire realm of culture can itself 
be seen as a text, or a set of texts—to be read and interpreted.”395   
     The more or less  purely textual basis of Sarris's approach nevertheless  places him in a 
precarious position as a historian and pegs him as a slightly decadent aesthete rather than a 
dispassionate historian. This was a necessary corrective to the critics and historians who did not 
really pay attention to what was on the screen: “Film history is both films in history and the history 
of films. The forest critics tend to emphasize the former at the expense of the second.”396  Sarris, in 
other words, did not partake in the still-common belief that Siegfried Kracauer, arguably the most 
famous of the “forest critics,” was necessarily a superior film historian simply because he “was 
more interested in Hitler than in Caligari.”397 
     For Sarris, the cinema past is a vast repertoire of aesthetic experiences which not only 
affords but demands passionate personal involvement. His preference for the classical cinema and 
expertise on old films is based on a curious half-and-half mix of misty-eyed nostalgia and 
hardnosed pragmatism:  
 
Film history constitutes a very important part of my autobiography. Fortunately, the resources of archives, 
television, museums and revival houses make it possible to reappraise nostalgic memories in the clear, cold 
light of retrospection. Old movies come out of their historical contexts, but they must be judged ultimately in 
the realm of now.398 
 
This is the aesthetic critic dealing with the past through the eyes of the present, without any 
conscious attempt to recreate the original viewing situation by sympathetically judging the film on 
its own historical terms. Sarris is not as consistently “presentist” throughout his criticism as this 
passage would indicate, but for some scholars, judging the past in terms of the present is a risky 
business which tends to lead astray. The auteur critics in general could also be accused of the 
reverse fallacy, judging the present in terms of the past. 
                                                 
395
 Jeffrey Geiger & R.L. Rutsky (2005)  Film Analysis: A Norton Reader. W.W Norton & Company:  Introduction  p. 
27. Emphasis in original text.  
396
 Andrew Sarris (1996 [1968]) The American Cinema: Directors and Directions 1929-1968. New York: DaCapo 
Press. pp. 24-25. 
397
 Andrew Sarris (1970) Confessions of a Cultist: On the Cinema 1955-1969. New York: Simon & Schuster. p. 14. 
Sarris is referring to Siegfried Kracauer's most famous book: From Caligari to Hitler: A Psychological History  of 
the German Film. (1947) Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press. 
398
 Andrew Sarris (1996 [1968]) The American Cinema: Directors and Directions 1929-1968. New York: DaCapo 
Press. p. 25. 
152 
152 
  Conservative, or rather orthodox, historians would prefer to call this simply criticism.  
Historian Herbert Butterfield is extremely negatively inclined towards such enterprises: “The study 
of the past, with one eye, so to speak, upon the present, is the source of all sins and sophistries in 
history. [...] It is the essence of what we mean by unhistorical.”399 
    Even so, I wish to make a limited case for Sarris as a critical historian, and feel compelled to 
point out that many modern historians pride themselves on the diametrically opposed attitude to the 
one outlined by Butterfield; this is, in fact, the only plausible way to understand Benedetto Croce's 
celebrated bon mot: All history is contemporary history.400  I take this puzzling formulation not to 
mean that all history is about the present in any direct sense, but rather that accounts of the past 
must have some relevance in the present tense in which they are written and read. This, I think, is 
precisely what motivated Sarris.   
       So what, in the final analysis, is Sarris’s ultimate standing as a critical film historian? I have 
already pointed out that he introduced the concerns of classical art history to film scholarship. He 
performed the essential primary function of writing an aesthetically oriented, critically opinionated 
and subversive film history from a critic's perspective, by using the examples of the older arts as his 
simile. Honing in on style as one of very first film historians by simply seeing so many more films 
than his predecessors, he laid an important groundwork. Margaret Finch writes the following about 
style in art history in a way which finds its perfect cinematic analogy in Sarris's writing:  
 
Style may be defined as those distinctive characteristics that enable an observer to link an artwork with other 
works. There are fundamentally two types of style: these are an individual personal style, and the style 
common to a group of artists. In other words, the distinctive traits in a work of art enable the observer to link 
an artwork with other works by the same artist or with other works by a different artist.401 
 
 Sarris may be seen as naive for focusing on personal style, on what John Alsberg has termed 
stylus402, in collectively made, commercial and popular movies, but at least he triggered an 
awareness about not only how movies can be works of art, but also how they look and how they 
convey unified themes and meanings that reflect their makers. When Sarris looked back on his long 
career as an auteurist in 1977, he observed: 
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After years on the front lines, my own attitude to the auteurist controversy may be summed up by the defiant 
words sung by the late Edith Piaf: “Non, non je ne regrette rien.” Still, if had to do it all over again, I would 
reformulate the auteur theory with a greater emphasis on the tantalizing mysteries of style than on the romantic 
agonies of the artists.403 
In a sense, others have taken up that mantle. Swedish film scholar Per Persson has remarked: 
“Research on specific directors and filmmakers are still in Schwung, but they always focus on 
social, economical and historical parameters, rather than the biography of the actual filmmaker.404” 
     The work,  however, of fostering stylistic awareness for audiences and film historians, is not 
yet done. The structural auteurists that followed in Sarris’s wake more or less left style out of the 
equation, erecting instead massive theoretical structures dedicated to themes, that other great 
Sarrisian concern. “A vision of the world”, which the pantheon directors supposedly projected 
according to Sarris, must of course be understood largely in terms of themes. Where I feel the 
structural auteurists that followed in his wake went wrong was in focusing on the most questionable 
aspect of Sarris's thinking. I have in mind what we may call the residue of interior meaning:  
 
The auteur theory is not so much a theory as an attitude. A table of values that converts film history into 
directorial biography. The auteur critic is obsessed with the wholeness of art and the artist. The parts, however 
entertaining individually, must cohere meaningfully.405  
 
But there is no binding reason why they should cohere meaningfully, and we must raise the 
question as to whether such meaningful coherence is inherent or superimposed by the critic. 
However, as I have indicated, an awareness of cinematic style in Anglo-American criticism could 
be said to have begun with Sarris, and it is it is here his importance has yet to be played out. Sarris's 
methodological individualism is not beyond criticism and cannot be claimed to be historically 
sophisticated in an academic sense, but it is nevertheless preferable to the sociocentric outlook he 
rebelled against—which is reductive not only of film history but history itself, reducing Clio, the 
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proud muse of history, to the subservient handmaiden of sociology, to paraphrase the Swedish 
historian Rolf Torstendahl.406 
       Faced with the question of what is underrepresented in film historical scholarship today, 
there is a strong case to be made  not for a new kind of  sociologically  inclined film history, (a 
tradition  which has grown immensely for the last  generation or so  since  the publication of Garth 
S. Jowett's in many ways hugely impressive book Film – The Democratic Art407), but on the 
contrary for the position  that the intersection between style and technology in film history is the 
aspect of film scholarship which is most dimly understood, and here the literature is still almost 
embarrassingly thin. The number of empirical histories of film style can, with little exaggeration, be 
counted on the fingers of one hand.408  
      Barry Salt, a pioneer of so called statistical mise-en-scène analysis, pays homage to Sarris 
and his art- and artist-centred approach, even while faulting it for being too impressionistic and too 
much the work of a critic: “The auteur theory is basically an evaluative theory having implicit 
subsidiary analytical and interpretive components that are only demonstrated in practice.”409 
This practice, however personal in complexion, was essential to film studies, and few have praised 
it so movingly as David Bordwell did from the perspective of 2001:  
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For those of us who learned so much from Sarris, there remains much to do. [...] “The auteurists,” Sarris 
remarked over thirty years ago, “are still fighting an uphill battle to make movie audiences conscious of style.” 
La lutte continue, as the French used to say.410 
 
All in all, Sarris succeeded extraordinarily well in his actually quite modest aim of leading us out of 
the forest and into the trees. His advice for film scholars is still sound and his claims for the theory 
he promulgated modest: 
 
The film scholar should see as much as possible and write about as much as possible. To avoid passing 
judgement on a film because of lack of sympathy is an act of intellectual arrogance. Nothing should be beneath 
criticism or contempt. I take the transcendental view of the role of the critic. He must aspire to totality even 
though he knows he will never attain it. The transcendental view disposes of the either/or tone of many 
opponents of the auteur theory. This tone suggests that the critic must make an irrevocable choice between the 
cinema of directors and the cinema of actors, or between a cinema of directors and a cinema of genres, or 
between a cinema of directors and the cinema of social themes and so on. The transcendental view of the 
auteur theory considers itself the first step rather than the last stop in the total history of the cinema. 
Eventually, we must talk about everything if there is enough time and space and printer's ink.411 
 
     We cannot really  blame Sarris' formulation of the auteur theory for having been too 
effective or for having obscured other aspects of film history. To blame him for all those auteur 
monographs that others have since written, which according to many do pass muster as film 
histories, is as absurd as blaming him for all those awful first-year term papers which ride on 
viciously circular premises: “I love Tim Burton's films so his films must be art. His films are art so 
he must be an artist/auteur.412” Auteur-centred studies was never meant by Sarris to be the last word 
on film scholarship, and there are indications that his views on it have evolved over the years. When 
he attended a conference in 1975, he noted about William Rothman’s exegesis on Hawksian 
symbolism: “I was very stimulated by Rothman's paper. It was audaciously and uncompromisingly 
auteurist in a way that I am not so much any more.”413 Few of us believe today  that uncovering 
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interior meaning is a condition or goal for film criticism, but without Sarris’s example, it is difficult 
to imagine that the current batch of film scholars grounded in historical methods would have had a 
tradition in film scholarship to modify or reject at all.  Film studies has its own traditions and its 
own internal history, and without the idea that popular films could be art and their directors artists, 
it is difficult to see where the hypothetical and counterfactual impulse for film history would have 
come from.   
 
So much for film history. It is time to wind down and take in the wider perspective of Sarris and 
Kael not only as film historians, but also to look at what, in the final analysis, is their true metier—
their works as critics and cultural commentators. 
      What, finally, is current today of the Kaelian gambit of playing art and trash against one 
another? Is the Sarrisian auteur theory still vital, or has it been much altered during  its journey from 
a novel countercultural interpretation to the status it enjoys today—a part of our common 
understanding so obvious that we barely reflect upon it? It is time for a few concluding remarks. In 
the conclusion, scholarly analysis will finally yield to journalism as I attempt to pass judgement,  
from my own personal standpoint, on who is actually the best critic of our two protagonists, and 
address the outcome of Raymond J. Haberski's concept of “The duel for the soul of American film 
criticism”—which, after all, is repeated in the title of the thesis. 
 
Final Thoughts 
  True to the spirit of the work of the two critics that this thesis has been an attempt to shed 
light on, elucidation must at this point succumb to something resembling a final evaluation. I can no 
longer dodge the persistent question which has been implicit throughout my text: Who won the 
battle for the soul of American film criticism? The answer, though multifaceted and longwinded, 
probably cannot help but disappoint some  readers. I offer an answer somewhat  tempered with 
reservations and qualifications. 
      First of all, the very question might be seen as journalistically oversimplified and a bit 
tacked on, playing up as it does Sarris's and Kael's original feud over the auteur theory while 
neglecting other aspects of their criticism. When a study encompasses more or less their whole 
body of work and attempts to give a full comparative picture of their collected writings, as I have 
done, it is tempting to quote Sarris: “I am grateful to film for allowing me to focus my intellectual 
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insights and worldviews within a manageable frame. I believe that the subject of film is larger than 
any one critic or indeed the entire corps of critics.”414 
  Sarris's formulation could be construed as a rejection of Haberski Jr's idea that American 
film criticism in fact had a soul to be won by the critic who was most cogent, timely, perceptive or 
whatever. Although perhaps essentially true, there is still a case to be made for the odd mixture of 
subversion of taste and cultural gravitas provided by fountainheads of film culture beginning in the 
mid-twentieth century, when film seemed not only the liveliest art, but the most aesthetically  
exciting and culturally relevant as well.  
    Few commentators are as sympathetic to both Sarris and Kael as I am, and  regarding the 
question I  first posed with reckless rhetorical bluster at the end of the last chapter,  I must admit 
that it is tempting to hedge my bets. However prudent, this course of action  would feel like copping 
out. I will, however, attempt to answer the question in two different ways.  Empirically, in terms of 
who won the battle over film studies per se, there can be little who's impact and influence has been 
the greatest. As Emanuel Levy pointed  out in 2001: “[T]hose claiming that ”auteurism is dead” 
may actually mean that, as a critical method, it is so absorbed in our consciousness and so integral 
to our movie culture that there is no need anymore to fight for it. The battle over auteurism is long 
over and the winner is...Andrew Sarris.415”   
 Quite ironically, Sarris came out on top and  eventually emerged victorious out of the 
“Circles and Squares”- debate in the long run, even if “Circles and Squares” is a much stronger 
piece of writing than “Notes on the Auteur Theory in 1962.” However, this  is actually just one way 
to see this issue,  from a viewpoint, moreover, which is quite limited. The output of works in film 
scholarship by the university presses since the start of the 1970s may have vindicated Sarris as a 
film scholar416, but we may still make the case that Kael is the  better critic overall. This, in turn,  
depends on what you want to emphasise, and there are certain distinctly positive qualities in Kael's 
criticism which are less pronounced, if not quite absent  in Sarris's body of work.  
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Though Sarris's prose style is no less personal than Kael's, it is unquestionably more formal and 
measured. What Kael captured better than anyone was the excitement of 'going to the movies,' 
whereas Sarris's body of work is a near perfect illustration of the principle of  'films recollected.' 
No one can argue that Kael is as good a writer as anyone who have their attention to films. Even a 
Sarrisan like Kent Jones admits this much: 
 What is winning in Kael - moving, in fact, is the urgency of her need to communicate her emotional responses to films 
and, especially actors who made an immediate impact, in a correspondingly immediate style so breathlessly intoxicating 
that it haunts film criticism to this day. Her best pieces shimmer and throb like a Tommy James single. And that has 
always been the rub, for her and her devotees. Anything that smacked of premeditation or intellectual mediation, 
anything that moved in any other direction than towards the immediate,  was anathema.417  
When Kael used her powers of intellectual reflection, which were considerable,  she did so to 
debunk other writers. Her own aesthetic doctrine was  sensory, immediate and grounded in direct 
experience. But what a writer! But for the pull of movies, she probably would have been a novelist. 
I think she identified with  the “Lost Generation” authors who treated movies with a genuine if 
slightly ambivalent amusement, and I suspect she would have given up criticism to have written 
something like Beat the Devil (John Huston, 1953 - adapted by Truman Capote from James 
Helvick's novel.)The opening chapter of “Trash, Art, and the Movies” contains her most evocative 
writing and is a case in point. This piece seems to have been  modelled on the opening passages of 
John Dos Passos's U.S.A. There is enough in her criticism to suggest that she could have been a 
significant writer of fiction.  
 Sarris, on the other hand, mapped the cultural field of cinema by systematizing his 
impressions and intuitions in a way that was indispensible for nascent film scholarship: 
 
The auteur theory was [...] never any theory at all, but rather a collection of facts, a reminder of movies to be 
resurrected, of genres to be redeemed, of directors to be discovered. To sum up, montage, the double imagery 
of documentary and fiction, the use of fables to express feelings, the sheltering cultural inferiority complex of 
the medium, the industrial organization of movie-making and the contrasting demands of repetition and 
variation combined to create a situation in which movies managed to break the most sacred rules of art, and the 
first became last, and the last became first.418  
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 Sarris was one of the first to probe these relationships, but that is not why I think he was a better 
critic. Kael settled into dogmas too quickly and made a cult out of seeing films only once, as if they 
by definition do not bear close scrutiny. Sarris, on the other hand, very famously reversed his 
judgement on 2001: A Space Odyssey with a candour and humility that Kael could never muster. In 
The American Cinema, Sarris had written off Kubrick's film: “Ultimately, Stanley Kubrick shares 
with Claude Lelouch a naive faith in the power of images to transcend fuzzy feelings and vague 
ideas. The ending of 2001 qualifies in its oblique obscurity as instant Ingmar.”419 Three years later, 
he was persuaded to revisit this most prestigious of head movies under other circumstances: 
 
I must report that I recently paid another visit to Stanley Kubrick's 2001 while under the influence of a smoked 
substance that I was assured by my contact was somewhat stronger and more authentic than oregano on a King 
Sano [cigarette brand] base. (For myself, I must confess that I soar infinitely higher on vermouth cassis, but 
enough of this generation rap.) Anyway, I prepared to watch 2001under what I have always been assured were 
optimum conditions, and surprisingly (for me) I find myself reversing my original opinion. [...] However, I 
don't think 2001 is exclusively or even especially a head movie (and I speak now with the halting voice of 
authority). [...]  I am still dissatisfied by the open-ended abstractness of the allegory, not to mention the 
relatively conventional sojourn into psychedelia. Nonetheless, 2001 now works for me as Kubrick's parable of 
a future toward which metaphysical dread and mordant amusement tip-toe side by side.420 
 
That I think Sarris was right the first time is in a sense irrelevant. He has always been willing to 
revisit, rethink and reformulate. It is almost as if Kael saw this trait as pedantry, or even a sign of 
intellectual weakness. Thus, there is probably a  hard core of truth to David Thomson's charge that 
her breathlessly vivacious prose and headlong flight from one topic to the next tends to discourage 
reflection.421 She did not grapple with Andrei Tarkovsky or the later films of Robert Bresson, for 
instance. I think a lack of faith in reflection is evident in her famous statement from “Trash, Art, 
and the Movies”: “Responsibility to pay attention and appreciate is anti-art, it makes us too anxious 
for pleasure, too bored for response.”422  The question is whether younger American filmmakers 
with an auteurist view of themselves took Kael at her word, and contributed to the development of 
movies with her extolled excitement and sensation over sense and thought?423 
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For all the respect afforded to Robert Altman and Martin Scorsese, the most influential 
figure to emerge in the sixties and seventies was Steven Spielberg, even if his desire to be seen as a 
Mensch later in his career displeased Kael and still makes young film students mock him. At a 
young age, his grip on the visceral aspects of filmmaking was uncanny and his eye innovative, 
while his views on film have always been that of a studio head who thrives on consensus and 
enormous audience responses. Kael wrote admiringly of his first big hit and his first truly 
characteristic theatrical feature: “There are parts of Jaws (1975) that suggest what Eisenstein might 
have done if he hadn't intellectualized himself out of reach.”424 Spielberg has been one of the 
pioneers who have taken film beyond film, exploring the technological boundaries of movie-
making rather than thematic boundaries. His use of special effecrs, notably digital compositing and 
CGI has led the way in Hollywood, and has made the basis for mise-en-scène criticism that 
underscores the auteur theory a murkier proposition than when Sarris first formulated his theory. 
The kind of filmmaking process that occurs on the set and under the director's control that Truffaut 
valorised in Day for Night (1973) is no longer current, least of all in Hollywood.  
What Sarris  rightly thought was  obvious in 1970 is  much less so now:  
The extent  to which actors (documentary) not only interpret but augment characters (fiction) gives the screen a 
double aesthetic image. The inescapable realism of the documentary image restricts the scope and stature of the 
fictional image425 
There is much  yet been written about how this side of  the digital revolution impacts on 
screen acting: As John Baxter remarks: “To talk about 'performance' in movies at the beginning of 
the twenty-first century is to discuss an art as fossilised as Egyptian wall-painting.426”  
 
The basic ideas of auteurism and style are still hard to dismiss as critical tools, however. 
Writing about one of Spielberg's first attempts at prestigious filmmaking, Empire of the Sun (1987), 
John Baxter has noted:  
 
Style is more than a suit of clothes; it embodies decades of experience. Spielberg's influences run through 
Empire as the name “Brighton” runs through a stick of rock. Break it anywhere and there's the mark of a comic 
book in the emphatic low-angle splash in a puddle, or the influence of Hollywood classics in a crane shot over 
a crowd of refugees that recalls both Gone with the Wind and Lawrence of Arabia. To have become a different 
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filmmaker, Spielberg would have needed to go back to his childhood and not seen The Greatest Show on 
Earth, Captains Courageous and Bambi.427  
 
   It has become more important than ever to consider and raise questions about the importance 
of cultural influence on even the most dexterous and dazzling artist or showman, at a time when 
filmmakers (especially in Hollywood) are often accused of knowing too much about movies and too 
little about everything else. But Baxter's perspective on Spielberg does not really address how 
quickly auteurism moved from vanguard critical strategy to a kind of co-opted marketing strategy. 
The writing was on the wall by 1970, when Joseph Gelmis published an anthology of interviews 
entitled The  Film Director as Superstar.428 No film scholar has discussed the subsequent commerce 
of auteurism as incisively as Timothy Corrigan: 
  
The idea of the auteur-star may appear merely to hark back to earlier avatars of auteurism who were placed in 
certain aesthetic and intellectual pantheons; from Orson Welles to Robert Bresson, the celebrity of the auteur 
was the product of a certain textual distinction. As generally consistent as that tradition of the textual auteur is, 
more recent versions of the auteurist positions have swerved away from its textual center. In line with the 
marketing transformation of the international art cinema that defined the film artist in the seventies, auteurs 
have become increasingly situated along an extratextual path in which their commercial status as auteurs is 
their chief function as auteurs. The auteur star is meaningful primarily as a promotion or recovery of a movie 
or a group of movies, frequently regardless of the filmic text itself.429 
 
This has obviously less to do with how movies are studied than how they are consumed, but in the 
multiplex and in the art house, the economic legacy of auteurism is Cashiers du Cinema. 
   It was Kael who clearly wanted to be seen as the American populist among film critics, but 
it was Sarris who caught the popular imagination. Kael fought for the immediate, unpretentious 
pleasures of the movies, because the movies had so much more to offer than simply great art, a level 
of achievement she felt movies, even the best of them, rarely attained.                 
          When she insisted that most movies we enjoy are not works of art, she felt she was protecting 
that concept as a term of value or quality. In truth, film was one of the last cultural areas where the 
concept of art as a term of value orientation and the canon  had any subversive meaning. During the 
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sixties, the practice of art history, for example, moved decisively towards visual culture, with much 
less emphasis on the canon and questions of artistic value. (In art history proper, the sixties saw the 
arrival of so-called post-painterly abstraction, an indication that painting had become so stripped 
bare that it simply self-destructed, or perhaps imploded is a better word.)  
Value remained the core of Kael's views on art, and she no doubt felt she defended her 
position on behalf of something important: “It's preposterously egocentric to call everything we 
enjoy art—as if we could not be entertained by it if it were not; it's just as preposterous to let 
prestigious, expensive advertising snow us into thinking we're getting art for our money when we 
haven't even had a good time.430”   
              There is a tenor in Kael's writing which seems to underline just how the aesthetic, sensory 
aspects of films can be more overwhelming than simply artistic or stylistic ones; there is something 
in film art (as opposed to other art) that is purely emotional and goes beyond the detached aesthetic 
attitude we often take in relation to traditional and high modern art. In the preface of her last 
collection, she noted: 
  
An avidity for more is built into the love of movies. Something else is built in: You have to be open to the idea 
of getting drunk on movies. (Being able to talk about movies with someone – to share the giddy high 
excitement you feel – is enough for a friendship.)  Our emotions rise to meet the force coming from the screen 
– and they go on rising throughout our movie-going lives. When this happens in a popular art form – when it's 
an art experience that we discover for ourselves – it is sometimes disparaged as fannishness. But there is 
something there that goes deeper than connoisseurship or taste. It's a fusion of art and love.431 
 
This almost seems like an auteurist credo. After all, fannish binging on favourite directors in the 
way earlier generations of more or less bright minds had binged on their favourite writers seems to 
be the most lasting impact of auteur criticism on the young and impressionable film students on 
campuses the world over, even if the actually tangible material of what is published by the 
university presses is a more visible and more academically legitimate legacy inherited from the 
auteurists who transcended the obscure magazines in which they were first promulgated and entered 
academia. It was this idea inherent in auteurism which became the most useful. Kael's ideas about 
the subversive elements of trash in art today finds a major outlet in the very safe and cozy films of 
John Waters, whose films show how quickly an aesthetics of trash merged with camp, which was 
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certainly not Kael's intention. More than an aesthetic doctrine, the fruitful interplay between trash 
and art seems to have arisen out of a need to rationalize an intellectual guilt. Andrew Sarris is spot 
on when he speaks of a “quaint reconciliation of what [Kael] can enjoy viscerally with what she can 
endorse cerebrally.”432 In the early sixties, the study of film took off because of critics who took in 
what was on the screen and relayed their enthusiasm. Though no card-carrying auteurist, Kael was 
in a very similar position from the outset and relied on similar strategies. In 1973, Sarris actually 
attributed to Kael what he must consider the by and large positive, if theoretically neutral, virtues of 
his own criticism: “[Kael is] screen-oriented, [...] concerned to the brink of hysteria [and] more 
readable than literate.”433 
  Studio executives feared Kael in the seventies, but Sarris's influence on the American film 
has arguably been greater, if less direct, because of the impact of the auteur theory as sketched 
above. This is a fact he regards with mixed feelings, feelings that also disclose that he did not share 
Kael's high (some would say panegyric) regard for New Hollywood Cinema, which today has 
become ingrained as the most persistent interpretive cliché in film current historical scholarship434: 
 
Now I do think a great many directors became self-indulgent during this period and I think that they're 
oversimplifying their power. There was a whole drug culture in the sixties and seventies and a lot of these 
directors just went completely crazy. They didn't accept any limits of any kind. Perhaps that's why the films of 
the thirties and forties are considered classics, because they were filmed in a rather controlled environment. 
When you look at the great books of literature, how many of them were done in a society that was rather 
constrained? Is War and Peace less of a novel because Tolstoy could not indulge in full frontal nudity? I mean, 
come on! You know, people are babbling. There is a lot of licentious babbling going on in the name of free 
expression, and it has nothing to do with anything else. And I am certainly am not going to say that all this 
auteuristic fervour and ferment, of which I was a part, was designed for the greater glory of Michael Cimino, 
Martin Scorsese,  Francis Coppola, Peter Bogdanovich or any of the directors working during that period.435   
 
Sarris may not quite have seen the range of his auteurist polemic and Kael could not escape its basic 
proposition, even if she tried to modify it on non-analytic terms and reject its excesses. For all her 
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resistance against the academic appreciation of film and suspicion of high culture, the final proof 
that Kael had entered the mainstream of interpretive practices on film came at the end of her career 
when the Walker Art Center published a selection of her reviews in connection with a retrospective 
of the films of Jonathan Demme.436 Kael had herself, in effect, if not intention, not only entered 
high culture but written a belated study of a director, twenty-two years after the Museum of Modern 
Art had published Sarris's first book, The Films of Josef Von Sternberg.  Consider the last time you 
read a monograph on a director, and it will dawn on you that the achievements of the auteur critics 
are not minor. Before the Cahiers writers, there were no book-length studies on Alfred Hitchcock, 
and today it is difficult to imagine that there is anything new left to be said about him or his films. 
The vast amount of literature on Hitchcock is arguably the clearest indication that auteurism 
prompted discovery, and, perhaps, over-discovery. 
  The reasons that Sarris and Kael broke through and spoke to so many interested in film must 
be at least partly explained by referring to their own fervour and intelligence. The zeitgeist of their 
formative period may have been informed with a respectability for film culture largely because the 
other arts seemed historically and conceptually exhausted and done to death,437 but just as not every 
film is equally good or aesthetically worthwhile, nor is every critic equally important or interesting. 
A critic may have more or less favourable conditions, but a lot still depends on the critic. 
     According to film scholar Ernest Callenbach, who was the editor of Film Quarterly at the 
time “Circles and Squares” was first published, neither Kael nor Sarris had a real theoretical bone in 
their bodies.438 But ideas can rarely transcend the words which are used to express them, and Sarris 
and Kael were thankfully much better and consistent writers than theorists. They succeeded better 
than most in establishing an aesthetic discourse on film. As journalists, they also performed what 
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can be regarded as the primary task of the modern American intellectual. For once, Camille Paglia 
is measured and reasonable: “The American intellectual should mediate between academe and 
media, the past and the present. Language should be lucid, concrete, direct with the brash candor of 
the American people and the brusque can-do rhythms of American life.”439 Sarris may have 
attempted to graft vestiges of French intellectualism on American pragmatism, but he was always 
his own man, quite apart from the official Cahiers-line.  In Paglia's formulation, we see not only 
Pauline Kael's unacknowledged influence, but also an amplification of Kael's excesses.  
 Sarris and Kael's preferred subject was American film and its relationship with a more self-
conscious and self-declared artiness of European film culture. Their conclusion was that the former 
was not necessarily less artistically valuable than the latter. Furthermore, they agreed that the 
particular greatness of the best American movies is unlike anything found elsewhere.  
Here is Kael: 
 
If debased art is kitsch, perhaps kitsch may be redeemed by honest vulgarity, may become art. Our best movies 
transform kitsch and make art out of it; that is the peculiar greatness and strength of American movies. [...] 
There is more energy, more originality, more excitement, more art in American kitsch like Gunga Din, Easy 
Living, the Rogers and Astaire pictures like Swing Time and Top Hat, in Strangers on a Train, His Girl Friday, 
The Crimson Pirate, To Have and Have Not, The African Queen, Singin' in the Rain, Sweet Smell of Success, 
or more recently, The Hustler, Lolita, The Manchurian Candidate, Hud, Charade, than in the presumed High 
Culture of Hiroshima Mon Amour, Marienbad, La Notte, The Eclipse and the Torre Nilsson pictures.440  
 
We may agree or disagree with Kael's blast against art films, but what is really worth noting is the 
argument that kitsch is debased art and art is kitsch transformed. This is a perversion of the high-
toned ideas that were always inherent in Clement Greenberg's criticism, but there is something 
absurd about the argument: since film art is kitsch redeemed, she seems to say equally that art 
without the elements of kitsch is not art. Entertainment need not be art, but art must also by 
definition be entertainment; otherwise it is a chore. It is an idea that may still work in film criticism, 
but it is arguably less useful in the others areas of culture, at least if entertainment is to have any 
common-sense meaning as something distinct from mere entertainment. This has a bearing on 
current film culture. While the films of Kurosawa, Bergman, Antonioni and Fellini played to  
relatively  large and respectful audiences during the heyday of film culture, the only foreign auteur 
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that has a rather large and consistent following outside the festival circuit today is arguably Pedro 
Almòdovar, whose roots are squarely in popular filmmaking and popular art. Kael sums him up 
thus:  
 He absorbed the avant-garde slapstick of the   sixties and the seventies along with Hollywood's frivolous and romantic 
pop, and all this merged with the legacy of Bunũel and his own intuitive acceptance of loco impulses. Generalissimo 
Franco kept the lid on for thirty-six years; he died in 1975, and Pedro Almòdovar is part of what jumped  out the box. 
The most original pop writer- director of the eighties, he's Godard with a human face – a happy face.441  
That Kael enjoyed and understood Almòdovar is almost self-evident a priori, but I cannot help 
wondering whether or not  she would have dismissed or embraced  a ravishing and often difficult 
sensualist like Claire Denis who has not reached the audiences she clearly deserves. 
   Andrew Sarris, the critic Kael accused of turning trash into art, has, if anything, been more 
measured than Kael about the status of the commercial (American) film as opposed to the art film. 
As early as 1973, he wrote: 
 
As film scholarship becomes more sophisticated, the facile distinctions between so-called “art films” and so-
called “commercial films” become less and less meaningful. Out of the sifting and winnowing emerges a new 
division of “art” and commercial films on one side and bad “art” and “commercial” films on the other. Not 
only do art and commerce intersect, they seem intertwined in the muddled processes of filmmaking. Even art 
films have to make money, and even commercial films have to make some statement. To put it in another way, 
more and more critics are demanding more fun in art, and more art in fun. The post-Marxist pop and camp 
movements have perhaps overreacted to the socially conscious solemnity of the past, but the increasing 
scepticism about mere good intentions is a healthy sign of higher standards. Unfortunately, the pendulum has 
swung from the extreme of sobriety to the extreme of silliness. Suddenly every director is entitled to equal time 
on the American critical scene in which critics are compelled to abandon many of their cherished prejudices 
and snobberies.442    
 
Kael died in 2001 and her last pieces of criticism were written nearly twenty years ago.  She was a 
great writer, but few people are more difficult to sentimentalize; according to David Thomson, she 
was “a terrific journalist who took enormous pains to seem spontaneous, who believed that it ought 
to be possible to write about entertainments in a way that made them more stimulating for 
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thousands of people. [...] She was obstinately anti-auteurist because she fell into a stupid New York 
feud with Andrew Sarris (and because he'd made that key point [of authorship] first).”443  
       Kael fought for popular movies and soon discovered the benefits of being popular, but it is 
hypocritical to scorn critics for wanting to be popular when we consider how much tactical 
positioning takes place in academia. Still, she held court, and was depressed by all those lonely 
moviegoers who are drawn to film out of a naked need for reassurance and comfort, whereas Sarris 
intended The American Cinema for those perennial cinephiles, the solitary moviegoers.444 Sarris is 
still active, and film scholars have sometimes taken it upon themselves to be nostalgic and 
sentimental on his behalf. David Bordwell writes: “As for auteurism, everybody knows the word, 
but when Oliver Stone and Quentin Tarantino are pressed upon us as having a vision of the world, 
we can only recall Sarris's melancholy speculation from 1968: ‘In ten years or less there may be no 
American cinema of great artistic significance.’”445 
 
In this instance, Bordwell the scholar is more sentimental than Sarris the critic, who does not 
believe in golden ages, but rather believes, like one of his favourite subjects, John Ford, in the 
benign drift of (film) history.446 Quizzed about the state of film culture in 1991, Sarris said: 
  
The so-called Golden Age of the forties was a period when Orson Welles and Preston Sturges were driven out 
of the industry. What's so golden about that? I mean, they keep talking about hype, hype, hype. But that's 
journalism. Journalism has to constantly fuel the alarm, the apocalypse, whatever. Look, I think there are as 
many good films now as there have ever been, and I know this because I don't have time to see everything I 
want to see. And that doesn't even count the retrospectives I want to catch up with. So I don't know what 
everybody's yapping about.447 
 
George Hickenlooper, the interviewer on this instance, went on to pose the nagging question that is 
eating away at many current film scholars concerned with film as a popular art: 
 
Hickenlooper: Well, why isn't there as much argument or fervor as there was? 
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Sarris: Because we are all much smugger. We all play by many of the same rules, whereas both Pauline and I 
were outsiders. And were really sort of screwballs.448  
 
So, the film culture in the latter half of the 20th century depended on a confluence of various events: 
the impasse in the traditional arts, television, archival facilities for old films and an academically 
virginal territory, there for the taking. There are more good writers on film today than there have 
ever been, but just because more visual artists graduate from American universities each year than 
there were inhabitants of 15th century Florence does not mean that the quality of fine arts produced 
today is aesthetically better or even more inventive than the art of the Renaissance. What is beyond 
question is that  art today is less relevant and lasting, and intentionally so.  
     Still, there is enough of the methodological individualist in my makeup to recognize that the 
single critics do matter. We would have had the auteur theory in some form without Sarris's input, 
just as the value of trashiness that Kael argued for was a sign of the times in the sixties. 
 This takes nothing away from the fact that Sarris and Kael were witty, engaged and vital 
writers who caught the pulse of the medium at the time when the movies seemed most vital. The 
question as to whether or not the average movie is worse now than it was then is impossible to 
answer because we can never agree on the terms of discussion. Video may have killed both the 
radio star and a certain kind of film culture, but as Sarris observed in 1998: “Happily, these are the 
best of times, technologically speaking, to catch up with old movie classics clustered around their 
directors, writers, actors, cinematographers, set designers, and all the other artists and technicians 
involved in what is still liveliest art of them all.”449  
Film as film may be dead—but whatever the future holds remains to seen. 
 
Conclusion – What Has Been Done? 
The preceding chapters constitute an attempt to chart, in essayistic form, the contexts as well as the 
aesthetic ideas and underlying tastes of Andrew Sarris and Pauline Kael. I have openly claimed that 
they are the most important film critics in American history. As such, I have placed them in a 
precarious but important position as mediators between journalism and academic film writing and 
demonstrated their importance as both critical essayists and aesthetic film historians. The large 
general chapter on criticism is made up of a critical discussion of their general ideas that are of 
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permanent value to criticism as such in a metaperspective, with emphasis on the nature of value 
judgements and how these can yield systematic knowledge. The debate stemming from Sarris's  
“Notes on the Auteur Theory 1962” and Kael's subsequent attack, “Circles and Squares”, has been 
afforded ample space as the most important polemical debate carried out by journalistic critics.  
Secondly, there is a historical side to the issue, and their positions in history and their positions as 
historians have been described and evaluated in some detail. I could have included a paragraph on 
the development of structural auteurism in the sixties. I chose not to, because this has had no impact 
or influence whatsoever on Sarris's criticism. 
        The argument could be made that structural auteurism is theoretically more advanced and 
ought to have been discussed in a thesis that affords so much space to the auteur theory, but Sarris 
never attempted to explicate themes in binary opposites. In the words of David Bordwell, Sarris 
always preferred to observe cinematic style through thematic clusters,450 something which obviously 
afforded a more flowing prose. Furthermore, it is the vanguard oppositional fandom of stylistic 
auteurism that still survives in film studies and as a cultural strategy among fans. Sarris's method has 
in recent years been applied to European exploitation directors like Mario Bava and Lucio Fulci by 
discerning horror buffs, while structural auteurism is a dead relic of the Marxist-inflected film 
theory of the seventies.  Pertaining to this, I cannot  really see the relevance or feel the impact of the 
sustained argument made by Graeme Turner that the auteur theory belongs in a discussion about the 
decline of [film] aesthetics.451 (It was obviously rather a beginning of film aesthetics with a strong 
historical element.) This is  nevertheless a  common enough complaint among those who (like 
Turner) are grounded in cultural studies, but it is difficult to discern even a semblance of an 
aesthetic remedy in the writings of those who clutter their readings of films with readymade and 
often quite spurious  ideology and jazzed up agit-prop arguments.   
 A similar complaint could be made against my discussion of Kael's trash/art interplay because I 
make no reference to the role of camp in that context. I can only point out that camp is a form of 
textually engaged, self-conscious audience-centred cultism in which Kael did not participate: 
“Perhaps movies came to fore in the sixties because, unlike books but like rock music, movies can 
be experienced tribally.”452  Tribalism in the enjoyment of movies were quite simply not her thing, 
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and I think she disdained that cultist trait and perceived it as a negative feature of the British Movie-
auteurists and the “right on” American students at university campuses.  
      Lastly, my analysis of Sarris and Kael as film historians could be faulted for an insufficient 
focus on various modes of non-aesthetic film history. I feel I can do no more than acknowledge 
their existence, as I have done, and present non-aesthetic film history merely as a foil to aesthetic 
film history. For the film historian as critic, aesthetic considerations, if not necessarily evaluative 
ones, take precedence over other aspects of film history, even from the wider metaperspective of 
historiography. The last chapter, “Final thoughts”, is intended (and hopefully understood) as the 
historical conclusion of this thesis, evaluating as it does contemporary film culture and the roles 
Sarris's and Kael's criticism continues to play. It is an attempt to grasp the tangible but elusive 
nachleben of their critical feud and its fallout.   
 If I have finally  made the case  that Sarris is the better critic, I must also point out that Sarris's body 
of work and Kael's body of work are necessary correlates which deepens and enrich one another; in 
many ways facets of the same tastes, priorities and approaches.  The conclusion to be drawn is that  
the actual duel itself  for the soul of American film criticism was  more important than its  outcome. 
Only two critics of genuine stature could embody the heated  battle for film culture, notwithstanding 
that Sarris could discern 'no overriding moral issues involved in the conflicting tastes of two movie-
reviewers'.453 With this, I want to say that the similarities between Andrew Sarris and Pauline Kael 
are greater than the differences, if not necessarily more important. The only thing left for me to do is 
quote Sarris and make his words my own: “At this climactic moment of self-revelation, all I can do 
is to commend my critical soul to your mercy and understanding.”454
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